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Tuesday, March 3, 2009

Ross Nesbit Ag v. Atlantic MutInsCoA08-0725

29. A08-725
Ross Nesbit Agencies, Inc., Appellant, vs. Atlantic Mutual Insurance
Company, Respondent; Dean Soltis, et al., Respondents.
Affirmed. Judge Louise Dovre Bjorkman.
Hennepin County District Court, Hon. Marilyn Brown Rosenbaum.

30.
A07-1906
Fredy Rene Palma Espinal, petitioner, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota,
Respondent.
Affirmed. Judge Gary L. Crippen.
*
Washington County District Court, Hon. John Edward Cass.

31.
A08-549
State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Douglas Lee Juelson, Appellant.
Affirmed. Judge Lawrence T. Collins.
**
Itasca County District Court, Hon. Lois J. Lang.




SPECIAL RELEASE OPINION FILED FEBRUARY 26, 2009


32. A08-1312, A08-1551
In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Jacob Karl Rask.
Affirmed. Chief Judge Edward Toussaint, Jr.
Houston County District Court, Hon. Donald E. Rysavy.


* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

** Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.


This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2008).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A08-0725

Ross Nesbit Agencies, Inc., Appellant, vs. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company, Respondent, Dean Soltis, et al., Respondents.

Filed March 3, 2009

Affirmed

Bjorkman, Judge

Hennepin County District Court

File No. 27-CV-07-20510

Rolf E. Sonnesyn, Teresa A. Gumerman, Tomsche, Sonnesyn & Tomsche, P.A., 610 Ottawa Avenue North, Golden Valley, MN 55422 (for appellant)

Jon A. Hanson, Candy B. Olson, Hanson, Lulic & Krall, LLC, 700 Northstar East, 608 Second Avenue South, Minneapolis, MN 55402 (for respondent Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company)

Dean Soltis and Melissa Soltis, 15355 Brockton Lane North, Dayton, MN 55327 (pro se respondents)

Considered and decided by Klaphake, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Bjorkman, Judge. 2

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

BJORKMAN, Judge

Appellant challenges the district court‟s dismissal under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e) of this declaratory-judgment action, arguing the court erred in determining that the complaint did not present a justiciable controversy. We affirm.

FACTS

Respondents Dean and Melissa Soltises‟ home sustained wind and hail damage on September 21, 2005. The Soltises submitted an insurance claim for the damage to respondent Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company. Atlantic Mutual denied coverage, asserting that appellant Ross Nesbit Agencies, Inc., and its principal Ross Nesbit, the independent insurance agent who prepared the insurance-policy quote for the Soltises, did not bind coverage for the Soltises. Nesbit Agencies acknowledges that it had not yet notified Atlantic Mutual of the Soltises‟ policy as of the date of loss, but nonetheless asserts that it bound coverage for a period from August 2, 2005, through August 2, 2006.

Nesbit Agencies subsequently asked the Soltises to assign their interests and claims against Atlantic Mutual arising out of the denial of coverage. In consideration for this proposed assignment, Nesbit Agencies agreed to adjust the Soltises‟ property-damage claim as if it were Atlantic Mutual and the proposed insurance policy had been in force on the date the damage occurred. The Soltises signed the agreement on September 20, 2007, but it was not fully executed until November 30, 2007.

On September 21, 2007, before the assignment was fully executed and before Nesbit Agencies had adjusted the Soltises‟ claim, Nesbit Agencies initiated this 3

declaratory judgment action against Atlantic Mutual and the Soltises, seeking a declaration that "Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company is obligated to insure Soltis[es] and the Property," and "Nesbit [Agencies] is entitled to indemnity from Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company for all monies Nesbit [Agencies] expends to adjust the Soltis[es‟] property insurance claim." The complaint alleges that Nesbit Agencies "stands ready to adjust the Soltis[es‟] September 21, 2005 property insurance claim in exchange for an assignment by Soltis[es] to Nesbit [Agencies] of Soltis[es‟] contractual rights against Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company." The complaint further alleges that Nesbit Agencies "asserts its right of indemnity against Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company under the anticipated assignment of rights and pursuant to the applicable principles of agency/principal law." Nesbit Agencies attached to its complaint a copy of the quote Atlantic Mutual proposed on July 27, 2005.

Atlantic Mutual moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to rule 12.02(e) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The district court granted Atlantic Mutual‟s motion, finding that the complaint fails to present a justiciable controversy, and dismissed Nesbit Agencies‟ claims without prejudice. This appeal follows.

D E C I S I O N

I. The district court dismissed this case under rule 12.

The submission to the district court of matters outside of the pleadings ordinarily converts a rule 12 motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02. But a district court may consider, within the rule 12 framework, written 4

documents, such as contracts, if "the complaint refers to the contract and the contract is central to the claims alleged." In re Hennepin County 1986 Recycling Bond Litig., 540 N.W.2d 494, 497 (Minn. 1995). Nesbit Agencies contends that the district court considered the assignment document in connection with the rule 12 motion and that we should likewise consider it on appeal. We note the district court referenced Nesbit Agencies‟ attempt to "arrange an assignment of the Soltises[‟] rights in relation to Atlantic Mutual" in the memorandum accompanying the dismissal order, but observe that the district court expressly stated that no assignment had taken place. We conclude that rule 12 governs the scope of our review.

When reviewing cases dismissed under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, the only question we consider is "whether the complaint sets forth a legally sufficient claim for relief." Barton v. Moore, 558 N.W.2d 746, 749 (Minn. 1997).

II. The district court correctly concluded that Nesbit Agencies’ complaint fails to set forth a justiciable controversy.

The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA) gives courts the power to "declare rights, status, and other legal relations." Minn. Stat. § 555.01 (2008). Declaratory relief is a unique statutory remedy that serves an "important social function of deciding controversies at their inception." State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Skluzacek, 208 Minn. 443, 447, 294 N.W. 413, 415 (1940) (quotation omitted). But the UDJA "cannot create a cause of action that does not otherwise exist." Alliance for Metro. Stability v. Metro. Council, 671 N.W.2d 905, 916 (Minn. App. 2003); see also Hoeft v. 5

Hennepin County, 754 N.W.2d 717, 722 (Minn. App. 2008), review denied (Minn. Nov. 18, 2008) (addressing justiciability requirements in declaratory-judgment action).

The UDJA does not, by itself, confer jurisdiction on a court over the action. Alliance for Metro. Stability, 671 N.W.2d at 915. Rather, a declaratory-judgment action must present a justiciable controversy or a district court has no jurisdiction to declare rights under the act. Onvoy, Inc. v. ALLETE, Inc., 736 N.W.2d 611, 617 (Minn. 2007). A claim presents a justiciable controversy if it "(1) involves definite and concrete assertions of right that emanate from a legal source, (2) involves a genuine conflict in tangible interests between parties with adverse interests, and (3) is capable of specific resolution by judgment rather than presenting hypothetical facts that would form an advisory opinion." Id. at 617-18. Determining whether a justiciable controversy exists, and thus whether a district court has jurisdiction over a declaratory-judgment action, is a question of law, which we review de novo. Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Franck, 621 N.W.2d 270, 273 (Minn. App. 2001).

