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Friday, March 13, 2009

MidCountryBank v. Krueger A08-534 Mortgage Record


A08-750 Joan M. Krieger, Respondent, vs. City of St. Paul, Appellant;
Dew Corporation, et al., Defendants, and City of St. Paul,
Third Party Plaintiff, vs. Dew Corporation, Third Party
Defendant.
Ramsey County District Court, Hon. Steven D. Wheeler.
For purposes of the trespasser-liability exception to recreational-use immunity, an inherently dangerous condition is not established where death or serious bodily harm might result only in particularly vulnerable users of recreational property.
Reversed and remanded. Judge Heidi S. Schellhas.

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A08-0750

Joan M. Krieger, Respondent, vs. City of St. Paul, Appellant, Dew Corporation, et al., Defendants, and City of St. Paul, Third Party Plaintiff, vs. Dew Corporation, Third Party Defendant.

Filed March 10, 2009

Reversed and remanded

Schellhas, Judge

Ramsey County District Court

File No. 62-C0-07-002337

Mark J. Fellman, Fellman Law Office, 400 Robert Street North, Suite 1740, St. Paul, MN 55101; and

Wilbur W. Fluegel (co-counsel), Fluegel Law Office, 150 South Fifth Street, Suite 3475, Minneapolis, MN 55402 (for respondent)

John J. Choi, St. Paul City Attorney, Lawrence J. Hayes, Jr., Assistant City Attorney, 750 City Hall and Courthouse, 15 West Kellogg Boulevard, St. Paul, MN 55102 (for appellant) 2

Considered and decided by Lansing, Presiding Judge; Kalitowski, Judge; and Schellhas, Judge.

S Y L L A B U S

For purposes of the trespasser-liability exception to recreational-use immunity, an inherently dangerous condition is not established where death or serious bodily harm might result only in particularly vulnerable users of recreational property.

O P I N I O N

SCHELLHAS, Judge

In this tort case, appellant City of St. Paul challenges the district court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment, arguing that it was protected by recreational-use immunity and that certain elements of the trespasser-liability exception to recreational-use immunity are not met in this case. We agree, and therefore reverse and remand for entry of summary judgment in favor of appellant.

FACTS

Respondent Joan M. Krieger alleged that she tripped on a gouge in a temporary walkway located at the North Dale Recreation Center, which was owned by appellant City of St. Paul (the city). The incident happened as Krieger left the recreation center at approximately 9:00 p.m., on March 3, 2004. In her answers to interrogatories, Krieger explained that there were no warning signs or markers indicating areas unsafe for walking, that the area was not illuminated by external lighting, and that she was unable to see that there was a gouge in the temporary surface. No pictures or descriptions of the 3

gouge are contained in the record. As the case progressed, claims against other parties were added and then dismissed. Only Krieger’s claim against the city remains.

The city asserted recreational-use immunity, official immunity, and statutory immunity as affirmative defenses, and twice moved the district court for summary judgment. The court denied both motions. This appeal follows.

ISSUE

Did the district court err in concluding that genuine issues of material fact exist about whether the sidewalk gouge was likely to cause death or serious bodily harm and whether the city had notice of a defect likely to cause death or serious bodily harm?

ANALYSIS

On appeal from summary judgment, we ask (1) whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and (2) whether the lower court erred in its application of the law. State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn. 1990). A genuine issue of material fact exists when reasonable persons can draw different conclusions from the evidence. DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 69 (Minn. 1997). "We review immunity issues de novo, without deference to the district court." Unzen v. City of Duluth, 683 N.W.2d 875, 878 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Oct. 27, 2004).

The city claims protection by recreational-use immunity under Minn. Stat. § 466.03, subd. 6e (2008). Though municipalities are generally liable for their torts, Minn. Stat. § 466.02 (2008), recreational-use immunity is an exception that protects municipalities from suit for some claims. The recreational-use-immunity statute provides immunity from: 4

Any claim based upon the construction, operation, or maintenance of any property owned or leased by the municipality that is intended or permitted to be used as a park, as an open area for recreational purposes, or for the provision of recreational services, or from any claim based on the clearing of land, removal of refuse, and creation of trails or paths without artificial surfaces, if the claim arises from a loss incurred by a user of park and recreation property or services.

Minn. Stat. § 466.03, subd. 6e. The statute also contains an exception: "Nothing in this subdivision limits the liability of a municipality for conduct that would entitle a trespasser to damages against a private person." Id.

Minnesota courts use the standard for liability to adult trespassers set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 335 (1965). Green-Glo Turf Farms, Inc. v. State, 347 N.W.2d 491, 494 (Minn. 1984). Section 335 imposes liability when a possessor of land (1) creates or maintains an artificial condition, (2) that the possessor knows is likely to cause death or serious bodily harm, (3) where the possessor has reason to believe that trespassers will not discover the condition, and (4) the possessor has failed to warn of the condition and the risk involved. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 335. A landowner is liable only for failing to warn of such dangers. Id. A plaintiff must establish all of the elements of the trespasser-liability exception to recreational-use immunity to defeat an immunity claim. Stiele ex rel. Gladieux v. City of Crystal, 646 N.W.2d 251, 255 (Minn. App. 2002).

The district court ruled that recreational-use immunity applied, that the trespasser-liability exception also applied, and that there were genuine issues of material fact on two elements of the trespasser-liability exception: (1) the existence of a defect likely to cause 5

death or serious bodily harm; and (2) notice of a defect likely to cause death or serious bodily harm. The city argues that Krieger has failed to establish that: (1) a defect existed; (2) any defect was a condition likely to cause death or serious bodily harm; (3) the city had actual notice of a defect likely to cause death or serious bodily harm; (4) the city maintained the walkway in a defective condition; and (5) the defect was concealed. The city also argues that it is entitled to official immunity and statutory immunity.

We conclude that Krieger has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defect was a condition likely to cause death or serious bodily harm and whether the city had actual notice of the defect. We decline to reach the city’s remaining claims of error.

The district court determined that genuine issues of material fact exist because it could not conclude that the sidewalk gouge was not likely to cause death or serious bodily harm as a matter of law "because the characteristics of the depression or defect in this case are in question." We disagree and conclude that under this court’s precedent, a gouge in a sidewalk, as a matter of law, is not an inherently dangerous condition likely to cause death or serious bodily harm.

This court concluded in Johnson v. State that a raised joint in a sidewalk was not a condition likely to cause death or serious bodily harm, 478 N.W.2d 769, 773 (Minn. App. 1991), review denied (Minn. Feb. 27, 1992), noting that conditions found to satisfy this element "generally have inherently dangerous propensities, such as a high voltage electrical wire." Id. We concluded that it is not enough that serious bodily harm might 6

result, stating that "[t]he remote possibility that death or serious bodily harm could result any time a person falls does not make a raised sidewalk joint rise to the level of an inherently dangerous condition." Id. The city argues that a gouge in a sidewalk is analogous to a raised sidewalk joint and that, like the raised sidewalk joint in Johnson, a gouge in the walkway is not an inherently dangerous condition likely to cause death or serious bodily harm. We agree.

