Facebook Badge

Tuesday, September 30, 2008

A07-1311 Walnut Towers, Respondent, vs. Lori A. Schwan, Appellant

Former St.Paul City Attorney and SMRLS Lawyer

This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2006).

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A07-1311 Walnut Towers, Respondent, vs. Lori A. Schwan, Appellant. Filed September 16, 2008 Reversed Hudson, Judge Blue Earth County District Court File No. 07-CV-07-1183 Walnut Towers, 105 East Walnut Street, Mankato, Minnesota 56001 (respondent) Tashi Lhewa, Southern Minnesota Regional Legal Services, Inc., 12 Civic Center Plaza, Suite 3000, Mankato, Minnesota 56002-3304; and Michael Hagedorn, 166 East Fourth Street, Suite 200, St. Paul, Minnesota 55101-1448 (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Kalitowski, Presiding Judge; Hudson, Judge; and Collins, Judge.

Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. 2

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

HUDSON, Judge

On appeal in this eviction matter, appellant-tenant argues that the district court erred in (a) permitting respondent-corporation to appear in district court without the representation of a licensed attorney; (b) entering judgment in favor of respondent-corporation on the basis that appellant‟s request for reasonable accommodation would impose an undue financial and administrative burden on respondent-corporation; and (c) granting the request to evict appellant when appellant was not provided with the opportunity to meet with management before filing of the eviction action. Because the district court erred in allowing respondent-corporation to appear in district court without the representation of legal counsel, we reverse.

FACTS

In July 2006, appellant Lori Schwan entered into a lease agreement to rent a federally subsidized apartment from respondent Walnut Towers. In the following months, appellant was issued several "Notice of Lease/Rule Violations" for conduct that was allegedly in violation of her lease agreement. Finally, in March 2007, after a confrontation with her landlord, appellant was advised that her lease was terminated.

After an eviction action was filed against appellant in April 2007, appellant filed, in district court, a memorandum in support of reasonable accommodation. Appellant claimed to be disabled as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 3602 (h) (2003), and requested that Walnut Towers provide her with a reasonable accommodation. At the eviction hearing, Mary Dundas, the manager at Walnut Towers, appeared on behalf of Lasson Management, the corporation that 3

manages Walnut Towers. Appellant objected to Dundas appearing on behalf of the corporation because she is not a licensed attorney. The court overruled appellant‟s objection, stating that it is "the long standing tradition in Blue Earth County of not requiring incorporated landlords to be represented during eviction hearings." The district court then concluded that appellant "may have a disability as defined under 42 U.S.C. § 3602 (h)," but the "accommodation requested by [appellant] is unreasonable as it will impose undue hardships and/or undue financial and administrative burdens upon [Walnut Towers]." Thus, the district court entered judgment in favor of Walnut Towers. Appellant‟s eviction was stayed pending determination of this appeal.

D E C I S I O N

Appellant argues that the district court erred in permitting Walnut Towers, a corporation, to be represented by a non-attorney agent during eviction proceedings in district court. Questions concerning rules are questions of law, and we need not defer to the conclusions of law drawn by the district court from undisputed facts. See Reichel v. Hefner, 472 N.W.2d 346, 347 (Minn. App. 1991). Consequently, we review this issue de novo. See Frost-Benco Elec. Ass’n v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 358 N.W.2d 639, 642 (Minn. 1984) (stating that appellate courts review legal issues de novo).

We initially note that appellant phrases the issue as one of jurisdiction, and that while appellant does not specify whether her argument refers to personal jurisdiction, subject-matter jurisdiction, in rem jurisdiction, or some other type of jurisdiction, the substance of her argument suggests that she is arguing that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The issue presented, however, is not one of jurisdiction. In the past, this court 4

has been presented with similar issues and has loosely used the term "jurisdiction" to conclude that a corporation may not appear in district court without the representation of a licensed attorney. See, e.g., World Championship Fighting, Inc. v. Janos, 609 N.W.2d 263, 265 (Minn. App. 2000) (holding that because a corporation could not appear in district court without an attorney, the district court was correct to conclude that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case). More recently, the United States Supreme Court has cautioned against the misuse of the term "jurisdiction." Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454–55, 124 S. Ct. 906, 915 (2004) (noting that "[c]ourts, including this Court . . . have more than occasionally [mis]used the term „jurisdictional‟"). In an effort to add clarity to the issue, this court recently stated that "[b]ecause the common law rule requiring that a corporation be represented by counsel in legal proceedings does not describe the classes of cases or persons within the district court‟s adjudicatory authority, the rule is not „jurisdictional.‟" Save Our Creeks v. City of Brooklyn Park, 682 N.W.2d 639, 643 (Minn. App. 2004), aff’d, 699 N.W.2d 307 (Minn. 2005). The Minnesota Supreme Court, on review, found this reasoning to be "persuasive" and adopted it. Save Our Creeks v. City of Brooklyn Park, 699 N.W.2d 307, 310 (Minn. 2005). Therefore, we reiterate that the issue of corporations appearing in district court without counsel does not involve the court‟s subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case.