Here, the district court found that Nesbit Agencies‟ complaint does not present a justiciable controversy because "[n]o claim has been brought by the Soltises against [Nesbit Agencies] and although Nesbit Agencies states that it stands ready to adjust the Soltises[„] claim, no assignment has taken place and the claim has not been adjusted." Nesbit Agencies argues the district court erred because Nesbit Agencies obtained the assignment from the Soltises of their breach-of-contract claim against Atlantic Mutual. We address each justiciability factor in turn. 6

A. Nesbit Agencies’ complaint does not present definite and concrete assertions of right that emanate from a legal source.

Nesbit Agencies‟ argument is premised on its claimed assignment of the Soltises‟ claim against Atlantic Mutual and agreement to adjust the Soltises‟ claim. In tacit recognition of the fact that no assignment was in effect at the time it initiated this action and no adjustment of the Soltises‟ claim has occurred, Nesbit Agencies argues it possesses "a bona fide legal interest which has been, or with respect to the ripening seeds of a controversy is about to be, affected in a prejudicial manner." State ex rel. Smith v. Haveland, 223 Minn. 89, 92, 25 N.W.2d 474, 477 (1946). Nesbit Agencies asserts that the ripening-seeds analysis applies because the policy it allegedly bound for the Soltises contained a two-year limitations provision, and it brought the declaratory judgment action within two years to avoid losing its right to assert a claim against Atlantic Mutual. We find Nesbit Agencies‟ argument unpersuasive.

The ripening-seeds analysis may relax the "present controversy" inquiry in declaratory-judgment actions, but it does not do away with the justiciability requirements. Rice Lake Contracting Corp. v. Rust Env’t & Infrastructure, Inc., 549 N.W.2d 96, 99 (Minn. App. 1996), review denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 1996). And unlike the cases Nesbit Agencies relies on, this case does not present a party with a bona fide legal claim. See, e.g., Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Minneapolis, 271 N.W.2d 445, 448-49 (Minn. 1978) (supreme court held that a property owner could obtain a declaration as to the validity of a "due-on-sale" clause before a proposed sale after already losing one potential buyer). It is undisputed that at the time Nesbit Agencies 7

served its complaint, it had not been sued by the Soltises, had not made any payment to the Soltises, and did not have an assignment of the Soltises‟ claim against Atlantic Mutual. At the time of the rule 12 hearing, Nesbit Agencies had still not been sued and had made no payments to the Soltises related to their property damage. The district court properly determined that declaratory judgments cannot be granted based on such remote contingencies. State ex rel. Sviggum v. Hanson, 732 N.W.2d 312, 322 (Minn. App. 2007) (quoting Seiz v. Citizens Pure Ice Co., 207 Minn. 277, 283, 290 N.W. 802, 805 (1940)).

Even if we look beyond the complaint and consider the assignment agreement that the Soltises and Nesbit Agencies executed after this action was commenced, the complaint fails to state a definite legal claim. By its terms, the assignment agreement does not represent a full assignment of legally enforceable rights to Nesbit Agencies. The agreement does not set forth an amount that Nesbit Agencies would pay to adjust and settle the Soltises‟ claim. Indeed, the agreement expressly permits the Soltises to sue Nesbit Agencies in the event they are unable to resolve the damage claim. Nesbit Agencies cannot assert a right based on an incomplete agreement that was not effective at the time the complaint was filed.

Nesbit Agencies also seeks a declaration that it is entitled to indemnity from Atlantic Mutual for any payments it eventually makes to adjust the Soltises‟ claim. This claim fails as well. A declaration that Atlantic Mutual is required to indemnify Nesbit Agencies for unspecified future payments would also be based on remote contingencies and thus improper for determination by declaratory judgment. Nesbit Agencies has not 8

made any payments to the Soltises and thus has not suffered a direct injury or loss for which it may be indemnified by Atlantic Mutual.1 B. Nesbit Agencies’ complaint does not present a genuine conflict in tangible interests between parties with adverse interests. Nesbit Agencies asserts its interests are adverse to Atlantic Mutual based on the assignment agreement. The district court rejected this claim, stating: The Complaint does not involve definite claims by parties with adverse interests. [Nesbit Agencies] cannot make a cognizable claim against Atlantic Mutual for indemnity and/or contribution where no claim for indemnity has been made against [Nesbit Agencies]. [Nesbit Agencies] has not suffered a direct injury, has not entered into a settlement agreement with the Soltises and has not paid any settlement amounts. We agree with the district court. Whether we consider the assignment agreement or not, this case does not involve parties with adverse interests. Nesbit Agencies has not adjusted the Soltises‟ damage claim and has not made any payments to the Soltises. The agreement contemplates litigation between the Soltises and Nesbit Agencies in the event no adjustment is made by agreement of the parties. Any legal claim based on Nesbit Agencies‟ payment on Atlantic Mutual‟s behalf is speculative.

1 At oral argument, Nesbit Agencies‟ attorney informed this court that the Soltises initiated suit against Nesbit Agencies approximately two months earlier.

Nesbit Agencies alternatively contends that the second prong of justiciability is met because, under agency-law principles, it has an independent cause of action against Atlantic Mutual for wrongfully denying coverage to the Soltises. Nesbit Agencies claims "the law implies a promise of indemnity from a principal to his agent for any damages 9

resulting from the acts of the agent in the good faith execution of that agency," citing the Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.14 (2006).

But, absent a contract between them, any cause of action Nesbit Agencies might have against Atlantic Mutual for indemnification would be available only "when the agent makes a payment" or "when the agent suffers a loss that fairly should be borne by the principal in light of their relationship." Restatement (Third) of Agency, § 8.14(2)(a), (b). Neither of these events has taken place here because Nesbit Agencies has not yet adjusted the Soltises‟ claim. Moreover, Nesbit Agencies offers no explanation as to why or how its failure to notify Atlantic Mutual of the fact that it bound coverage for the Soltises constitutes good-faith execution of its agency. Under these circumstances, the district court did not err in concluding that the complaint "does not involve definite claims by parties with adverse interests."

C. Nesbit Agencies’ complaint does not present a claim that is capable of specific resolution by judgment.

Nesbit Agencies contends the district court erred when it found that "[a]ny ruling . . . would result in a premature, advisory opinion based upon hypothetical facts or anticipated events." We disagree.

Nesbit Agencies‟ complaint requests declaratory relief based on contingent future events that, at the time Nesbit Agencies served the complaint, were only anticipated occurrences. Even if the district court issued a declaration that coverage existed, the action could not be fully resolved until Nesbit Agencies adjusts the Soltises‟ damage claim and makes a settlement payment. Such circumstances do not meet the justiciability 10

requirements for declaratory judgment; to be justiciable a matter must be "capable of specific resolution by judgment rather than presenting hypothetical facts that would form an advisory opinion." Onvoy, Inc., 736 N.W.2d at 618.

Because Nesbit Agencies‟ complaint fails to set forth a justiciable controversy, the district court did not err in dismissing its claims without prejudice pursuant to rule 12.02(e).

Affirmed.