Krieger argues that the city’s reliance on Johnson was unpersuasive before the district court because "the judges recognized that here we are dealing with some fairly aged users of the property." Krieger distinguishes her case from Johnson by emphasizing that in Johnson, the user of the recreational property was an "able-bodied adult female," and she is 78 years old. Krieger also argues, citing Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 199 N.W.2d 639 (1972), that "[t]he core concept of premises liability" is reasonable care under the circumstances and that the circumstances here, including the age of the entrants, show a risk of serious bodily injury. We reject these arguments.

Krieger points to no language, and we can find none, in the district court’s order reflecting that the district court’s reasoning was based on a conclusion that a risk of serious bodily injury existed in this case because the facility was used by a particularly vulnerable person. And Johnson does not stand for the proposition that the vulnerabilities of the injured party are relevant to the application of the elements of the trespasser-liability exception.

Krieger has provided no authority establishing that for purposes of the trespasser-liability exception, the dangerousness of a condition is evaluated by considering the 7

danger posed to particularly vulnerable users of recreational property. The authority cited by Krieger, Peterson, does not address the trespasser-liability exception. In Peterson, the supreme court abolished "the traditional distinctions governing licensees and invitees" in determining a landowner’s duty to entrants and held that the landowner owes a duty of reasonable care to licensees and invitees. 294 Minn. at 164, 173-74, 199 N.W.2d at 642, 647. The supreme court specifically declined to "rule on the question of a landowner’s duty toward trespassers." Id. at 164, 199 N.W.2d at 642. Because the duty at issue in this case is the duty owed to a trespasser, Peterson is not controlling. And we have found no authority establishing that a condition that might create a risk of death or serious bodily harm to particularly vulnerable users of recreational property constitutes an inherently dangerous condition for purposes of the trespasser-liability exception to recreational-use immunity. In the absence of contrary authority, we follow Johnson and conclude that a gouge in a sidewalk is not an inherently dangerous condition likely to cause death or serious bodily harm.

Because Krieger has not established that the gouge was a condition likely to cause death or serious bodily harm, she has failed to establish an element of the trespasser-liability exception to recreational-use immunity.

We need not address Krieger’s remaining claims of error, but we will address her argument that the city had notice of the condition of the sidewalk, that is, the gouge. Krieger relies entirely on a constructive-knowledge standard and concedes that her case fails if an actual-knowledge standard is applied. Actual knowledge is required. See Prokop v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 625, 754 N.W.2d 709, 715 (Minn. App. 2008) (ruling, 8

following most recent precedent on point, that actual knowledge is required). For this additional reason, we conclude that Krieger has failed to establish all the elements of the trespasser-liability exception to recreational-use immunity.

D E C I S I O N

Because (1) a gouge in a sidewalk is not an inherently dangerous condition likely to cause death or serious bodily harm and (2) the element of actual knowledge of the landowner is not met in this case, Krieger has failed to establish two elements of the trespasser-liability exception to recreational-use immunity. We decline to adopt respondent’s argument that for purposes of the trespasser-liability exception to recreational-use immunity, the dangerousness of a condition must be assessed by considering the danger to particularly vulnerable users of recreational property. Therefore, we conclude that the city is entitled to summary judgment.

Reversed and remanded.


A08-534 MidCountry Bank, f/k/a First Federal fsb, Appellant, vs.
Frederick C. Krueger, Respondent; Nancy Krueger,
Respondent; Cherolyn A. Hinshaw, et al., Respondents.
Scott County District Court, Hon. Rex D. Stacey.
A purchaser of real property is charged with constructive notice of the contents of a mortgage recorded in a county's grantor-grantee index and tract index.
Reversed. Judge Larry B. Stauber, Jr.

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A08-0534

MidCountry Bank, f/k/a First Federal fsb, Appellant, vs. Frederick C. Krueger, Respondent, Nancy Krueger, Respondent, Cherolyn A. Hinshaw, et al., Respondents.

Filed March 10, 2009

Reversed

Stauber, Judge

Scott County District Court

File No. 70CV0624231

Justin P. Weinberg, Charles W. Hanson, Gislason & Hunter LLP, 2700 South Broadway, P.O. Box 458, New Ulm, MN 56073-0458 (for appellant)

Frederick C. Krueger, 4420 Blakewood Drive, Shakopee, MN 55379-5826 (pro se respondent)

Nancy Krueger, 4420 Blakewood Drive, Shakopee, MN 55379-5826 (pro se respondent)

James M. Lockhart, Christopher R. Grote, Karla M. Vehrs, Lindquist & Vennum, P.L.L.P., 4200 IDS Center, 80 South Eighth Street, Minneapolis, MN 55402-2205 (for respondents Hinshaw and PHH Home Loans, LLC)

Considered and decided by Stauber, Presiding Judge; Kalitowski, Judge; and Shumaker, Judge. 2

S Y L L A B U S

A purchaser of real property is charged with constructive notice of the contents of a mortgage recorded in a county’s grantor-grantee index and tract index.

O P I N I O N

STAUBER, Judge

Appellant mortgage company challenges the district court’s summary judgment in favor of respondent purchaser and her lender, arguing that the court erred as a matter of law in finding that respondent was a bona fide purchaser because she was charged with constructive notice of appellant’s underlying priority mortgage interest in her property. Because respondent is charged with constructive notice of the mortgage that appeared in the county’s grantor-grantee index, we reverse.

FACTS

On March 21, 2000, James and Nancy Krueger purchased and acquired legal title to a parcel of land (the Hinshaw property). On May 13, 2004, they purchased two additional parcels of land (parcels 1 and 2) and simultaneously executed a mortgage securing both these parcels and the Hinshaw property in favor of appellant lender MidCountry Bank (MidCountry). On May 19, 2004, they delivered the warranty deed conveying parcels 1 and 2, and MidCountry’s mortgage securing parcels 1, 2, and the Hinshaw property to the Scott County Recorder for recording.

The Scott County Recorder’s office, as required by statute, maintains two indices: the historically primary grantor-grantee index, which indexes recorded real estate 3

documents by parties’ names; and the more recently required tract index, which indexes recorded real estate documents by legal description.

During the recording process of MidCountry’s mortgage, the Scott County Recorder neglected to index the legal description for the Hinshaw property as one of three parcels encumbered by the MidCountry mortgage on the tract index.1 The effect of this error was that the MidCountry mortgage did not appear in the tract index for the Hinshaw property. The MidCountry mortgage was, however, properly and timely recorded, and assigned document number A657036. The MidCountry mortgage was indexed in the Scott County grantor-grantee index in association with the Kruegers’ names as an encumbrance against parcels 1, 2, and the Hinshaw property. Thus, a search of the grantor-grantee index would reveal the document number of MidCountry’s mortgage (A657036), and upon viewing the mortgage document one would find that it encumbered the Hinshaw property.