We now turn to the district court‟s decision to allow Walnut Towers, a corporation, to proceed in the eviction action without the representation of legal counsel. In reaching this conclusion, the district court stated that: 5

[Appellant‟s] counsel has raised the issue of [Walnut Towers] appearing in District Court without the assistance of an attorney. The Court has addressed this issue with [appellant‟s] counsel and reiterated the long standing tradition in Blue Earth County of not requiring incorporated landlords to be represented during eviction hearings. This policy is akin to the policy in other informal proceedings such as conciliation court. Ultimately, whether [Walnut Towers] is represented in Court by counsel would not change the facts or outcome of this case.

Appellant argues that under Minnesota law, the district court‟s conclusion is erroneous. We agree. In Minnesota, a corporation must be represented by an attorney in legal proceedings. Nicollet Restoration, Inc. v. Turnham, 486 N.W.2d 753, 754 (Minn. 1992). "The purpose behind attorney licensing requirements „is the protection of the public and the courts from the consequences of ignorance or venality.‟" Id. (quoting Strong Delivery Ministry Ass’n v. Bd. of Appeals of Cook County, 543 F.2d 32, 33 (7th Cir. 1976)).1

1 In addition, Minn. Stat. § 481.02, subd. 3(12) (2006), provides that "any authorized management agent of an owner of rental property used for residential purposes, whether the management agent is a natural person, corporation, partnership, limited partnership, or any other business entity," is not authorized to "appear before a district court or the court of appeals or supreme court pursuant to an appeal" if the agent it not a licensed attorney. We think the language of this statute comports with Nicollet Restoration, but we recognize that there could be alternative readings of this statute. Nonetheless, because the statutory construction of Minn. Stat. § 481.02, subd. 3(12), was not briefed in this appeal, we decline to address it. See Balder v. Haley, 399 N.W.2d 77, 80 (Minn. 1987) (stating that, generally, appellate courts will not consider issues not argued in the parties‟ briefs).

In Nicollet Restoration, the supreme court rejected the argument that Minn. Stat. § 481.02, subd. 2 (1990), authorized a corporation to appear by or through a non-attorney agent. 486 N.W.2d at 755. The court stated that under the common law, a corporation still must be represented by a licensed attorney when appearing in district court because "a 6

careful reading of Minn. Stat. § 481.02, subd. 2," does not permit an officer, employee, or agent appearing on behalf of a corporation in district court to be a non-attorney. Id. The court further noted that "[e]ven assuming that Minn. Stat. § 481.02, subd. 2, could be construed to permit a corporation to appear by or through a non-attorney agent, such a construction would raise serious constitutional problems." Id. The court then stated that under Article III, section I, of the Minnesota Constitution, the power to decide who may properly practice law before the courts of this state is vested solely in the judiciary. Id. Thus, the court held that "legislative enactments which purport to authorize certain classes to practice law in the courts of this state are not controlling upon the judiciary. As such, we reaffirm our conviction that a corporation must be represented by a licensed attorney when appearing in district court." Id. at 756.

Here, despite the district court‟s attempt to carve out an exception for incorporated landlords to appear in eviction hearings without representation by legal counsel, we conclude that on this record, Nicollet Restoration controls, and there is no legal support for such an exception. See Save Our Creeks, 699 N.W.2d at 309 (stating that under Minnesota common law, a corporation must be represented by an attorney in legal proceedings); see also Nicollet Restoration, 486 N.W.2d at 756 (holding that "a corporation must be represented by a licensed attorney when appearing in district court"); Janos, 609 N.W.2d at 265 (stating that the legislature did not intend that some corporations be allowed to institute district-court actions without the aid of counsel while others would not). We fully acknowledge that the conciliation court rules permit a corporation to appear by a non-attorney in conciliation-court proceedings. See Minn. R. 7

Gen. Pract. 512(c). We also recognize the supreme court‟s adoption of the rules for the "housing courts" in Hennepin and Ramsey counties, which permit incorporated landlords to appear without counsel, if their agents have the required "Power of Authority." See Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 603 (stating that "[n]o person other than a principal or a duly licensed attorney shall be allowed to appear in Housing Court unless the Power of Authority is attached to the complaint at the time of filing").2 But those rules do not apply to eviction proceedings heard in district court. When appearing before this court, our supreme court, or in district court, the law in Minnesota requires that a corporation must be represented by a licensed attorney. Therefore, given our role as an error-correcting court, we conclude that the district court erred in permitting the non-attorney agent of Walnut Towers to appear on behalf of the corporation in the eviction proceedings. Next, we address the appropriate remedy to be applied. In Save our Creeks, the issue before the supreme court was "whether a complaint filed and signed on behalf of a corporate entity by a non-lawyer is a legal nullity." 699 N.W.2d at 309. The court held that it was not a legal nullity, but it presented a curable defect. Id. at 310. The court then explained that

2 We express no opinion at this time as to whether Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 603 is inconsistent with Minn. Stat. § 481.02, subd. 3. See Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 601 (stating that the rules pertaining to housing court "shall apply to housing court practice except where they are in conflict with applicable statutes").

an amendment to add an attorney‟s signature to a corporation‟s complaint should be permitted when the following four elements are met: (1) the corporation acts without knowledge that its action was improper; (2) upon 8

notice, the corporation diligently corrects its mistake by obtaining counsel, but in no event may it appear in court without an attorney; (3) the nonattorney‟s participation in the action is minimal; and (4) the nonattorney‟s participation results in no prejudice to the opposing party.

Id. at 311.