Daniel E. Olean Appel v. James E. Pomroy A08-878

http://www.mncourts.gov/opinions/coa/current/opa080878-0303.pdf

11. A08-878
Daniel E. Olean, Appellant, vs. James E. Pomroy, et al., Respondents.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Judge Terri J.
Stoneburner.
Pine County District Court, Hon. James T. Reuter.Court of Appeals Unpublished Opinions

This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2008).

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A08-0878 Daniel E. Olean, Appellant, vs. James E. Pomroy, et al., Respondents. Filed March 3, 2009 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded Stoneburner, Judge Pine County District Court File No. 58C603000846 Paul Sortland, Sortland Law Office, 120 South Sixth Street, Suite 1510, Minneapolis, MN 55402-1817 (for appellant) Frank J. Rajkowski, Rajkowski Hansmeier Ltd., 11 Seventh Avenue North, P.O. Box 1433, St. Cloud, MN 56302 (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Shumaker, Presiding Judge; Stoneburner, Judge; and Collins, Judge.*

* Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. 2

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

STONEBURNER, Judge

The district court found in favor of respondent on appellant’s claims for injunctive relief and for damages allegedly caused by improvements to a driveway on respondents’ property that resulted in the flooding of a portion of appellant’s land. Appellant challenges the denial of his motion for relief from judgment or a new trial, arguing that the district court’s findings of fact are not supported by the record and that the district court erred or abused its discretion in (1) denying his request for a jury trial; (2) finding that respondents’ use of property was reasonable; (3) dismissing appellant’s claim under the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act; (4) denying appellant’s motion to add a claim of punitive damages; (5) denying appellant’s posttrial submission of additional evidence; and (6) awarding certain disbursements. We affirm the district court’s judgment for respondents but reverse the award of disbursements and remand for additional findings relating to some of the claimed disbursements.

FACTS

Appellant Daniel E. Olean owns property in section 28 of Pine County that has been in his family for more than 100 years. A portion of the property is wetland. In 1999, respondents Lori Pomroy and Jim Pomroy (Pomroy) bought property that includes wetland north of and adjacent to Olean’s wetland. Pomroy bought the property to use as recreational property. Surface water flows north through the wetland and eventually into Bremer Creek, a public waterway. 3

The building site on Pomroy’s property is accessed by an east-west driveway that crosses the wetland. Pomroy’s predecessor placed a culvert covered with eight to ten inches of rock and gravel in the lowest portion of the driveway. In wet conditions, or if the culvert became plugged, water flowed across the driveway, making access to the building site by vehicle difficult or impossible at times. In 2001, Pomroy decided to raise the driveway.

Representatives of the Pine County Soil and Water Conservation District visited the site and determined that Pomroy’s proposed driveway improvement, which involved placing fill primarily on the traveled portion of the driveway rather than in the wetlands, would fall within a "de minimis" exception to the Wetlands Conservation Act and would not require a wetland replacement plan.

Pomroy contracted with Dean Pogatchnik, a local bridge builder, to raise the level of the driveway and install a 12-inch culvert with a Clemson leveler (a device designed to keep the culvert from clogging). Neither Pomroy nor Pogatchnik consulted with anyone concerning the effect that elevating the driveway would have on the water flow. Olean contends, but Pomroy denies, that Olean told Pomroy that the planned improvement to the driveway would flood Olean’s property.

Pogatchnik raised the driveway in the winter of 2001 when the ground was frozen. Pogatchnik trenched the sides of the driveway to create a shoulder, put in the 12-inch culvert "close to the top of the old road" and added 30 ten-cubic-yard loads of fill from nearby higher ground and a layer of gravel to the driveway surface. 4

In April 2002, Olean discovered that the elevated driveway was acting as a dam, causing water to be impounded two feet higher on the south side of the driveway and flooding approximately 29 acres of Olean’s land that had not previously had standing water. Olean notified Pomroy, who discovered that the Clemson leveler in the 12-inch culvert was plugged with debris due, in part, to the fact that the Clemson leveler had been installed backward. Pomroy immediately contacted Pogatchnik, who, within two days, cut a trench in the driveway to drain the water then installed a 32-inch culvert and reinstalled the 12-inch culvert. The Clemson leveler was badly damaged when it was removed from the 12-inch culvert, but what remained was reinstalled correctly in the 12-inch culvert. An additional 16-inch pipe was also installed through the driveway. Since that time, the water has remained level on both sides of the driveway, but at a higher level than before the driveway was raised.

There are beaver dams on Pomroy’s property north (downstream) of the driveway. Olean, who asserts that Pomroy told him that the purpose of raising the driveway was to create a lake on Pomroy’s property, contends that Pomroy also altered the height of the beaver dams to facilitate creation of a lake. Pomroy, who denies that he ever intended to create a lake, admits having altered the beaver dam or dams, but asserts that all alterations were attempts to keep water flowing through the dams rather than to raise the height of the dams to impound water. The first beaver dam downstream of the driveway washed out in 2003, but the beaver raised the height of downstream "coffer dams," raising the water level on the subject properties. Pomroy and his witnesses testified, and the district court found, that these natural beaver dams plus unnaturally high amounts of 5

rainfall, rather than the driveway, have caused water to remain on Olean’s property. Pomroy will not permit the beaver dams to be destroyed or lowered.

Olean continues to have standing water on portions of his property that had not had standing water for at least 80 years prior to the driveway improvements. Olean and his witnesses testified that the standing water has damaged and killed trees on his property, and Olean testified that the land can no longer be used for hunting. He sued Pomroy in June 2003, seeking injunctive relief to restore his property to its pre-driveway-improvement condition and for damages.1 The case was set for a jury trial to begin on November 15, 2004, but was removed from the calendar pending resolution of discovery motions and Olean’s motion to amend the complaint. Those motions were resolved in mid-January 2005, after which Olean amended the complaint to add a claim for injunctive relief under the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act (MERA), Minn. Stat. § 116B.03 (2004).

1 The parties dispute the measure of damages applicable to Olean’s claims. Olean sued for treble damages for the value of damaged trees plus costs of replanting. Pomroy asserted that the only measure of damages applicable is the diminution, if any, in the value of the affected land. At one point in this lengthy litigation, Pomroy sought to extend discovery deadlines to obtain an appraisal of the affected land. Olean objected. The district court denied the motion based on the parties’ acknowledgement that the applicable measure of damages is a matter of law for the court. The record does not reflect that the district court ever ruled on the issue, and the applicable measure of damages is not before us in this appeal.