1 Scott County engages in a practice it calls "cloning" when it indexes documents. Essentially, if two documents affecting one property are delivered to the recorder’s office, the county copies or "clones" the legal description from the first document to the second document so as to avoid typing the information into the system twice. Here, it appears that the Recorder erred in that it cloned the two newly acquired Krueger parcels from the warranty deed to the companion MidCountry mortgage, neglecting to observe that the companion mortgage encumbered three parcels, including the Hinshaw property.

In 2006, respondent Cherolyn Hinshaw sought to purchase the Hinshaw property from the Kruegers. Hinshaw hired Burnet Title, Inc., to examine the title to the Hinshaw property. Burnet Title, Inc.’s abstractor examined the Scott County tract index, and found no encumbrance indexed against the Hinshaw property. The abstractor admits that 4

she did not examine Scott County’s grantor-grantee index before closing on the Krueger to Hinshaw transaction.

On May 12, 2006, Hinshaw closed on her purchase of the Hinshaw property. The Kruegers delivered a warranty deed, and simultaneously Hinshaw executed a mortgage deed in favor of her lender PHH Home Loans LLC (PHH). On May 31, 2006, the Hinshaw deed and PHH mortgage were properly recorded with the Scott County Recorder, in both indices, as documents numbered A740490 and A740491, respectively. The underlying MidCountry mortgage was not satisfied at closing.

Some time thereafter the Kruegers stopped making their mortgage payments to MidCountry. In October 2006, MidCountry brought a judicial foreclosure action against the Kruegers, Hinshaw, and PHH. On October 18, 2006, MidCountry delivered a notice of lis pendens on the Hinshaw property to the Scott County Recorder for recording.

It appears that in late October 2006, Scott County corrected its records by indexing MidCountry’s mortgage in the tract index for the Hinshaw property. The mortgage foreclosure lis pendens was indexed in the Hinshaw tract index in March 2007.

MidCountry pursued its judicial foreclosure action in the Scott County District Court by a summons dated October 3, 2006, naming the Kruegers, Hinshaw, and PHH as defendants. The parties made cross-motions for summary judgment. MidCountry argued that it was entitled to summary judgment because, while its mortgage interest in the Hinshaw property did not appear in the Scott County tract index, it did appear in conjunction with the Kruegers’ names in the grantor-grantee index, which Hinshaw was obligated to search. MidCountry claimed that Hinshaw could not be a bona fide 5

purchaser because she was charged with constructive notice of the contents of the documents recorded in both indices. Hinshaw and PHH argued that MidCountry’s mortgage was not properly recorded because it did not appear as an encumbrance in Scott County’s tract index until October 2006; therefore, Hinshaw did not have constructive notice at the time she purchased the Hinshaw property in May 2006. Hinshaw claimed she was a bona fide purchaser, against whom MidCountry’s mortgage interest was void.

The district court found that MidCountry’s prior mortgage was not properly recorded because the tract index searches did not reveal that it encumbered the Hinshaw property. The court held that the date, time stamp, and recording document number on the MidCountry mortgage were not evidence that it was properly recorded. Thus Hinshaw and PHH, who recorded their interests in the Hinshaw property in May 2006, could not be charged with actual, implied, or constructive notice of MidCountry’s mortgage, and were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. MidCountry brought this appeal.

ISSUES

I. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment to Hinshaw on the basis that she was a bona fide purchaser?

II. Did the district court err in failing to grant summary judgment to MidCountry on the basis that its prior mortgage was properly recorded?

ANALYSIS I.

MidCountry contends that the district court erred in granting Hinshaw summary judgment and ruling that she was a bona fide purchaser. "On an appeal from summary 6

judgment, we ask two questions: (1) whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and (2) whether the [district] court[] erred in [its] application of the law." State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn. 1990). Here, the factual issues are not in dispute and the only question we must decide is whether the district court erred as a matter of law. A reviewing court is not bound by and need not give deference to a district court’s decision on a purely legal issue. Modrow v. JP Foodservice, Inc., 656 N.W.2d 389, 393 (Minn. 2003).

The Minnesota Recording Act protects the property interests of purchasers of property who purchase in good faith, for valuable consideration, and who properly record their interests:

Every conveyance of real estate shall be recorded in the office of the county recorder of the county where such real estate is situated; and every such conveyance not so recorded shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser in good faith and for a valuable consideration of the same real estate, or any part thereof, whose conveyance is first duly recorded, and as against any attachment levied thereon or any judgment lawfully obtained at the suit of any party against the person in whose name the title to such land appears of record prior to the recording of such conveyance.

Minn. Stat. § 507.34 (2008). A "bona fide purchaser," against whom a prior conveyance is void, must purchase his or her interest in property "in good faith and for a valuable consideration . . . without actual, implied, or constructive notice of inconsistent outstanding rights of others." Anderson v. Graham Inv. Co., 263 N.W.2d 382, 384 (Minn. 1978) (quotation omitted). 7

Historically, real estate records were maintained in a grantor-grantee index allowing title examiners to follow the "chain of title" from one owner to the next. Other related indices allowed examiners to similarly trace real estate mortgages. These have now been generally consolidated in the grantor-grantee index. Minn. Stat. § 386.03 (2008). Some counties also maintained a tract index, but it was not until 2005 that the legislature amended section 386.05 to mandate that a county recorder "procure . . . and keep in the office of the county recorder suitable books or electronic media . . . to allow information to be . . . retrieved by the [legal] description of each [parcel of land] . . . and recite . . . the recorded document number . . . . Such tract index shall be kept as one of the records in the office." 2005 Minn. Laws ch. 4, § 75, at 40 (emphasis added) (now codified at Minn. Stat. § 386.05 (2008)).

The result is that Minnesota statutes, since 2005, require county recorders to maintain two recording indices, the historically primary grantor-grantee index and the newly required tract index. Although electronic recording systems now permit a recorded document to be simultaneously indexed in both indices, it is still possible that the indexer could, as here, err such that the document is indexed in only one of the statutorily-required indices. The Scott County Recorder’s indexing error, using the cloning shortcut, occurred because the indexer neglected to read the entire legal description recited in the text (page 3) of MidCountry’s mortgage. This resulted in the mortgage not being indexed in the required tract index.

The burden of proving bona-fide-purchaser status is on the party seeking to show that he or she is a bona fide purchaser. Miller v. Hennen, 438 N.W.2d 366, 369 (Minn. 8

1989). The parties agree that Hinshaw purchased the property for valuable consideration and recorded her interest. It remained Hinshaw’s burden to show that she had no actual, implied, or constructive notice of MidCountry’s mortgage interest in the Hinshaw property. MidCountry asserts that Hinshaw had constructive notice of its outstanding interest in the Hinshaw property, and so its priority mortgage is valid against her.

"Constructive notice is a creature of statute and, as a matter of law, imputes notice to all purchasers of any properly recorded instrument even though the purchaser has no actual notice of the record." Miller, 438 N.W.2d at 369–70. "The purpose of the record is to give notice of the existence and contents of the instrument recorded . . . ." Thorwarth v. Armstrong, 20 Minn. 464, 467 (1874). MidCountry claims that Hinshaw is charged with constructive notice of its mortgage interest in the Hinshaw property because its mortgage was properly recorded, and appeared in the Scott County Recorder’s grantor-grantee index effective May 19, 2004. A purchaser is charged as a matter of law with constructive notice of any "properly recorded" instrument. Minn. Stat. § 507.32 (2008). We believe that MidCountry’s mortgage was properly recorded.