Under Save Our Creeks, the mere fact that an attorney did not sign the eviction complaint on behalf of Walnut Towers does not render the complaint void. See id. But in this case, unlike in Save Our Creeks, there was never any attempt to remedy the defect and Walnut Towers still has not retained counsel to represent it in this matter. Because the defect caused by the non-attorney appearance on behalf of Walnut Towers was not cured, the district court should have dismissed the eviction action, rather than proceeding to trial. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment in favor of Walnut Towers. In light of our decision, the additional issues raised by appellant are moot and, therefore, we decline to address them.

Reversed.

Thursday, August 28, 2008

Diva's Bar_Unpublished 26Aug08

http://www.mncourts.gov/opinions/coa/current/opa071599-0826.pdf

This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2006). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A07-1599 DRJ, Inc., d/b/a Diva‟s Overtime Lounge, Relator, vs. City of St. Paul, Respondent. Filed August 26, 2008 Affirmed

Harten, JudgeCity of St. Paul Council File No. 07-737 Marshall H. Tanick, Teresa J. Ayling, Mansfield, Tanick & Cohen, P.A., 1700 U.S. Bank Plaza South, 220 South Sixth Street, Minneapolis, MN 55402; and Andrew J. Dawkins, Law Office of Andrew J. Dawkins, 1700 U.S. Bank Plaza South, 220 South Sixth Street, Minneapolis, MN 55402 (for relator) John Jung-Hoon Choi, St. Paul City Attorney, Rachel Gunderson Tierney, Assistant City Attorney, 400 City Hall, 15 West Kellogg Boulevard, St. Paul, MN 55102 (for respondent) Considered and decided by Klaphake, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Harten, Judge.

Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. 2

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

HARTEN, Judge

Relator DRJ Inc., d/b/a Diva‟ Overtime Lounge (Diva‟), challenges the revocation of its licenses by respondent City of St. Paul (the city). Because evidence supports the city‟ findings of fact and conclusions of law and because the revocation was not arbitrary or capricious, we affirm.

FACTS

In June 2005, the bar at 1141 Rice Street in St. Paul began operating as Diva‟. Maintaining video surveillance cameras that operated during business hours was among the conditions imposed when Diva‟ obtained necessary operational licenses from the city.

In May 2006, the city filed a notice of violation, alleging that Diva‟ had permitted after-hours consumption of alcohol and display of alcoholic beverages. Diva‟ appeared before the St. Paul City Council (the city council), which imposed a $500 fine and $2,800 in costs and required Diva‟ to close at 1:00 a.m. instead of 2:00 a.m.

Two other events, not related to these violations, happened at Diva‟ later in 2006: a murder was committed inside the building in July, and the attempted murder of a patron leaving the building occurred in November.

In December 2006, the city served on Diva‟ a notice of intent to revoke its licenses (the December notice). A hearing on the allegations in the notice was held in March and April 2007 before an administrative law judge (ALJ). During the hearing, the ALJ ruled that: (1) the city could not rely on the incidents in July and November 2006 3

because they were still under criminal investigation; (2) the city could "submit and adduce testimony [about these incidents], in the same manner as . . . other historical events in the hearing record—such as meetings, inspections or police calls—are referenced"; but (3) [the incidents may] not form the basis of an adverse licensing action."

In April 2007, while the ALJ‟ decision on the December notice was pending, Diva‟ received another notice of violation (the April notice). A hearing on the April notice before a second ALJ resulted in that ALJ concluding that Diva‟ had violated Minn. Stat. § 340A.502 (2006) by serving alcohol to an intoxicated person and had violated St. Paul, Minn., Legislative Code § 310.06(b) (2006) by failing to comply with its obligation to provide the city‟ police with surveillance videotapes. The second ALJ‟ order recommended that the city "take appropriate action against [Diva‟] licenses."

The first ALJ released his order pertaining to the December notice in June 2007. He concluded that Diva‟ committed six violations of code or license requirements, to-wit: (1) and (2) Diva‟ twice failed to comply with the video surveillance requirement; (3) Diva‟ did not obtain the required building permit before building a smoking patio; (4) Diva‟ did not apply for a building permit before renovating a kitchen exhaust system; (5) Diva‟ did not apply for a permit to display signs and violated limitations on the size of signs; and (6) Diva‟ did not timely pay a fine imposed at Diva‟ initial appearance before the city council. The ALJ also concluded that the city did not establish by a preponderance of evidence that Diva‟ conduct endangered the community and 4

recommended that the city impose "a weighty administrative sanction" but not revoke Diva‟ licenses.

In August 2007, the city council held a public hearing on the recommendations of both ALJs. Following the hearing, the city adopted both ALJs‟findings of violations and found in addition that Diva‟ had unreasonably annoyed or endangered a number of members of the public. The city council revoked Diva‟ licenses. Diva‟ challenges the revocation.1 D E C I S I O N "[W]hen examining quasi-judicial municipal proceedings, we review the evidence only to determine whether it supports the findings of fact or the conclusions of law, and whether the municipality‟ decision was arbitrary or capricious." In re Dakota Telecomm. Group, 590 N.W.2d 644, 646 (Minn. App. 1999). 1. Does Substantial Evidence Support the City’s Findings?