Counsel for the parties participated in an unreported telephone scheduling conference on January 24, 2005, that resulted in an amended scheduling order setting the matter for a court trial on May 4, 2005. The order states that "the parties have waived a 6

jury trial."2 The case was called for trial on May 4, but was continued because a child-protection trial had priority. According to an affidavit of Pomroy’s attorney, the jury waiver was discussed on May 4, and Olean’s attorney conferred with Olean about the waiver, after which both parties confirmed to the district court that a jury was waived. The matter was rescheduled for a court trial in September 2005. Trial was again delayed by military deployment of Olean’s original attorney. Another telephone scheduling conference took place on October 14, 2005, in which Olean was represented by his current attorney. An amended scheduling order was issued the same day, setting the matter for a court trial on March 6, 2006. On January 31, 2006, Olean moved for a jury trial, a stay, and for an order compelling discovery. The request for a stay was based on the request for a jury trial and on the fact that Olean was severely injured in an explosion and would not be able to participate in the trial as scheduled. The motions were not heard as scheduled because the parties stipulated to a continuance. In September 2006, Olean renewed his motion for a jury trial and to compel discovery. Pomroy objected to the request for a jury trial, asserting the prior waiver of a jury trial and prejudice from any further delay. The district court denied Olean’s request for a jury trial based on the waiver. The matter was again scheduled for a court trial. Olean moved to add a claim for punitive damages. The motion was denied.

2 A footnote to findings of fact in the district court’s order denying Olean’s motion for a new trial states: "This waiver of a jury trial is noted in [presiding judge’s] handwritten hearing notes of January 24, 2005." But the referenced notes are not part of the record. 7

The matter was tried to the district court over three days in August 2007. The record was held open until September 21, 2007, for submission of written arguments. On September 21, Olean sought to introduce additional documentary evidence, but the district court declined to accept additional evidence. In November 2007, the district court issued its opinion concluding that Olean failed to show that Pomroy had caused water damage to Olean’s land and trees and dismissing all of Olean’s claims. Pomroy petitioned for costs and disbursements. Olean objected to some of the claimed disbursements and moved for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial. The district court denied Olean’s motions and ordered him to pay Pomroy $12,174.62 in costs and disbursements within 60 days of the order. This appeal followed.

D E C I S I O N

The district court has the discretion to grant a new trial, and we will not disturb the decision absent a clear abuse of that discretion. Halla Nursery, Inc. v. Baumann-Furrie & Co., 454 N.W.2d 905, 910 (Minn. 1990).

I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Olean’s request for a jury trial

Olean argues that he is entitled to a new trial because he was denied his right to a jury trial. Minn. R. Civ. P. 38.02 provides, in relevant part, that with permission of the district court, a party may waive a jury trial by "oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes." Pomroy argues that Olean, through counsel, waived a jury trial in the first unreported telephone scheduling conference and again in court on May 4, 2005. But it is doubtful that a telephone conference constitutes "open court." See Black’s Law 8

Dictionary 1118 (7th ed. 1999) (noting that "open court" usually refers to a proceeding in which formal entries are made on the record, and defining the term, in part, as "[a] court session that the public is free to attend"). And the record does not reflect that a jury-trial waiver was entered in the minutes at either proceeding. On this record, we cannot conclude that Olean validly waived a jury trial under rule 38.02.

We have previously reversed the denial of a motion for a new trial where a party was entitled to a jury trial and the record did not demonstrate a waiver in any manner specified under rule 38.02. Peterson v. Steinmaus, 393 N.W.2d 693, 694 (Minn. App. 1986). But we conclude that Olean is not entitled to a new trial in this case because the record reflects a valid waiver of a jury trial by means other than rule 38.02, and Olean was not constitutionally entitled to a jury trial in this matter.

Prior to the January 1, 1952 effective date of the Rules of Civil Procedure, waiver of a civil jury trial was governed by Minn. Stat. § 546.26 (1952). The supreme court held that the statutory methods of waiver, which are identical to those contained in rule 38.02, are not exclusive if the intention to waive a jury trial by another method is clear and unequivocal. Roske v. Ilykanyics, 232 Minn. 383, 390, 45 N.W.2d 769, 774 (1951). Because waiver under the rule is identical to waiver under the superseded statute, we conclude that likewise, rule 38.02 is not the exclusive method of waiver. In this case, the district court issued two scheduling orders setting the matter for a court trial and one of the orders recites the parties’ waiver of a jury trial. Olean’s failure to object to either of these orders evinces a clear and unequivocal intention to waive a jury trial. The district court did not err in concluding that Olean effectively waived a jury trial. 9

Olean argues that if there was an effective waiver, the district court abused its discretion by failing to allow him to withdraw the waiver. See Blenda Life Corp. v. Blenda Life, Inc., 293 Minn. 448, 451, 196 N.W.2d 925, 926 (1972) (stating that the district court has discretion whether or not to grant a motion to withdraw a jury-trial waiver). But Olean never moved the district court to withdraw his waiver. And based on Pomroy’s objection to Olean’s later request for a jury trial asserting that he would be prejudiced by further delay in the already protracted litigation, we cannot conclude that denial of a motion to withdraw the waiver would have constituted an abuse of discretion.

Pomroy first questioned Olean’s right to a jury trial in opposition to Olean’s motion for a new trial. The district court did not address Olean’s right to a jury trial, but both parties have briefed the issue on appeal. Where consideration of an issue is required in the interest of justice, the parties have had adequate briefing time, and the issues were implied in the district court, we make an exception to the general rule that we do not address issues that were not fully argued to and considered by the district court. Tischendorf v. Tischendorf, 321 N.W.2d 405, 410 (Minn. 1982); see Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.04 (allowing appellate courts to address issues in the interests of justice). We conclude that the requisite conditions exist to permit review of Olean’s right to a jury trial in this appeal.

Pomroy relies on the holding in Koeper v. Town of Louisville to argue that, in an action for both equitable and legal relief, neither party is entitled to a jury trial as a matter of right. 109 Minn. 519, 124 N.W. 218 (1910). The facts in Koeper are very similar to this case. Koeper sued to compel a town to close an opening it made in a lake bank 10

during a highway improvement. Koeper claimed that the opening caused flooding on his land. Id. at 520, 124 N.W. at 218. Koeper sought both injunctive relief and damages. Id. at 521, 124 N.W. at 218. The district court denied Koeper’s request for a jury trial and found for the town. Id. Koeper appealed, claiming that he was wrongfully denied a jury trial. Id.

The supreme court stated that whether Koeper was entitled to a jury trial depends on the character of his cause of action, noting that a party has a constitutional right to a trial by a jury of a legal cause of action, even if an equitable cause of action is asserted as a counterclaim. Id. (citing Lace v. Fixen, 39 Minn. 46, 38 N.W. 762 (1888)). But the supreme court stated:

There is a clear distinction between cases . . . where two causes of action, one legal and the other equitable, are united in the same action, and those where the cause of action is an equitable one, in which equitable relief is sought, and also legal relief as an incident to the equitable cause of action; for example, a claim for damages growing out of the facts upon which the equitable relief depends. The rule in cases of this kind is that in an action not of a strictly legal nature, where the plaintiff seeks both equitable and legal relief, neither party is entitled to a jury trial as a matter of right.

Koeper, 109 Minn. at 521–22, 124 N.W. at 218–19. We conclude that Olean’s cause of action is not distinguishable from the cause of action involved in Koeper; that Olean, like Koeper, was not entitled to a jury trial as a matter of right; and, therefore, Olean is not entitled to a new trial based on the district court’s denial of his request for a jury trial.