The MidCountry mortgage was delivered for recording to the Scott County Recorder’s office on May 19, 2004. The mortgage was given the document number A657036, and was stamped "Office of the County Recorder, Scott County, Minnesota, Certified Filed and/or Recorded on 05-19-2004 at 02:15 . . . . Pat Boeckman, County Recorder." Section 386.41 (2008) provides that an instrument is properly recorded if the document bears the certificate of the county recorder: 9

Every county recorder shall endorse upon each instrument recorded, over the recorder’s official signature, OFFICE OF THE COUNTY RECORDER, . . . COUNTY, MINNESOTA, CERTIFIED, FILED, AND/OR RECORDED ON, the date and time when it was recorded and the document number and/or book and page in which it was recorded; every instrument shall be considered as recorded at the time so noted.

(Emphasis added). The MidCountry mortgage satisfied these requirements.

The Scott County Recorder admits that it erroneously indexed the MidCountry mortgage by only "cloning" the legal descriptions for parcels 1 and 2 to the tract index, while entirely omitting the Hinshaw property. Thus, the mortgage did not appear in the tract index for the Hinshaw property when that index was searched preliminary to Hinshaw’s closing. However, this does not mean that the mortgage was improperly recorded. The MidCountry mortgage bore the recording certificate and information required by Minn. Stat. § 386.41. The certificate of recording is presumptive proof that the document was properly recorded. See Thomas v. Hanson, 59 Minn. 274, 279–80 61 N.W. 135, 136–37 (1894) (holding that the recorder’s certificate is sufficient evidence that document was recorded without proof of the appointment or election of the recorder). Further, the Scott County Recorder admits that MidCountry’s mortgage appeared in the grantor-grantee index as of May 2006. Absent some evidence that the contents of the MidCountry mortgage did not include the Hinshaw property, we conclude that MidCountry’s mortgage was properly recorded. 10

Next we must determine whether the MidCountry mortgage, as recorded and indexed, charged Hinshaw with constructive notice that it encumbered the Hinshaw property. Typically, when a purchaser applies for a real estate mortgage, the mortgagee will require an up-to-date abstract or similar indicia of title marketability. 6A Steven J. Kirsch & Robert Beutel, Minnesota Practice § 44.2 (3d ed. 1990). Real estate title searches are done by licensed abstracters, who build or extend formal abstracts by tracing the various indices down to the current date.

The purpose of an abstract of title is to afford a prospective purchaser or mortgagee of land a simplified and convenient method of ascertaining the condition of the title and the land without having to make a painstaking search of all of these various records, or a portable index from which he or his attorney may make the search.

Id. at § 44.1 (3d ed. 1990). The resulting abstract would show the "chain of title," including encumbrances and other relevant recorded documents. An attorney would examine the updated abstract and render a written opinion of title to the prospective buyer or lender. The title opinion would recite not only ownership of the property, but recorded encumbrances as well.

Prior to closing on her purchase of the Hinshaw property, Hinshaw hired an abstracter to conduct a title search. Unfortunately, the abstracter, using an electronic system for searching land title records, searched only the tract index and not the grantor-grantee index. This abbreviated search did not indicate MidCountry’s recorded mortgage indexed in the Scott County tract index. Additionally, the Kruegers apparently did not 11

disclose the existence of MidCountry’s mortgage, so the closing on the sale to Hinshaw took place without satisfying the mortgage.

The parties agree that Scott County, as with all Minnesota counties, maintains by statute both the grantor-grantee index and the tract index. "A subsequent purchaser is presumed to have examined the whole record, and he is charged with such knowledge as the proper index entries afford, as well as with notice of the facts derived from the transcript of the [recorded document] itself." Latourell v. Hobart, 135 Minn. 109, 113–14, 160 N.W. 259, 260–61 (1916). The record consists of "the entries required by law to be made in the reception books, and the transcribing of the instrument into the record book." Id. at 113, 160 N.W. at 260. As stated earlier, as of 2005, counties must keep both grantor-grantee and tract indices. Minn. Stat. §§ 386.03 (as to the grantor-grantee index); 386.05 (as to the tract index).

Minnesota Title Standards for Examination of Title (Title Standards) establish the industry standard for title examinations. The recently revised Title No. 37, entitled "INSTRUMENTS RECORDED OUTSIDE THE LINE OF SEARCH IN GRANTOR-GRANTEE INDEX," states the following:

An instrument necessary to the chain of title or affecting a title, but recorded at a point in time prior to the date of a recorded instrument creating a source of title, so as not to be within the scope of an examination of the county recorder’s grantor reception book and grantee reception book, does not constitute constructive notice of the contents of such instrument, and such instrument should be re-recorded unless it has been of record for at least five years or appears in the tract index. 12

Minnesota Title Standards for Examination of Title, Standard No. 37 (2008) (emphasis added). The Title Standards Committee cautions that "[t]o the extent the county recorder maintains a tract index[,] examination must be made of the tract index." Id. The committee’s explanation of Standard No. 37 states: "The amendment recognizes that counties are now required to maintain a tract index as part of their official records. The former comment is changed to a caution and revised to reflect that the tract index, to the extent one is maintained, must be examined." Id. Accordingly, a person is charged with constructive notice of the information indexed in both indices.

Hinshaw contends that, even though MidCountry’s mortgage appeared in the grantor-grantee index as of May 2006, she was not obligated to look beyond the computerized document inquiry to the contents of the document itself. The purpose of the record is to provide purchasers with notice "of the existence and contents" of recorded instruments. Thorwarth, 20 Minn. at 467. The constructive notice imputed to a purchaser by the record of an instrument is strictly confined to that which is set forth on its face. Bank of Ada v. Gullikson, 64 Minn. 91, 94, 66 N.W. 131, 132 (1896); see also Miller, 438 N.W.2d at 370 ("A recorded interest is constructive notice only of the facts appearing on the face of the record." (quotation omitted)). The record includes not only the document numbers as indexed, but also the contents, including legal descriptions, of the instruments as recorded. Document numbers in either index contain no mention of the terms recited therein. "The entries required by law to be made in the reception books, and the transcribing of the instrument into the record book, constitute the full record of the [instrument]. Each supplies defects in the other in giving constructive notice." 13

Latourell, 135 Minn. at 113, 160 N.W.2d at 260 (quotation omitted). Thus, while Hinshaw was under no duty to search beyond the record itself, she was obligated to read the entire record, which included MidCountry’s mortgage, referred to by document number A657036, in the grantor-grantee index.