1 Both the city and this court denied Diva‟ motions to stay the revocation pending appeal. See DRJ, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 741 N.W.2d 141, 143, 45-46 (Minn. App. 2007) (holding that the city‟ denial of Diva‟ motion for a stay pending appeal was not an abuse of discretion).

Code § 310.06(b) provides that a license may be revoked because "(5) [t]he licensee or applicant has failed to comply with any condition set forth in the license, or set forth in the resolution granting or renewing the license," or "(8) [t]he licensed business, or the way in which such business is operated, maintains or permits conditions that unreasonably annoy, injure or endanger the safety, health, morals, comfort or repose 5

of any considerable number of members of the public." St. Paul, Minn., Legislative Code § 310.06(b)(5), (8) (2006). a. Code § 310.06(b)(5)

The city based its revocation in part on the conclusion that "[eight] violations [of laws, codes, or license conditions,] with one prior sustained adverse action, form a sufficient basis for license revocation." Diva‟ does not challenge three violations: failure to comply with signage requirements, failure to timely pay the fine imposed at Diva‟ first appearance, and serving alcohol to an intoxicated patron.

Three of the remaining five violations involved failures to provide surveillance videotapes. One ALJ found that, when police requested tapes for the night of 2-3 March 2007 to see if Diva‟ had served an obviously intoxicated individual, the tapes Diva‟ provided were "useless for determining whether [Diva‟] had served [the individual] when he was intoxicated" because: (1) they "did not show camera angles from outside" and "revealed only about one-fourth of the service area inside"; (2) they "switched between one date and another and switched from black and white to color"; (3) "[i]n some shots, patrons wore shorts and short sleeves, although the tape was to have [been] recorded March 2nd"; (4) "[i]n other shots, patrons were smoking, indicating that the video could not have been [recorded on 2 March 2007], by which date smoking had been banned entirely from bars"; and (5) at some points, "[t]he portion of the tape . . . was recorded at 16 times normal speed." The other ALJ found that, when police sought tapes for the night of 12-13 September 2006 to investigate a fight, a videocassette Diva‟ provided on 20 September was blank; a viewable tape was provided on 4 October but the 6

date-line on it was not the tape for the date requested; and, about a month later, police ultimately obtained tapes and recording equipment with a warrant. Diva‟ does not dispute any of the ALJs‟videotape findings.

A fourth violation was the constructing, without the required permit, of a smoking patio that did not comply with legal requirements. Diva‟ challenges this procedurally, arguing that the city is estopped from considering the patio violation because the city allegedly told Diva‟ to remove the patio by 2 August 2006 and Diva‟ removed it on 1 August. But the city found that the office of License, Inspection, and Environmental Protection (LIEP) had informed Diva‟, as it had informed all other licensees, of the requirements for a smoking patio at the time the smoking ban came into effect. Diva‟ then built a non-complying patio, without a permit, in April 2006. On 26 June 2006, the city directed Diva‟ to either furnish a site plan or remove the patio by 3 July 2006, or face legal action. Diva‟ did not remove the patio. After the murder at the premises on 13-14 July 2006, Diva‟ was again told to remove the patio or bring it into compliance, this time by 2 August 2006. Thus, Diva‟ ignored both the city‟ directives on how to build a patio and its first order to remove the patio and complied only with a second order, by which time the patio had existed for four months.

A fifth violation involved an exhaust hood in the kitchen. Diva‟ again argues that the city is estopped from raising this issue because, in a letter dated 26 July 2006, the city told Diva‟ that it "shall not use the kitchen exhaust hood until the building inspector has given written approval" and the exhaust hood was never used. But Diva‟ estoppel argument ignores two other letters Diva‟ received from the city, one on 28 July 2006 and 7

the other on 4 October 2006. Both letters said that the exhaust hood had to be removed or brought up to compliance. The first letter provided 31 August 2006 as the last day to comply without penalty; the second letter referenced the first and set 18 October 2006 as a "final opportunity" to correct the problem. Thus, failing either to remove the hood or to bring it into compliance was a violation. Substantial evidence supports the findings that Diva‟ in eight instances failed to comply with the conditions set forth in its licenses, thereby violating Code § 310.06(b)(5) and providing a basis for revocation.

b. Code § 310.06(b)(8)2

2 Code § 310.06(b)(8) is almost identical to Minnesota‟ public nuisance statute, which provides that it is a misdemeanor to "maintain[] or permit[] a condition which unreasonably annoys, injures or endangers the safety, health, morals, comfort or repose of any considerable number of members of the public." Minn. Stat. § 609.74(1) (2006). 3 The city also gave "violations of the license conditions" as a factor supporting revoking Diva‟ licenses under Code § 310.06(b)(8). While these violations furnish an independent basis for revocation under Code § 310.06(b)(5), they do not meet the "unreasonably annoy, injure or endanger the safety, health, morals, comfort or repose of any considerable number of members of the public" criterion of Code § 310.06(b)(8).

The city based its conclusion that Diva‟ had violated Code § 310.06(b)(8) on eight factors: (1) an increase in police calls to the area; (2) large street fights involving Diva‟ patrons; (3) modification of police patrol patterns to accommodate Diva‟; (4) neighborhood noise; (5) the concern of police officers for their own safety in dealing with situations at Diva‟ because of large crowds; (6) proximity of Diva‟ to a residential neighborhood, school, and church; (7) citizen complaints; and (8) failure of community efforts to resolve issues with Diva‟.3 Substantial evidence supports these factors. 8

The first factor, an increase in police calls, is supported by exhibits showing that there were 117 police calls to Diva‟ area between its June 2005 opening and March 2007 (22 months), as opposed to 43 police calls in the 22 months preceding June 2005, and that many of the 117 calls were for fights and/or led to arrests.