II. The district court correctly applied the doctrine of reasonable use 11

On appeal, Olean asserts that this case involves impoundment of a natural water course rather than diversion of surface waters, making it "questionable as to whether or not the doctrine of reasonable use even applies to this situation."

In determining liability for the obstruction or diversion of minor natural and artificial drainways or channels for the drainage of waters this court has uniformly applied the law relating to surface waters . . . .

"Each possessor (of land) is legally privileged to make a reasonable use of his land, even though the flow of surface waters is altered thereby and causes some harm to others. He incurs liability only when his harmful interference with the flow of surface water is unreasonable. The issue of reasonableness or unreasonableness is a question of fact to be determined in each case upon a consideration of all the relevant circumstances, including such factors as the amount of harm caused, the foreseeability of the harm on the part of the possessor making the alteration in the flow, the purpose or motive with which he acted, and others."

Collins v. Wickland, 251 Minn. 419, 425, 88 N.W.2d 83, 87-88 (1958) (citing Stanley V. Kinyon & Robert C. McClure, Interferences with Surface Waters, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 891, 904 (1940)).

There is ample evidence in the record to support the district court’s conclusion that this case involves drainage of surface waters rather than alteration of a natural water course. The district court did not err in applying the doctrine of reasonable use.

III. There is evidence in the record supporting the district court’s findings on reasonable use and causation

The parties presented conflicting evidence about why and how the driveway was raised and who or what caused water to be impounded on Olean’s property. "It is not the province of this court to reconcile conflicting evidence. On appeal, a trial court’s 12

findings are given great deference, and shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous . . . . If there is reasonable evidence to support the trial court’s findings of fact, a reviewing court should not disturb those findings." Fletcher v. St. Paul Pioneer Press, 589 N.W.2d 96, 101 (Minn. 1999).

Olean presented evidence that (1) Pomroy raised the driveway as much as four feet, intending to create a lake on his property deep enough to maintain fish through the winter; (2) the bottom of the culverts in the raised driveway are higher than the level of the original driveway surface such that water cannot begin to drain until the water is at a higher level than was possible when water could flow over the original driveway; (3) the culverts are too few and too small to permit the volume of flow necessary to drain Olean’s land at the same rate that was permitted by the original driveway, causing water to stand longer and at higher levels on Olean’s property; (4) 29 acres of Olean’s previously dry land are under water due to Pomroy’s driveway improvements; (5) Pomroy has directly or indirectly increased the height of downstream beaver dams, which also caused water to be impounded on Olean’s property; and (6) the high water caused by Pomroy has killed trees on Olean’s property and destroyed hunting land.

The district court plainly rejected Olean’s evidence and credited Pomroy’s evidence that (1) the only purpose of raising the driveway was to make his land consistently accessible by vehicle; (2) the driveway was raised only about 21 inches from the old driveway surface and culverts were installed to permit drainage at the same level and volume as before the driveway was raised; (3) Pomroy did not directly or indirectly 13

raise the height of downstream beaver dams; and (4) higher-than-average rainfall and beaver activity are the sole causes of increased water on Olean’s property. Based on Pomroy’s evidence, the district court found that (1) raising the driveway had no appreciable effect on the water level on Olean’s property after May 2002; (2) Olean’s tree damage was caused solely by high levels of precipitation between 2001 and 2003 combined with beaver activity; (3) raising the driveway constituted reasonable use of Pomroy’s property; and (4) Pomroy could not reasonably have foreseen any substantial harm that would result from the manner in which the driveway was raised. Because there is evidence in the record to support the district court’s findings and the findings are not manifestly and palpably contrary to the evidence as a whole, we will not disturb these findings on appeal, even though we might have found the facts to be different if we had the fact-finding function. See Grant v. Malkerson Sales, Inc., 259 Minn. 419, 425–26, 108 N.W.2d 347, 351 (1961). IV. The district court did not err in dismissing Olean’s MERA claims The MERA provides, in relevant part, that a person may maintain a civil action for equitable relief to protect natural resources from impairment or destruction. Minn. Stat. § 116B.03, subd. 1 (2008). The district court dismissed all of Olean’s claims without specifically addressing the MERA claim.

Pomroy asserts that Olean’s MERA claim was properly dismissed as without merit and as untimely,3 noting that Olean did not serve the attorney general and the Minnesota

3 The parties do not dispute that the two-year statute of limitations for improvements to real property applies to the MERA claim in this case. See Minn. Stat. § 541.051 (2004). 14

Pollution Control Agency, as required by the MERA, until 2007. Olean argues that because his amended complaint relates back to his original complaint, the action was timely. Neither party has briefed or argued the effect of late service on the relation-back doctrine, but we need not reach this issue. Because we are affirming the district court’s findings that Pomroy’s acts are not the cause of any of the environmental effects asserted by Olean and had no appreciable effect on the public waters of Minnesota, Olean failed to make a prima facie case under the MERA. See Minn. Stat. § 116B.04 (2008) (stating that a plaintiff under the MERA has the burden to make a prima facie showing that the defendant’s conduct "has, or is likely to cause the pollution, impairment, or destruction of the air, water, land or other natural resource located within the state"). Therefore, the district court did not err by dismissing Olean’s MERA claims.

V. The district court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting posttrial evidence

Olean argues that the district court should have permitted him to supplement the trial record with "newly discovered" evidence from the county soil and water conservation district. We review denials of motions to consider new evidence under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Zander v. Zander, 720 N.W.2d 360, 364 (Minn. App. 2006), review denied (Minn. Nov. 14, 2006). The district court found that all of the documents that Olean sought to introduce were available to him before trial. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 59.01(d) (describing newly discovered evidence as "[m]aterial evidence newly discovered, which with reasonable diligence could not have been found and produced at the trial"); Bruno v. Belmonte, 252 Minn. 497, 503, 90 N.W.2d 899, 903 (1958) (stating that for newly discovered evidence to be considered, the moving party must show that it 15

exercised "proper diligence" to discover it before trial). Olean asserts that he had requested the documents but they were withheld and only turned over when the county attorney became involved after the trial. But Olean never attempted to depose anyone who could have produced these documents or to subpoena these documents during the years of discovery that preceded the trial. On this record, the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Olean’s posttrial evidence. VI. The issue of punitive damages is moot Olean argues that he established a sufficient basis to support a claim for punitive damages under Minn. Stat. § 549.20, subd. 1 (2008), and the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to add a claim for punitive damages. Because we are affirming dismissal of Olean’s action, the issue of punitive damages is moot. See Obermoller v. Federal Land Bank of St. Paul, 409 N.W.2d 229, 230–31 (Minn. App. 1987) (stating that an issue is moot when a determination is sought on a matter, which, when made, will not have any practical effect or will make no difference with respect to the controversy on the merits), review denied (Minn. Sept. 18, 1987). VII. The district court’s award of disbursements is not supported by sufficient findings or authority

The district court awarded Pomroy $12,174.62 in costs and disbursements, over Olean’s objections, without a hearing.4 The prevailing party in a district court action "shall" be allowed costs and "reasonable disbursements." Minn. Stat. §§ 549.02, .04

4 Olean does not challenge the award of costs under Minn. Stat. § 549.02 (2008). His challenge is to certain disbursements awarded under Minn. Stat. § 549.04 (2008). Many cases improvidently use the phrase "costs and disbursements" in discussing disbursements under section 549.04. 16

(2008). The amount of disbursements awarded is within the district court’s discretion and will not be reversed on appeal unless there is an abuse of discretion. Stinson v. Clark Equip. Co., 473 N.W.2d 333, 336 (Minn. App. 1991), review denied (Minn. Sept. 13, 1991). When reviewing a request for disbursements, the district court must make sufficient findings that the disbursements were reasonable and necessary disbursements. Id. at 338.