Hinshaw further argues that Scott County’s error in failing to index the MidCountry mortgage in the tract index should prevent her from being charged with constructive knowledge of its existence, citing caselaw from other jurisdictions that purportedly support this contention. However, we are not aware of any Minnesota precedent that supports her contention, and the cases so cited do not indicate what recording systems and indices are used. Our courts have held that a document that is "so mis-recorded as to be, in effect, not recorded at all," can be no notice to anyone. Thorp v. Merrill, 21 Minn. 336, 339 (1875). In Thorp, the subject instrument contained an erroneous legal description of the property to which the mortgage applied. Id. at 337–38. But here, the document was not mis-recorded because it met the recording requirements, and the legal description was accurate (including the Hinshaw description). Here, the mortgage as recorded accurately reflects the contents of the original document.

The Scott County Recorder’s error in indexing MidCountry’s mortgage did not prevent Hinshaw from being charged with constructive notice. The mortgage appeared in the primary grantor-grantee index, and Hinshaw is charged with knowledge of the contents of the documents recorded in that index as well as the newer tract index. This constructive knowledge prevents her from being a bona fide purchaser, and therefore, the district court erred as a matter of law in granting her summary judgment on this basis. 14

Accordingly, Hinshaw and PHH’s interests in the Hinshaw property were subject to MidCountry’s prior, properly recorded mortgage, of which Hinshaw and PHH were charged with constructive knowledge. II.

This case arose from the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. The parties agree that there are no genuine issues of material fact precluding a grant of summary judgment.2 Because we hold that, as a matter of law, a party is charged with constructive notice of the contents of properly recorded documents indexed in both the grantor-grantee index and the tract index, MidCountry was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its claim that Hinshaw and PHH acquired the Hinshaw property subject to its prior mortgage interest. MidCountry’s mortgage was properly recorded first, and therefore its interest is not void as against a subsequent purchaser, respondent Hinshaw. D E C I S I O N A purchaser is charged with constructive notice of properly recorded real estate documents indexed in the grantor-grantee index and in the tract index. We therefore reverse the decision of the district court ruling that respondent was a bona fide purchaser and order that judgment be entered in favor of appellant. Appellant’s mortgage, though indexed only in the grantor-grantee index, creates a recording priority against respondent Hinshaw’s deed and respondent PHH’s mortgage.

2 Appellant argues that genuine issues of material fact exist. Because this argument has been raised for the first time on appeal, we do not consider that argument. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988).

Reversed.


Constitutionality MS253B.185 Committment denied Jury Trial A08-1693 File 27_MH_PR-06-985 Joshua J.Cox

This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2008).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A08-1693

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Joshua Joseph Cox

Filed March 10, 2009

Affirmed

Toussaint, Chief Judge Hennepin County District Court

File No. 27-MH-PR-06-985 253B.185, 2008 Minnesota Statutes

Stephen D. Radtke, 10781 Hopkins Circle, Bloomington, MN 55420 (for appellant Cox)

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, John L. Kirwin, Assistant County Attorney, C-2000 Government Center, 300 South Sixth Street, Minneapolis, MN 55487 (for respondent State of Minnesota)

Considered and decided by Toussaint, Chief Judge; Kalitowski, Judge; and Halbrooks, Judge. U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

TOUSSAINT, Chief Judge

Appellant Joshua Joseph Cox challenges his commitment as a sexually dangerous person (SDP) under Minn. Stat. § 253B.185 (2006), arguing that the statute is unconstitutional, that his commitment violated his right to a jury trial, and that the district court erred in concluding that he had engaged in a course of harmful sexual 2

conduct, in rejecting his proposed less-restrictive alternative, and in committing appellant despite testimony about changes in his condition. Because the supreme court has established that Minn. Stat. § 253B.185 is constitutional and that there is no right to a jury trial in commitment cases and because we see no error on the part of the district court, we affirm. D E C I S I O N

1. Constitutionality of Minn. Stat. § 253B.185 (the SDP Act) "Minnesota statutes are presumed constitutional, and our power to declare a statute unconstitutional should be exercised with extreme caution and only when absolutely necessary." In re Haggerty, 448 N.W.2d 363, 364 (Minn. 1989). Appellant argues that the SDP Act, under which he was committed, is unconstitutional because it violates his substantive and procedural due-process rights, creates double jeopardy, and violates equal protection.

A. Substantive Due Process

An SDP is a person who "(1) has engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct . . .; (2) has manifested a sexual, personality, or other mental disorder or dysfunction; and (3) as a result, is likely to engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct . . . ." Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18c(a) (2006).

We now clarify that the SDP Act allows civil commitment of sexually dangerous persons who have engaged in a prior course of sexually harmful behavior and whose present disorder or dysfunction does not allow them to adequately control their sexual impulses, making it highly likely that they were engage in harmful sexual acts in the future.

In re Linehan, 594 N.W.2d 867, 876 (Minn. 1999) (Linehan IV). 3

For commitment as an SDP, "it is not necessary to prove that the person has an inability to control the person‟s sexual impulses." Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18c(b). Linehan IV explicitly rejected the argument that this language violated Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997), and held that the statute was to be interpreted to require that a person‟s mental disorder "does not allow [the person] to adequately control [his] sexual impulses." Linehan IV, 594 N.W.2d at 876; see also Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413, 122 S. Ct. 867, 870 (2002) (holding that "proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior" is sufficient for commitment); In re Martinelli, 649 N.W.2d 886, 890 (Minn. App. 2002) (holding that Linehan IV satisfied the Crane standard), review denied (Minn. Oct. 29, 2002). Thus, appellant‟s substantive due process challenge lacks merit. B. Double Jeopardy

Appellant‟s double-jeopardy argument has also been explicitly rejected. "The Supreme Court‟s reasoning [in Hendricks] supports our earlier ruling that the SDP Act does not contravene the Double Jeopardy . . . clause[]." Linehan IV, 594 N.W.2d at 871.

Appellant argues that the statute is punitive because it does not provide treatment until after a sentence has been served. But "[t]his procedure does not render the commitment statute punitive; had the person not been committed, he would still have had to serve time in the correctional facility." Joelson v. O’Keefe, 594 N.W.2d 905, 912 (Minn. App. 1999), review denied (Minn. July 28, 1999).

Appellant also claims that the statute is punitive because no one committed under it has been discharged. But protection of the public is a primary purpose of SDP 4

commitment. See In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 914 (Minn. 1994) (holding that "compelling government interest [required to justify the state in depriving an individual of freedom] is the protection of members of the public from persons who have an uncontrollable impulse to sexually assault"). Appellant provides no support for the view that, because no one has been discharged, SDP commitment violates double jeopardy. C. Equal Protection.

Appellant argues that commitment violates his equal protection right because others who are also a threat to public safety are not committed. But "[this] argument ignores the fact that the sexual predator poses a danger that is unlike any other." Id. at 917 (rejecting argument that statutory commitment violates equal protection). Thus, the supreme court has rejected appellant‟s three challenges to the constitutionality of the SDP Act. D. Right to a Jury Trial

Appellant argues that his commitment hearing violated his right to a jury trial. "[T]he Minnesota Supreme Court has rejected the argument that a jury trial is required [in commitment proceedings."] Joelson, 594 N.W.2d at 910 (citing State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 205 Minn. 545, 556-57, 287 N.W. 297, 303 (1939), aff’d 309 U.S. 270, 60 S. Ct. 523 (1940)).