The second, third, fourth, and fifth factors—street fights, changes in police patrol patterns, neighborhood noise, and officers‟concern for their own safety—are supported by testimony from six police officers.

One officer testified that, at about 2:00 a.m. on 20 November 2005, she was driving past Diva‟ and observed about 30 people fighting in the street, that the people did not respond to requests to clear the area, and that about ten squad cars were summoned to assist. When asked, "Could you tell where the people were coming from?" she answered, "They were coming out of Diva‟ bar." When asked, "Did you see them coming out of Diva‟ bar?" she answered, "We did." The officer testified that she would have been concerned for the safety of someone who happened to walk by and that the situation was disruptive to the neighborhood.

A second officer testified that he was sent to Diva‟ on 17 June 2006 at about 2:00 a.m.; that he found one man unconscious in the street after apparently having been hit with a brick; that the crowd numbered at least 30 people; that the officer assumed they came from Diva‟ and knew of nowhere else they could have come from; that he did not remember seeing Diva‟ security guards present; that at least 14 officers were needed to control the situation; and that he was concerned for the officers‟safety. 9

A third officer testified that he was driving by Diva‟ at the time of the 17 June 2006 incident, saw a crowd of between 50 and 60 people, got out of his squad car to try to control the crowd, had to radio for assistance, and saw people coming out of Diva‟ and fighting. A fourth officer, testifying about yet another incident, answered the question, "Was the crowd [outside Diva‟] loud?" with "They were fighting, obnoxious, yelling." A fifth officer testified that "It was known [to officers] that when it got close to bar clos[ing time], that we had to go up around that [Diva‟] area because of the continued problems that we had up there as far as fights." The sixth officer testified that, "The midnight sergeant said there was a lot of problems at the Diva‟ Bar . . . and he asked the officers if anybody had any downtime, when they were not taking calls, to please drive up there and just make sure that there‟ no problems going on up there." This officer also testified that she had used her loudspeaker to tell two groups of fighting patrons "to break it up, go home, keep walking," but that they "weren‟ listening to our orders to go home."

The testimony of these six officers provides substantial evidence to support the findings that large fights involving Diva‟ patrons occurred in the street outside Diva‟, that police officers changed their patrol patterns because of the situation at Diva‟, that Diva‟ was a source of noise in the neighborhood,4 and that officers feared for their own safety because of occurrences at Diva‟.

4 Diva‟ claims that "noise" was not an appropriate basis for the revocation because noise was not mentioned in the notice of intent to revoke. But the notice of intent to revoke 10

listed an incident on 28 April 2006 when an officer near Diva‟ observed "a large group of people yelling who can be heard from 80 feet away."

The sixth, seventh, and eighth factors—Diva‟ proximity to church, school, and residence, citizens‟complaints, and the failure of community efforts to resolve issues with Diva‟—were supported by testimony from the city‟ director of LIEP. When asked how he became aware of Diva‟, he testified that, soon after becoming LIEP director, he "began to meet with neighborhood groups and organizations talking about the position, and [Diva‟] frequently came up." He recounted complaints made through a computerized complaint system about loud music at all hours, about Diva‟ dumping dirty water under a nearby store, about an obscene sign, about a sign saying "Smoking permitted" because Diva‟ was a "private club," and about patrons so loud between 1:00 and 2:30 a.m. that a neighbor two blocks away had to close her windows. The LIEP director reported that one complainant had said, "Diva‟ had brought a trashy element to the neighborhood . . . patrons wander the streets and yell at each other." The record also includes a number of email complaints from neighborhood residents.

The LIEP director testified about complaints made to him personally about Diva‟ "hours of operation, of late at night the loud music, reports of fights and unfortunately of gunshots being fired and people actually being shot, killed and wounded." The LIEP director also testified about an occasion in July 2006 when he

had an opportunity to meet with over 150 neighbors in a very large meeting, and to a person they expressed to me their concern about public safety as a result of the way that this particular establishment [Diva‟] was being operated. . . . [I]t‟ the nature of the fights, of the large, loud interactions of people outside of the establishment, and again the gunshots, 11

the people being shot, and the fear that people have for that establishment being . . . right across the street from a school.

The LIEP director explained that he was familiar with the neighborhood where Diva‟ was located and that what had been "a very safe, very sound neighborhood" was now a place "where [people] feel threatened in their own particular neighborhood, where they don‟ feel safe actually walking out of church at night to their cars." He believed that this was "solely due to the way this particular bar is operating, when it has been a bar for many, many, many years and we had not had complaints like that."

When asked how he responded to all the complaints, the LIEP director said, "[W]e met in a number of meetings . . . to try to fashion conditions that would be placed on the license [issued to Diva‟s] that would assure that the establishment could operate, continue to operate, and at the same time would be safe to the rest of the neighborhood." He testified that, after the murder at Diva‟, meetings were held "to develop conditions to assure the safe operation of that establishment, to protect the neighborhood and to maintain the license holder‟ right to operate." This testimony supports the findings that Diva‟ was close to a school, a church, and private residences; that citizens had complained about Diva‟; and that efforts to resolve issues with Diva‟ had failed.