In Beniek v. Textron, Inc., we quoted Stinson for the proposition that to make the required findings, the district court must "take oral testimony of all [disbursements] with full opportunity for both direct and cross-examination so a full record is available for review." 479 N.W.2d 719, 724 (Minn. App. 1992) (citation omitted), reviews denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 27, 1992). In Buller v. A. O. Smith Harvestore Prods. Inc., 518 N.W.2d 537, 543 (Minn. 1994), the supreme court noted that Minn. R. Civ. P. 54.04 does not require the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine the reasonableness of alleged disbursements. But, in this case, Pomroy’s claimed disbursements are sparingly documented, and Olean had no opportunity to challenge the request. The district court made only one conclusory finding that all amounts claimed were reasonable. On this record, we conclude that the district court erred in this case by failing to conduct a hearing on Olean’s objections.

It is undisputed that the procedures set out in Minn. R. Civ. P. 54.04 and Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 127 were not followed in this case. Nothing in the record explains why the rules were not followed. Pomroy filed notice of taxation and Olean objected, but the court administrator failed to take any action and the matter was unresolved until the 17

district court, in its order denying Olean’s posttrial motion, made a conclusory finding that the "costs and disbursement records as submitted by [Pomroy] [are] a fair and reasonable taxation of costs to be paid by [Olean]" and ordered Olean to pay the full amount awarded within 60 days.5 Because the procedure employed deprived Olean of the opportunity to meaningfully challenge the amounts claimed and the district court failed to provide adequate findings to support the award, we reverse the award of disbursements and remand for further proceedings to determine the reasonableness and necessity of disbursements authorized by law, consistent with this opinion. a. Lost vacation time and mileage for counsel and parties are not recognized disbursements The district court awarded Pomroy $3,090.00 for "lost vacation time for mandatory court appearances." There is no documentation supporting this "loss" or how it was calculated, and there is no explanation of how this claim constitutes a reasonable disbursement "paid or incurred" under Minn. Stat. § 549.04. We conclude that such an award is, as a matter of law, not a disbursement contemplated by the statute and reverse the award for "lost vacation time."

5 Pomroy claimed $12,311.62 in costs and disbursements. Despite the court’s finding that the records Pomroy submitted represented fair and reasonable costs and disbursements, the court awarded Pomroy only $12,174.62. Our analysis uses the amount Pomroy claimed for each particular disbursement because the court’s findings are devoid of information regarding how much of the total award was allotted for each particular disbursement.

The district court awarded $1,441.40 for mileage for Pomroy and his attorney. There is no recognized practice in Minnesota of awarding mileage to a party or a party’s counsel as a disbursement under section 549.04. Taxation of section 357.22 witness fees, 18

which caps travel expenses at .28 cents per mile, is a recognized practice in Minnesota, but there is no authority for awarding witness fees to parties appearing on their own behalf or to their counsel. See Barry v. McGrade, 14 Minn. 286, 14 Gil. 214, 215, (1869) (noting that an attorney is not entitled to fees for attending hearings as a witness, and a party is entitled to witness fees only when it appears that the party is acting solely as a witness for co-parties). We conclude that mileage expenses for parties and counsel are not disbursements under section 549.04 and reverse the mileage award for Pomroy and his attorney.

b. Expert witness fees

The district court awarded Pomroy $4,882.91 in expert-witness fees based solely on an attachment to counsel’s affidavit showing that this amount was paid by Pomroy’s insurer to Pomroy’s expert witness. Olean objected to the amount claimed as excessive and unsubstantiated.

The judge of any court of record may allow expert-witness fees or compensation "as may be just and reasonable." Minn. Stat. § 357.25 (2008). Allocation of expert-witness fees to the prevailing party in an award of costs and disbursements has long been recognized practice in Minnesota. See Kundiger v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 218 Minn. 273, 286, 15 N.W.2d 487, 495 (1944) (noting that allowance of expert-witness fees to prevailing party "was made by order of the trial court . . . according to recognized practice"). Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 127 permits the court administrator, on appropriate affidavit, to award up to $300 per day for expert-witness fees, subject to increase or decrease by the judge. But the limitation on the amount and the exclusion from a court 19

administrator’s award of costs for an expert witness’s preparation or experiments outside the court room, do not apply to an award by the judge. Quade & Sons Refrigeration Inc. v. 3M, 510 N.W.2d 256, 260 (Minn. App. 1994) (noting that section 357.25 permits a judge to allow expert-witness fees "as may be just and reasonable"), review denied (Minn. Mar. 15, 1994).

In this case, the district court made no findings concerning the expert-witness fees. On remand, we instruct the district court to reopen the record to permit direct and cross-examination on the reasonableness and necessity of the claim and to make appropriate findings based on the record established.

c. Miscellaneous expenses

Over Olean’s objections, Pomroy was awarded $340.00 in motion and fax fees, $299.80 in subpoena-service fees, and $20.00 in parking fees. Minn. Stat. § 357.09, subd. 1(1), permits the sheriff to charge and collect fees established by the county board for serving subpoenas, and Minn. Stat. § 549.04, subd. 1, specifically includes fees for service of process as a taxable disbursement. But in this case the documentation provided to support the service fees does not match the amount requested. On remand, the district court must make findings supported by the record on the reasonable amount of such fees.

The district court has discretion to award miscellaneous costs, including photocopying, long-distance telephone calls, fax charges, parking, and courier services. Stinson, 473 N.W.2d at 338. Again, a request for such disbursements must be supported with evidence of the disbursement. Here, Pomroy’s attorney submitted a bill that lists fax 20

fees but no documentation about what was faxed to whom. Olean should be given an opportunity to challenge reasonableness of miscellaneous expenses claimed, Pomroy should have an opportunity to respond to Olean’s objections, and the district court must make findings specific to each challenged request.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Thursday, December 25, 2008

PortAuthority v. AdvanceShoring Ins A07-2206 Eminent Domain

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A07-2206

http://mncourts.gov/opinions/coa/current/opa072206-1223.pdf

Port Authority of the City of St. Paul, petitioner, Respondent, vs. RLR, Inc., et al., Defendants, Insurance Auto Auctions, Inc., Appellant.

Filed December 23, 2008

Reversed

Peterson, Judge

Ramsey County District Court

File No. 62-CV-07-729

Daniel J. Supalla, Marc J Manderscheid, Briggs and Morgan, P.A., 2200 IDS Center, 80 South Eighth Street, Minneapolis, MN 55402 (for respondent)

Mark J. Kiperstin, Daniel N. Rosen, Parker Rosen L.L.C., 300 First Avenue North, Suite 200, Minneapolis, MN 55401 (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Klaphake, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Shumaker, Judge.