Appellant concedes that this is the present state of the law but argues that "the time is right for a renewed review of the right to jury trial in these cases." The "task of extending existing law falls to the supreme court or the legislature, but it does not fall to this court." Tereault v. Palmer, 413 N.W.2d 283, 286 (Minn. App. 1987), review denied 5

(Minn. Dec. 18, 1987). This court lacks authority to reopen the issue. 2. Course of Harmful Sexual Conduct

In reviewing a civil commitment, this court reviews factual findings under a clear-error standard. In re Civil Commitment of Stone, 711 N.W.2d 831, 836 (Minn. App. 2006), review denied (Minn. June 20, 2006).

The district court found that appellant had "engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct" as defined in Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 7a. See Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18c(a)(1) (listing engagement in course of harmful sexual conduct as first element in definition of SDP). Appellant challenges this finding on the ground that two of his three victims, his stepbrother and stepsister, claimed that they were not harmed by his conduct. But "„[h]armful sexual conduct‟ means sexual conduct that creates a substantial likelihood of serious physical or emotional harm to another." Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 7a(a) (2006) (emphasis added). "The presumption is not that a victim actually suffers serious emotional harm, but that the conduct creates a substantial likelihood of such harm." Stone, 711 N.W.2d at 837. Thus, the issue is not whether the victims suffered actual harm from appellant‟s conduct; the issue is whether appellant‟s conduct created a substantial likelihood of serious emotional harm.

One court-appointed examiner, when asked if appellant‟s conduct was "the type of behavior that‟s harmful generically?" answered, "Generically or typically, or at least a strong likelihood [that the behavior is] harmful." A second court-appointed examiner answered, "That‟s correct" when asked if appellant‟s behavior "would typically cause emotional harm and, in fact, similar behavior in [appellant‟s] case did cause substantial 6

psychological harm [to appellant‟s siblings]?"

The record also supports the substantial emotional harm caused to the third victim, a 13-year-old boy. The officer who interviewed the boy said: "He was very upset about what had taken place and I could see that he was very scared and upset as we spoke. At this time he was crying very hard and before we could even start, he stood up and threw up into a garbage can located in the kitchen area."

The district court‟s finding that appellant engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct as defined in Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 7a(a), is not clearly erroneous. 3. Less Restrictive Alternative

An SDP is committed "to a secure treatment facility unless the patient establishes by clear and convincing evidence that a less restrictive treatment program is available that is consistent with the patient‟s treatment needs and the requirements of public safety." Minn. Stat. § 253B.185, subd. 1. On review, this court considers whether the district court complied with the commitment statute. In re Knops, 536 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Minn. 1995).

Appellant challenges his commitment on the ground that a less-restrictive program is available, i.e., treatment at Safety Center and residence with, and supervision by, his mother and stepfather. Appellant was previously treated at Safety Center from September to November 2001, from July 2002 to February 2003, and from March 2003 to December 2005. During his treatment, he was intermittently suspended for probation and rule violations and was ultimately discharged without having completed treatment. Appellant also escaped from his stepfather‟s supervision in November 2002. 7

One examiner answered "Yes" when asked if appellant needed to complete treatment in a secure setting and noted that, when Safety Center discharged appellant, it "certainly recommend[ed] that inpatient treatment was probably a better alternative for [appellant]." This examiner was not aware of any facility that "could provide 24-hour a day secure supervision for [appellant] while [Safety Center does] the primary treatment modality." A second examiner testified that, although there had been problems when appellant was at Safety Center and there would need to be very specific criteria for behavior that would result in appellant‟s discharge from Safety Center, "with some reservations," he would "be willing to consider" treatment at Safety Center and residence with appellant‟s mother and stepfather. This examiner told the court that a stay of commitment would be necessary for the Safety Center alternative and, when asked what he would recommend if the choice were commitment or release, said "Commitment."

Thus, while both examiners expressed the wish that there were a residential facility that could either provide treatment for appellant or accommodate him while he pursued treatment at Safety Center, they agreed that there is no such facility.1 The statute gives appellant the opportunity to present evidence of a less-restrictive alternative, but it does not give him the right to be assigned there. In re Kindschy, 634 N.W.2d 723, 731 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Dec. 19, 2001). Appellant did not "establish[]

1 A third examiner, who testified at the review hearing, also agreed. He stated that "if there was a residential facility for [appellant] then a stay [of commitment] would be appropriate, but, unfortunately, the only residential program that we have in the state . . . will not take people on a stay of commitment." 8

by clear and convincing evidence that a less restrictive treatment program is available that is consistent with [his] treatment needs and the requirements of public safety." Minn. Stat. § 253B.185, subd. 1. The district court complied with the statute by committing appellant to a secure facility. 4. Claim of Changes in Appellant’s Condition

At the March 2008 review hearing, appellant‟s mother testified about positive changes she perceived in his condition since the commitment hearing a year earlier. See In re Linehan, 557 N.W.2d 167, 171 (Minn. 1996) (Linehan II) (stating that evidence of changes in patient‟s condition is among items properly considered at review hearing), vacated and remanded, 522 U.S. 1011, 118 S. Ct. 596 (1997), aff’d as modified, 594 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1999). Appellant contends that the district court erred in committing him indeterminately despite this evidence.

But the report submitted by the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) in October 2007 indicated that:

Since his admission to MSOP in October 2006, [appellant] has reportedly had rule violations for problematic behaviors such as verbal abuse, taking money from other patients, possession of pornography, not wearing his identification badge, unit disruption, not maintaining hygiene, fraudulent misrepresentation, refusal to follow staff direction, and possessing various contraband. . . . There was also concern that [appellant] was engaging in sexual contact with another patient; however, [he] denied any inappropriate activity had taken place. . . .

. . . .

. . . His condition is unchanged and there is no new information that would suggest his risk to the community has diminished since the initial commitment. Hence, [he] continues to satisfy the statutory requirements as an SDP. 9

The examiner at the review hearing also reported that appellant continued to meet the criteria for commitment. The district court did not err in committing appellant despite his mother‟s testimony.

Affirm

McClure Jr v.Felhaber Law Firm et al A08-0673_MS480A.08

. A08-673
Stanford Taylor Edward McClure, Jr., Plaintiff, Jesse Gant, III, Appellant,
vs. H. Le Phan, individually and as employee/agent of Felhaber, Larson,
Fenlon & Vogt Law Firm, et al., Respondents. felhaber law firm minneapolis - Google Search
Affirmed. Judge Jill Flaskamp Halbrooks.
Ramsey County District Court, Hon. Kathleen R. Gearin.

This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2008).

480A.08, 2008 Minnesota Statutes

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A08-0673

Stanford Taylor Edward McClure, Jr., Plaintiff, Jesse Gant, III, Appellant, vs. H. Le Phan, individually and in her capacity as an employee/agent of Felhaber, Larson, Fenlon & Vogt Law Firm, et al., Respondents.