Diva‟ argues that some evidence indicates that Diva‟ did not violate Code § 310.06(b)(8), i.e., that it did not "maintain[] or permit[] conditions that unreasonably annoy, injure or endanger the safety, health, morals, comfort or repose of any considerable number of members of the public." But the city‟ findings must be supported by substantial evidence, which is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 12

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Minn. Pollution Control Agency, 569 N.W.2d 211, 215 (Minn. App. 1997), review denied (Minn. 16 Dec. 1997). It is unnecessary that all the evidence favor the finding of a violation.

To summarize, substantial evidence supports the findings that Diva‟, in eight instances, "failed to comply with any condition set forth in the license, or set forth in the resolution granting or renewing the license" under Code § 310.06(b)(5); and that Diva‟, or the way in which Diva‟ was operated, in eight further instances, "maintain[ed] or permit[ted] conditions that unreasonably annoy, injure or endanger the safety, health, morals, comfort or repose of any considerable number of members of the public" under Code § 310.06(b)(8).5 2. Was the Decision to Revoke Diva’s Licenses Arbitrary or Capricious?

5 Diva‟ also argues that the city council erred in relying on evidence of the murder and the attempted murder occurring on Diva‟ premises, but admits that "it may never be known with certainty whether the City Council improperly considered the July and November 2006 incidents[] when it voted to revoke." The ALJ ruled that the city council "may not rely on [these incidents] to establish that [Diva‟ violated] . . . Code 310.06(b)(8)" but that the city could "submit and adduce testimony [about these incidents] in the same manner as to which other historical events in the hearing record—such as meetings, inspections or police calls—are referenced." The ALJ also noted that "due process requires that [the incidents] not form the basis of an adverse licensing action." The only extensive testimony about the murder was provided by Diva‟ manager in response to questions from Diva‟ counsel, over the city‟ objection. The city produced ample evidence, exclusive of these incidents, to justify the revocation. Thus, those incidents did not form the basis of this adverse licensing action.

Code § 310.05(m) provides a matrix of penalties for violations based on the number of appearances the licensee has had before the city council. St. Paul, Minn., Legislative Code § 310.05(m) (2006). For example, violations of conditions placed on a 13

license or of relevant provisions of the code are punishable by a $500 fine after the first appearance; a $1,000 fine after the second appearance; a $2,000 fine and a ten-day suspension after the third appearance; and revocation after the fourth appearance. Id. Code § 409.26(b) provides another matrix specifically for those holding licenses to sell alcoholic beverages. St. Paul, Minn., Legislative Code § 409.26(b) (2006). For example, the sale of an alcoholic beverage to an intoxicated person is punishable at the first appearance by an unspecified fine; at the second appearance by an unspecified fine; at the third appearance by a suspension of the license for up to 18 days; and at the fourth appearance by revocation of the license. Id.

The penalties stated in the matrices "are presumed to be appropriate for every case; however the council may deviate therefrom in an individual case where [it] finds and determines that there exist substantial and compelling reasons making it more appropriate to do so." St. Paul, Minn., Legislative Code §§ 310.05(m), 409.26(a). When deviating, the city council must "provide written reasons that specify why the penalty selected was more appropriate." Id.

Diva‟ argues that, because this was only its second appearance before the city council, it was subject only to a fine of $1,000 under Code § 310.05(m) or an unspecified fine under Code § 409.26(b), and not to revocation. But the city council "considered all the evidence contained in the record for both hearings" before the ALJs and resolved "that these two separate actions having come before the Council at one time are more efficiently given one sanction." Therefore, the appearance at issue here was in reality a consolidation of what would have been Diva‟ second and third appearances. 14

In revoking Diva‟ license, the city council treated this as a fourth appearance, saying it found "[five] substantial and compelling reasons to deviate from [the] presumptive penalty [for a third appearance under Code § 310.05(m)]." First, "[b]oth Notices alleged more than one license violation . . . and in both cases more than one license violation was proved." Second, "[t]he violation of . . . Code § 310.06(b)(8) [wa]s a serious violation that indicates Diva‟ poses an immediate threat to public safety." Third, if Diva‟ had had a separate appearance before the city council for each violation, revocation would have been imposed after the fourth violation. Fourth, Diva‟ had multiple violations after it agreed to add conditions to its license, demonstrating that adding conditions to its license was ineffective. And fifth, in some instances Diva‟ had not complied with license conditions until the city took further action.

Diva‟ claims that one member of the city council "tried to blur the distinction between violations and appearances in determining the penalty." But the code clearly intends to make penalties commensurate with the type of violation and the number of times it was committed, not with the number of times an offender appears before the council. See St. Paul, Minn., Legislative Code §§ 310.05(m)(ii)-(iii), 409.26(c) (providing that "[t]he occurrence of multiple violations shall be grounds for departure from such penalties [in the matrix] in the council‟ discretion"; and that unless the licensee admits the facts of a subsequent violation and stipulates to its addition to the notice, "violations occurring after the date of the formal notice of hearing shall be the subject of a separate proceeding and dealt with as a „2nd [or subsequent] appearance‟before the council"). 15

Diva‟ contrasts its situation to that in BAL, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 469 N.W.2d 341 (Minn. App. 1991) (upholding revocation of a bar‟ license), to argue that the revocation was not permitted by the code and was arbitrary and capricious because Diva‟ was given the same penalty as another licensee whose violations were more severe.