S Y L L A B U S

To satisfy the requirement in Minn. Stat. § 117.041, subd. 2(a)(1) (2006), that it has reason to believe that acquisition of property may be required pursuant to eminent-domain proceedings, a political subdivision must identify a public use or public purpose for which the property could be acquired in eminent-domain proceedings. 2

O P I N I O N

PETERSON, Judge

In this appeal from a district court order that grants respondent access to appellant‟s property for the purpose of conducting environmental testing, appellant argues that respondent did not meet the requirements under the eminent-domain statute for entering property to conduct environmental tests. We reverse.

FACTS

Respondent Port Authority of the City of St. Paul (the port authority) is a governmental subdivision established under Minn. Stat. § 469.049 (2006). The port authority may create and define the boundaries of industrial development districts to establish and develop a system of industrial developments. Minn. Stat. § 469.058, subd. 1 (2006). For the purpose of industrial development, the port authority may exercise the power of eminent domain under Minn. Stat. ch. 117, which is the general eminent-domain statute that establishes procedures for exercising the power of eminent domain. Minn. Stat. § 469.059, subd. 4 (2006). See generally Minn. Stat. ch. § 117 (2006) (establishing eminent-domain procedures).

In 1993, the port authority created an industrial and economic development district called the Arlington-Jackson Development District. The parcels of property in the western section of the district, which is referred to as "Arlington-Jackson West," are identified as parcels 1 through 19. Parcels 11-14 constitute the majority of Arlington-Jackson West and are occupied in whole or in part by appellant Insurance Auto Auctions, Inc. (IAAI). 3

From 1994 through 1997, the eastern part of the Arlington-Jackson Development District was developed as Phase I. During development planning in 1994 and 1995, the port authority hired American Engineering Test, Inc. to perform environmental analyses of the properties within the development district. The initial environmental analyses completed during Phase I determined that lead, petroleum, and other hazardous materials are present in the Arlington-Jackson West properties.

On April 24, 2007, the port authority passed Resolution 4212, which authorized the port authority‟s staff, legal counsel, contractors, or agents to obtain the consent of the owners and occupants of properties in Arlington-Jackson West to allow the port authority to conduct environmental testing and inspection of the properties, and if they could not obtain consent, to obtain a court order pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 117.041 (2006) to allow the testing and inspection. The port authority‟s stated bases for Resolution 4212 were that (1) because of the marginal condition of Arlington-Jackson West, the minimal jobs located there, and the lack of investment during recent years, the port authority had reason to believe that acquisition of the properties pursuant to eminent domain proceedings may be required; (2) prior and current uses of the properties and environmental testing conducted during Phase I gave the port authority good reason to believe that hazardous substances, pollutants, and/or contaminants are present in the area and that a release of one or more of these materials may have occurred; and (3) entry onto the properties is rationally related to the health, safety, or welfare concerns of the citizens of St. Paul and necessary for the purpose of environmental testing to identify the 4

existence and extent of any release or threat of release of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant.

On June 29, 2007, the port authority filed a petition in the district court seeking an order to enter a number of properties in Arlington-Jackson West, including appellant‟s property, "for purposes of investigation, monitoring, testing, surveying, boring, or other similar activities necessary or appropriate to identify the existence and extent of a release or threat of release of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant." IAAI and other landowners in Arlington-Jackson West requested a continuance for more time to review the evidence and submitted a memorandum opposing respondent‟s petition.

The district court held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the port authority met the requirements under the eminent-domain statute for entering a property for the purpose of environmental testing. In an order filed on October 31, 2007, the district court granted the port authority access to several parcels in Arlington-Jackson West for the requested purpose of environmental testing. Although the order granted access to a number of parcels, only IAAI appealed.

I S S U E

Did the port authority meet the requirements under Minn. Stat. § 117.041 to obtain an order authorizing it to enter IAAI‟s property to conduct environmental testing?

ANALYSIS

"On appeal, a [district] court‟s findings of fact are given great deference, and shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. . . . If there is reasonable evidence to support the [district] court‟s findings of fact, a reviewing court should not disturb those findings." 5

Fletcher v. St. Paul Pioneer Press, 589 N.W.2d 96, 101 (Minn. 1999) (citation omitted). "An appellate court is not bound by, and need not give deference to, the district court‟s decision on a question of law." Bondy v. Allen, 635 N.W.2d 244, 249 (Minn. App. 2001) (citing Frost-Benco Elec. Ass’n v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 358 N.W.2d 639, 642 (Minn. 1984)). "Issues involving the correct application of a statute are questions of law, which we review de novo." In re Wrongful Death Proceeds for Next of Kin of Markuson, 685 N.W.2d 697, 702 (Minn. App. 2004).

IAAI argues that the district court erred by concluding that the port authority satisfied the requirements under the eminent-domain statute for obtaining an order authorizing the port authority to enter IAAI‟s property to conduct environmental testing.

The eminent domain statute states:

A . . . political subdivision by resolution may enter property for purposes of investigation, monitoring, testing, surveying, boring, or other similar activities necessary or appropriate to identify the existence and extent of a release or threat of release of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant if:

(1) the . . . political subdivision has reason to believe that acquisition of the property may be required pursuant to eminent domain proceedings;

(2) the . . . political subdivision has reason to believe that a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant is present on the property or the release of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant may have occurred or is likely to occur on the property; and

(3) entry on the property for environmental testing is rationally related to health, safety, or welfare concerns of the . . . political subdivision in connection with possible eminent domain proceedings.

Minn. Stat. § 117.041, subd. 2(a) (2006). 6

The statute further provides that before entering the property, the political subdivision must ask the property owner for permission to enter, and if the owner refuses to consent to the entry, the political subdivision must apply for a court order authorizing the entry. Id., subd. 2(b) (2006). If the political subdivision meets the standards in Minn. Stat. § 117.041, subd. 2(a), the court shall issue an order. Id.

The port authority applied for a court order authorizing it to enter IAAI‟s property, and the district court concluded that the port authority met all three standards in Minn. Stat. § 117.041, subd. 2(a). IAAI does not dispute that the port authority met the standards set forth in Minn. Stat. § 117.041, subd. 2(a)(2)-(3); it argues only that the port authority did not meet the standard in Minn. Stat. § 117.041, subd. 2(a)(1).

Minn. Stat. § 117.041, subd. 2(a)(1) requires the port authority to show that it has reason to believe that acquisition of IAAI‟s property pursuant to eminent-domain proceedings may be required. IAAI argues that the port authority did not meet this standard because it did not show that there is any purpose for which the port authority could use eminent-domain proceedings to acquire IAAI‟s property, and if eminent-domain proceedings could not be used to acquire the property, the port authority could not have reason to believe that it may be required to use eminent-domain proceedings to acquire the property.