Filed March 10, 2009 Affirmed Halbrooks, Judge Ramsey County District Court File No. 62-C8-07-004921 Jesse Gant, III, 13091 Taconite Court Northeast, Blaine, MN 55449 (attorney pro se) Paul C. Peterson, William L. Davidson, Lind, Jensen, Sullivan & Peterson, P.A., 150 South 5th Street, Suite 1700, Minneapolis, MN 55402 (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Poritsky, Judge.

Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. 2 U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

HALBROOKS, Judge

Appellant attorney, pro se, challenges the district court‟s grant of respondents‟ motion for sanctions against him and the denial of his own motion for sanctions. Because we conclude that the district court properly exercised its discretion, we affirm the district court‟s grant of respondents‟ motion and denial of appellant‟s motion. FACTS

Respondent H. Le Phan, an attorney, represented Career Systems Development Corporation (CSD) in several lawsuits brought against CSD by former employees. One of these suits was brought by Maryland Rosenbloom, pro se. Rosenbloom v. Career Sys. Dev. Corp., No. 62-C8-05-012402 (Ramsey County Dist. Ct.). Former CSD employees Stanford McClure and Courtney Yorke, who were involved in separate lawsuits against CSD, together attended a February 26, 2007 motion hearing in the Rosenbloom matter.

The next day, Phan wrote a letter to the district court stating that she would be hiring an off-duty police officer to attend Rosenbloom‟s upcoming deposition because she had been intimidated by events that occurred after the hearing on February 26. Phan enclosed an affidavit dated February 27, 2007, which set forth her version of events. According to Phan, after leaving the courthouse on February 26, she saw McClure, Rosenbloom, and Yorke approximately 200 feet from her. The three men allegedly looked directly at her, walked toward her, and followed her to a parking-ramp elevator. Phan stated in her affidavit that these events led her to believe that McClure, Rosenbloom, and Yorke were waiting for her to leave the courthouse so that they could 3

harass and intimidate her. She also stated that their conduct put her "in fear of imminent bodily harm . . . [and] caused [her] emotional distress and anxiety," and that "McClure testified at his deposition that he fantasizes about killing people who have wronged him."

On May 7, 2007, McClure, represented by appellant Jesse Gant, filed a defamation suit against Phan and her employer, respondent Felhaber, Larson, Fenlon & Vogt Law Firm. On May 22, 2007, respondents moved to dismiss the defamation suit with prejudice pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02. Respondents also moved for a protective order staying discovery until the district court ruled on the motion to dismiss.

On May 23, 2007, Gant wrote to respondents‟ counsel, giving notice of his intent to bring a motion for sanctions against respondents and their attorney unless they withdrew the motion to dismiss. In a May 31, 2007 letter to Gant, respondents‟ counsel stated that he did not intend to withdraw the motion to dismiss. Respondents‟ counsel also enclosed a rule 11 notice of motion, stating that McClure‟s defamation suit was barred by absolute privilege. In a letter dated June 1, 2007, Gant replied:

I received your letter . . . regarding your notice to file Rule 11 sanctions if I do not dismiss my client‟s case. That is not going to happen. Therefore, there is no need to wait the 21 days. So, for the sake of expediency, please obtain your motion date and time and provide me with notice thereof, so that I can make my motion for sanctions and await responding to your motion to dismiss.

McClure moved for sanctions on June 20, 2007. A hearing on the motion to dismiss and the cross-motions for sanctions was held on July 23, 2007.

The district court issued an order (1) granting respondents‟ rule 12.02 motion to dismiss; (2) dismissing McClure‟s defamation claim with prejudice and on the merits; 4

(3) dismissing McClure‟s motion for sanctions; and (4) dismissing respondents‟ motion for a protective order as moot and ordering cessation of discovery. The district court stated that the defamation case "must be dismissed on absolute privilege grounds."

Respondents subsequently moved for sanctions against Gant pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 11 and Minn. Stat. § 549.211 (2006). Gant moved for sanctions against respondents and their attorney. At the motion hearing, Gant appeared on his own behalf, stating that he was not representing McClure because the motion was for sanctions against him personally. McClure did not appear at the hearing and does not appeal the dismissal of his defamation suit.

On October 31, 2007, the district court filed an order granting respondents‟ motion for sanctions and denying Gant‟s motion for sanctions. Gant was ordered to pay respondents $8,460 for attorney fees "they reasonably incurred as a result of defending this action." This appeal from the resulting money judgment follows. D E C I S I O N

I. Gant argues that sanctions against him are not warranted. We review a district court‟s award of sanctions under Minn. R. Civ. P. 11 or Minn. Stat. § 549.211 for an abuse of discretion. Cole v. Star Tribune, 581 N.W.2d 364, 370 (Minn. App. 1998). Because "courts should construe rule 11 somewhat narrowly to avoid deterring legitimate or arguably legitimate claims," this court will reverse a district court‟s award of sanctions if the sanctioned party‟s assertion "is not an objectively unreasonable one." Conant v. 5

Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi, L.L.P.

, 603 N.W.2d 143, 150 (Minn. App. 1999) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Mar. 14, 2000).

The district court focused on whether or not Gant acted reasonably in filing McClure‟s defamation suit. The district court determined that Gant‟s filing of the suit was not objectively reasonable on three grounds: (1) the defamation claim against Phan was "unfounded" because establishing a defamation claim requires proof that a statement was false and "Phan‟s statements that she felt intimidated or fearful are emotions, and [could not] be proven false"; (2) "Gant could not have reasonably thought, or in good faith argued, that existing law supported his client‟s claims"; and (3) "Gant had knowledge of the absolute privilege doctrine from past litigation." The district court specifically noted Gant‟s representation of the plaintiff in Cole, in which Gant was sanctioned by the district court for his "unfounded arguments against awarding absolute privilege" to the defendant. The district court stated that "Gant must be held to the standard of a reasonable attorney, not his own standards. The public policy is to sanction those who bring either frivolous or harassing litigation."

Gant contends that he had an objectively reasonable basis for asserting McClure‟s defamation claim because: (1) McClure was not a party to Rosenbloom and (2) respondents stated in their answer that the February 26, 2007 Rosenbloom hearing was "unrelated" to McClure.

The supreme court‟s decision in Mahoney & Hagberg v. Newgard, 729 N.W.2d 302 (Minn. 2007), makes it clear that Gant‟s first argument is without merit. Mahoney & Hagberg, which Gant has cited throughout the defamation lawsuit and to this court, 6

involved a suit between two former business partners, Boldt and Burns. 729 N.W.2d at 304. Boldt and Burns had formed a company that provided administrative support to Mahoney & Hagberg, P.A., a law firm. Id. During the course of Boldt‟s lawsuit against Burns, Boldt‟s attorney drafted an affidavit signed by Newgard, a former secretary of the law firm. Id. Newgard‟s affidavit alleged improper and illegal conduct by several of the firm‟s attorneys. Id. The law firm then sued Newgard based on her affidavit. Id. at 305. The supreme court concluded that Newgard‟s statements in her affidavit had "reference and relation" to the subject matter of the litigation between Boldt and Burns; therefore the statements were relevant in the context of absolute privilege. Id. at 308. The supreme court noted that relevance in this context is not determined "by asking whether [the] statements are „legally relevant.‟ Rather, we look to see if the statement has a connection to the case before the court, keeping in mind that any doubts about the relevance of the statement are resolved in favor of relevancy and pertinency." Id.

Here, the contested statements in Phan‟s affidavit were relevant because they had a connection to the Rosenbloom litigation. Phan was explaining to the district court why she would be hiring a police officer to be present at a deposition to be taken in the Rosenbloom suit. The relevant statements in Newgard‟s affidavit in Mahoney & Hagberg were protected by absolute privilege, although they concerned persons who were not parties to the Boldt–Burns litigation. Likewise, the relevant statements in Phan‟s affidavit were protected by absolute privilege, although they were made about McClure, who was not a party in Rosenbloom. 7

Gant‟s argument regarding respondents‟ answer is also without merit. In their answer, respondents stated "that at an unrelated hearing involving Mr. Rosenbloom, Ms. Phan requested that the courtroom be closed to spectators." Gant contends that respondents‟ use of the word "unrelated" to describe the February 26, 2007 Rosenbloom hearing means that McClure "had no relation" to Rosenbloom. Gant appears to misunderstand the concept of relevance within the context of absolute privilege. As Mahoney & Hagberg makes clear, the question is whether the statements in the affidavit are related to the case before the court, not whether the person claiming defamation has any relation to the case before the court. See 729 N.W.2d at 306, 308. Except for McClure‟s nonparty status in Rosenbloom, Gant does not contend that the statements about McClure in Phan‟s affidavit were unrelated to that case.

Because Gant‟s arguments regarding whether it was objectively reasonable for him to file the defamation claims on behalf of McClure lack merit, the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting respondents‟ motion for sanctions against him. II.

Gant argues that the amount of sanctions awarded to respondents was excessive because no discovery took place, respondents took no depositions, and respondents‟ motion for dismissal was "rote and mundane." A district court has "wide discretion in determining the type of sanctions it deems necessary." Peterson v. Hinz, 605 N.W.2d 414, 417 (Minn. App. 2000), review denied (Minn. Apr. 18, 2000). Gant does not cite to any legal authority for his argument that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to grant sanctions of $8,460 for fees and costs incurred in bringing a successful motion to 8

dismiss. A district court "has the discretion to impose a sanction in the amount sufficient to deter future litigation abuse, even if the amount is greater than the amount of attorney fees." Gibson v. Trs. of Minn. State Basic Bldg. Trades Fringe Benefits Funds, 703 N.W.2d 864, 871 (Minn. App. 2005), vacated in part on other grounds (Minn. Dec. 15, 2005). We note that the district court imposed sanctions in an amount less than the amount of attorney fees expended by respondents.1 We therefore cannot say that the district court abused its discretion as to the amount of sanctions. III. Gant contends that the district court erroneously found that Phan had sought a protective order in the context of the Rosenbloom litigation. He argues that the district court based its decision that absolute privilege applied and that sanctions were warranted upon this factual error, requiring reversal. In its October 31, 2007 order and memorandum, the district court twice mentioned a protective order. First, the district court stated that the basis of McClure‟s defamation suit "was a protective order that Phan requested based on actions of [McClure] in the underlying litigation of [Rosenbloom]." Second, the district court stated: "Phan testified in an affidavit that she was afraid of McClure because in his deposition he had made comments about killing people that wronged him. The judicial proceeding concerned an order of protection to have a police officer in the courtroom."

1 The district court noted that it awarded respondents a reduced amount of costs because it believed that the legal work, namely the work on the issue of absolute privilege, was done in part for a defamation suit that Rosenbloom brought in state district court against respondents. That matter also involved Phan‟s February 27, 2007 affidavit. 9

We will not set aside findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. "Findings of fact are clearly erroneous only if the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Fletcher v. St. Paul Pioneer Press, 589 N.W.2d 96, 101 (Minn. 1999) (quotation omitted). The district court appears to be mistaken that Phan requested a protective order in Rosenbloom. The February 26, 2007 hearing involved Rosenbloom‟s and CSD‟s cross-motions for sanctions. The record does not contain any motion for a protective order brought by Phan or CSD in the context of Rosenbloom, and respondents concede that "technically, there was no request for a protective order" in Rosenbloom. We therefore conclude the district court‟s statement that Phan had requested a protective order in the Rosenbloom litigation was clearly erroneous.

But in order to prevail on appeal, an appellant must show both error and prejudice. Midway Ctr. Assocs. v. Midway Ctr., Inc., 306 Minn. 352, 356, 237 N.W.2d 76, 78 (1975); see also Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (stating that harmless error is to be ignored). Gant, though he bears the burden of demonstrating that the error was prejudicial, does not explain how the erroneous statement prejudiced him. See Bloom v. Hydrotherm, Inc., 499 N.W.2d 842, 845 (Minn. App. 1993), review denied (Minn. June 28, 1993). We conclude that the district court‟s decision that Gant acted unreasonably by filing McClure‟s defamation lawsuit is adequately supported without the inclusion of the erroneous finding. See Hanka v. Pogatchnik, 276 N.W.2d 633, 636 (Minn. 1979) (stating that where findings necessary for a legal conclusion are adequately supported, a court‟s inclusion of other unsupported findings is harmless error). The nonexistence of a 10

protective order in Rosenbloom does not alter whether the statements in Phan‟s affidavit were absolutely privileged. Any error was therefore harmless. IV.

Gant argues that the district court should not have denied his October 3, 2007 motion for sanctions. At the October 11, 2007 motion hearing, respondents argued that Gant had failed to comply with the safe-harbor provision of Minn. R. Civ. P. 11. Gant did not respond to this contention. Rule 11 provides that a "motion for sanctions . . . shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion . . . , the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected." Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.03(a)(1). Minn. Stat. § 549.211, subd. 4, also contains a 21-day safe-harbor provision. Compliance with the safe-harbor provisions of the rule and the statute is mandatory. Gibson v. Coldwell Banker Burnet, 659 N.W.2d 782, 789–90 (Minn. App. 2003); see also Johnson v. Johnson, 726 N.W.2d 516, 519 (Minn. App. 2007) (reversing district court‟s award of attorney fees to respondent who had "fail[ed] to adhere to the mandatory „safe-harbor‟ provisions" of the rule and statute).

Gant signed his motion for sanctions on October 1, 2007, and filed it with the district court on October 3. There is no affidavit of service in the district court file. By filing his motion with the court a mere two days after signing it, Gant did not comply with the safe-harbor provisions of the rule and the statute. As compliance with the safe-harbor provisions is mandatory, the district court properly exercised its discretion by denying the motion. 11

Because we conclude that Gant‟s motion for sanctions was procedurally improper, we do not reach the issue of whether Gant had standing to make such a motion.

Affirmed.

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