IAAI‟s argument is based on the fundamental principle that the power of eminent domain can only be used to acquire property for a public use or public purpose. See Hous. & Redevelopment Auth. v. Schapiro, 297 Minn. 103, 106, 210 N.W.2d 211, 213 (Minn. 1973) ("It is elementary that the power of condemnation may be exercised only 7

for a public use or purpose."). In 2006, the legislature affirmed this principle when it amended the eminent-domain statute to expressly state, "Eminent domain may only be used for a public use or public purpose." 2006 Minn. Laws ch. 214, § 1 at 195 (codified as Minn. Stat. § 117.012, subd. 2 (2006)).

In 2006, the legislature also defined "public use" or "public purpose" for the purposes of Minn. Stat. ch. 117 and any other general or special law authorizing the exercise of the power of eminent domain. This definition states:

(a) "Public use" or "public purpose" means, exclusively:

(1) the possession, occupation, ownership, and enjoyment of the land by the general public, or by public agencies;

(2) the creation or functioning of a public service corporation; or

(3) mitigation of a blighted area, remediation of an environmentally contaminated area, reduction of abandoned property, or removal of a public nuisance.

(b) The public benefits of economic development, including an increase in tax base, tax revenues, employment, or general economic health, do not by themselves constitute a public use or public purpose.

2006 Minn. Laws ch. 214, § 2 (codified at Minn. Stat. § 117.025, subd. 11 (2006) (emphasis added).

IAAI contends that because the port authority did not identify a public use or public purpose for which IAAI‟s property would be used, the port authority did not demonstrate that it has reason to believe that it would be required to use eminent-domain proceedings to acquire IAAI‟s property. The district court concluded: 8

In Resolution 4212, the Port Authority had reason to believe that the lack of economic investment, the marginal condition of the Arlington-Jackson West properties, and the discovery and environmental analysis demonstrating contamination, satisfied the criteria of Subdivision 2(a)(1) of Minn. Stat. § 117.041. The Port Authority concluded it has reason to believe that acquisition of some or all of the Parcels in Arlington-Jackson West may be required. Therefore, Minn. Stat. § 117.041, Subd. 2(a)(1) is satisfied.

But Resolution 4212 does not identify "the discovery and environmental analysis demonstrating contamination" as a basis for the port authority having reason to believe that acquisition of some or all of the parcels in Arlington-Jackson West pursuant to eminent-domain proceedings may be required. Resolution 4212 identifies "the results of environmental analyses done during Phase I" as a basis for the port authority having "good reason to believe that one or more hazardous substances, pollutants, and/or contaminants are present in the western section of the District and the release of one or more hazardous substances, pollutants, and/or contaminants . . . may have occurred in the western section of the District." Having reason to believe that hazardous substances, pollutants, and/or contaminants are present on the property satisfies the standard in Minn. Stat. § 117.041, subd. 2(a)(2), but having reason to believe only that these substances are present in some quantity is not sufficient to satisfy the standard in Minn. Stat. § 117.041, subd. 2(a)(1), which requires that the port authority have reason to believe that acquisition of IAAI‟s property pursuant to eminent-domain proceedings may be required.

Under Minn. Stat. § 117.025, subd. 11(a)(3), "remediation of an environmentally contaminated area" is a public use or public purpose for which 9

property may be acquired under the eminent-domain statute. But for purposes of the eminent-domain statute,

"Environmentally contaminated area" means an area:

(1) in which more than 50 percent of the parcels contain any substance defined, regulated, or listed as a hazardous substance, hazardous material, hazardous waste, toxic waste, pollutant, contaminant, or toxic substance, or identified as hazardous to human health or the environment under state or federal law or regulation; and

(2) for which the estimated costs of investigation, monitoring and testing, and remedial action or removal, as defined in section 115B.02, subdivisions 16 and 17, respectively, including any state costs of remedial actions, exceed 100 percent of the assessor‟s estimated market value for the contaminated parcel, as determined under section 273.11, for property taxes payable in the year in which the condemnation commenced, or for which a court of competent jurisdiction has issued an order under law or regulations adopted by Minnesota or the United States, that clean up or remediation of a contaminated site occur and the property owner has failed to comply with the court‟s order within a reasonable time.

Minn. Stat. § 117.025, subd. 8 (2006) (emphasis added). Under the plain language of this definition, which requires that the conditions in both paragraphs (1) and (2) be met to demonstrate that property is in an environmentally contaminated area, it is not sufficient to show only that there are parcels in the area that contain a statutorily identified substance. It is necessary to show that more than 50% of the parcels contain the identified substances and that either (a) the estimated costs of investigation, monitoring, testing, and remedial action or removal of the substances exceeds the assessor‟s market value of the property; or (b) a court has ordered that 10

clean up or remediation of the property occur and the property owner has failed to comply with the order within a reasonable time.

Resolution 4212 does not address the estimated costs of identifying and removing the substances on IAAI‟s property or indicate that a court has ordered that either clean up or remediation of the property occur, and no evidence that addresses these elements of the definition of "environmentally contaminated area" was admitted at the hearing before the district court. Without evidence that at least one of these elements exists, the port authority could not have reason to believe that acquiring IAAI‟s property pursuant to eminent-domain proceedings may be required in order to remediate an environmentally contaminated area. Therefore, the district court erred in concluding that the port authority satisfied the requirement in Minn. Stat. § 117.041, subd. 2(a)(1).

The port authority argues that it made the showing required under Minn. Stat. § 117.041, subd. 2(a)(1), because the operative term in Minn. Stat. § 117.041, subd. 2(a)(1), is "may," and "may" is permissive. See Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 15 (2006) ("„May‟ is permissive."). But although the port authority is correct that when used in Minnesota Statutes, "may" is permissive, applying this meaning in Minn. Stat. § 117.041, subd. 2(a)(1), supports our conclusion that the port authority did not satisfy the requirement in that statute.

To satisfy this requirement, the port authority needed to show that it "has reason to believe that acquisition of the property may be required pursuant to eminent domain proceedings." Minn. Stat. § 117.041, subd. 2(a)(1). Simply inserting the statutory 11

definition of "may" into this phrase leads to the conclusion that the port authority needed to show that it has reason to believe that acquisition of the property is permitted pursuant to eminent-domain proceedings. To show that it has reason to believe that acquisition of the property is permitted pursuant to eminent-domain proceedings, the port authority would need to show that there is a public use or a public purpose for the acquisition. The port authority argues correctly that it did not need to show that it will acquire the property pursuant to eminent-domain proceedings; it only needed to show that it may. But it may acquire the property pursuant to eminent-domain proceedings only if there is a public use or a public purpose for the acquisition, and the port authority did not identify a public use or public purpose for which it could acquire IAAI‟s property.

Because we are reversing the district court‟s order authorizing the port authority to enter IAAI‟s property to conduct environmental testing, the port authority is not authorized to conduct environmental testing, and IAAI‟s claims that the environmental testing constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure and a taking that requires just compensation have become moot. Therefore, we will not address the claims.

D E C I S I O N

Because the port authority did not identify a public use or public purpose for which IAAI‟s property could be acquired in eminent-domain proceedings, it did not satisfy the standard in Minn. Stat. § 117.041, subd. 2(a)(1), to obtain an order authorizing it to enter the property to conduct environmental testing.

Reversed.

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