As happened here, the city council in BAL revoked the license of The Wabasha Bar on its third appearance, even though the ALJ had not recommended revocation. 469 N.W.2d at 342-43. This court affirmed the revocation. Id. at 343. Diva‟ argues that BAL is distinguishable on its facts but the distinctions are insignificant. In BAL, "[w]itnesses and police officers testified they saw bar patrons leave the premises with drinks, congregate outside, and engage in loud and sometimes unruly behavior," id., whereas here, several police officers, but no other witnesses, testified to similar behavior of Diva‟ patrons. In BAL, the owner of a neighboring apartment building testified that he had lost business because of the bar; here, the LIEP director testified to complaints he had received from neighborhood residents and business owners. Moreover, The Wabasha Bar did not violate its on-sale license conditions or the building code. The situation of The Wabasha Bar in BAL is sufficiently similar to that of Diva‟ to show that imposing the same penalty on Diva‟ was not arbitrary or capricious. Thus, BAL does not indicate that the revocation of Diva‟ license was arbitrary or capricious. 16

We conclude that substantial evidence supports the findings that Diva‟ violated the conditions of its licenses and operated in such a way as to endanger members of the public and that the city‟ decision to revoke its license was not arbitrary or capricious.

Affirmed.

Friday, June 13, 2008

Freds Tire v. 2002ChevSilverado

For Litigation purposes Do We Sue the Person or the Property?
Posted for Educational purposes
http://ad.doubleclick.net/click;h= FindLaw> State Resources> Minnesota> Primary Materials> Minnesota Court Opinions

This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. � 480A.08, subd. 3 (2002).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A04-563

Fred's Tire Co., Inc.,

Appellant,

vs.

2002 Chevrolet Silverado,

VIN # 1GCEK 19T322276318, MN Plate JKG611,

Respondent.

Filed November 30, 2004

Affirmed

Robert H. Schumacher, Judge

Washington County District Court

File No. C1033746

Earl P. Gray, Mark D. Nyvold, 332 Minnesota Street, Suite W-1610, St. Paul, MN 55101 (for appellant)

Michael A. Welch, Hebert, Welch & Humphreys, P.A., 20 North Lake Street, Suite 301, Forest Lake, MN 55025 (for respondent)

����������� Considered and decided by Schumacher, Presiding Judge; Minge, Judge; and Crippen, Judge.*


U N P U B L I S H E D�� O P I N I O N

ROBERT H. SCHUMACHER, Judge

Appellant Fred's Tire Co. Inc. challenges the judgment ordering the forfeiture of respondent 2002 Chevrolet Silverado, VIN # 1GCEK 19T322276318, MN Plate JKG611, to Washington County under Minn. Stat. � 169A.63 (2002).� Fred's Tire argues the district court misinterpreted the forfeiture statute and also erroneously found that Fred's Tire knew or should have known of the illegal use of its vehicle.� We affirm.

FACTS

Shortly after midnight on May 27, 2003, Frank Macalus (Macalus) was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol.� He later pleaded guilty to the offense.� This was his fourth alcohol-related driving offense.� At the time of his current arrest, he was driving a 2002 Chevrolet Silverado owned by Fred's Tire.� Following the arrest, Washington County authorities seized the vehicle because Macalus's conviction was a "designated offense" under Minn. Stat. � 169A.63 (2002).�

Fred's Tire filed a petition in district court seeking return of the vehicle, claiming it was an innocent owner pursuant to Minn. Stat. � 169A.63, subd. 7(d).� At a hearing on the petition, Fred Macalus, Sr. testified that Fred's Tire is a family owned and operated business with four locations in the metro area, that he is the sole owner, and that he is not actively involved in day-to-day operation, "letting the family run it."� He also testified that each of the company's four stores is managed by one of his five children or their spouses; Macalus and his brother Tommy Macalus share the management duties of the store located in Forest Lake.�

Frank Macalus testified that on May 26, 2003, he went to the store and picked up the 2002 Silverado and drove it away.� He did not ask his father for permission to use the company vehicle.� He testified that, based on the company's policy instituted in February 2002, he did not have a right to take the 2002 Silverado for his personal use.� He further testified that under this new company policy company trucks were "not to be driven for personal use" but store managers were allowed to drive the truck home if the manager was "working with some delivering or something to do with business, where it works out best."�

At the hearing Fred's Tire stipulated that statements from Macalus's neighbors contained in a police report were accurate and the report was admitted into evidence.� The report stated that a neighbor across the street recognized a picture of the 2002 Silverado "as the vehicle that Macalus drove on a regular daily basis."� Another neighbor stated that he recognized the picture as the truck Macalus had driven for the last year and that Macalus "drove the vehicle on a daily basis." �

Washington County presented evidence showing that approximately 24,400 miles were put on the 2002 Silverado in one year.� Macalus testified that other than an occasional use by his girlfriend while she still worked for Fred's Tire, he was the only employee at the Forest Lake store who drove the vehicle.� He also testified that Fred Macalus, Sr. took the vehicle approximately once a month to haul his boat or supplies to the family's cabin in Wisconsin.� Fred Macalus, Sr. testified he also took the truck "a couple times" but did not know how many miles he had driven it.�

Macalus was also questioned about his alcohol use and prior driving under the influence convictions.� He testified that he was driving company trucks at the time of both his 1999 conviction and his 1993 conviction.� Further, as a result of his 1999 DWI conviction, the state impounded the license plates of the company truck he was driving and his driving privileges were suspended for 90 days.� He testified that the company "applied [to the state] through the office and got new plates."�

The district court found that Macalus has a significant history of drunk driving and alcohol-related offenses, that Fred Macalus, Sr.�the sole owner of Fred's Tire�was aware of his son's prior drunk driving and knew or should have known he was using the 2002 Silverado for his personal use, that the license plates of a company truck had been impounded in 1999 because Macalus was driving the truck while he was under the influence of alcohol, and that Fred's Tire "acquiesc[ed] in Frank Macalus's personal use of the company owned truck."� The court also found that the "knowledge of the corporation is not limited to the actual knowledge of its sole owner and president, but the corporation also has the constructive knowledge of its authorized agent," that Macalus, as a co-manager, was authorized to use the 2002 Silverado, and that Macalus himself knew of his intended use of the vehicle.� Based on these findings the district court ordered the 2002 Silverado forfeited to the Washington County Sheriff's Department under Minn. Stat. � 169A.63.

D E C I S I O N

Statutory construction is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo.� Brookfield Trade Ctr., Inc. v. County of Ramsey, 584 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 1998).� When reviewing a district court's findings of fact, this court may not set such findings aside unless they are clearly erroneous.� Rife v. One 1987 Chevrolet Cavalier, 485 N.W.2d 318, 321 (Minn. App. 1992), review denied (Minn. June 30, 1992).� If the underlying findings of fact made by the district court are undisputed or sustainable, the district court's "ultimate" findings must be affirmed because of the absence of a demonstrated abuse of discretion.� Maxfield v. Maxfield, 452 N.W.2d 219, 221 (Minn. 1990).�

1.�������� Under Minn. Stat. � 169A.63, subd. 6,� "A motor vehicle is subject to forfeiture . . . if it was used in the commission of a designated offense or was used in conduct resulting in a designated license revocation."� The parties stipulated that Macalus used the 2002 Silverado in the commission of a designated offense.� Because Fred's Tire was the owner of the 2002 Silverado, the vehicle is only subject to forfeiture "if its owner knew or should have known of the unlawful use or intended use."� Id., subd. 7(d).� Fred's Tire argues that "unlawful use" in subdivision 7(d) must refer to the "designated offense" in subdivision 6 and thus, the record must show that it knew of or should have known of Macalus's prior DWI convictions.

Courts interpret statutes to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent.� Minn. Stat. � 645.16 (1998); see also Klein Bancorporation, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 581 N.W.2d 863, 866 (Minn. App. 1998) (noting that "[w]e presume plain and unambiguous statutory language manifests legislative intent"), review denied (Minn. Sept. 22, 1998).� When a statute is free of ambiguity, we look only at its plain language.� Tuma v. Comm'r of Econ. Sec., 386 N.W.2d 702, 706 (Minn. 1986).

The plain meaning of the phrase "unlawful use" is use prohibited by law. Black�s Law Dictionary 1536, 1540 (7th ed. 1999) (defining unlawful as "not authorized by law; illegal" and "use" as "the application or employment of something"). The plain meaning of the phrase "intended use" is use that is deliberate or intentional.� American Heritage College Dictionary 721 (4th ed. 2002) (defining intended as "deliberate or intentional").� We conclude the language of subdivision 7(d) is unambiguous and it is sufficient that Fred's Tire knew or should have known that Macalus would intentionally drive the company vehicle for personal use or that he would use the vehicle while he was impaired in violation of Minn. Stat. � 169A.20.

2.�������� Fred's Tire also argues the record does not support a finding that he knew or should have know of the unlawful use, suggesting that the district court findings ignore "the strong evidence showing that it was not reasonable for Fred Macalus, Sr. to expect that the [2002 Silverado] would be used in the commission of a designated offense."� Although Fred's Tire argues it had no knowledge of Macalus's "unlawful use," Minn. Stat. � 169A.63, subd. 7(d) provides a vehicle is subject to forfeiture "if its owner knew or should have known of the unlawful use or intended use."� Our determination is limited to deciding whether the district court's ultimate finding that Fred's Tire knew or should have known of Macalus's unlawful use or intended use was an abuse of discretion because the court's findings were clearly erroneous.� See Maxfield, 452 N.W.2d at 221; Rife, 485 N.W.2d 318, 321.

The district court found that Macalus had a significant history of drunk driving and alcohol-related offenses, that Fred Macalus, Sr., the sole owner of Fred's Tire, was aware of his son's alcohol-related driving offenses, that the license plates of a company truck had been impounded in 1999 because Macalus was driving the truck while he was under the influence of alcohol, and that Fred's Tire "acquiesc[ed] in Macalus's personal use of the company owned truck."�

These findings are supported by the record.� Macalus testified that he was driving a company vehicle during his prior DWI offenses, that the license plates had been impounded, and that new license plates were obtained "through the office."� Macalus's neighbors provided statements that he used the 2002 Silverado daily.� Washington County also produced multiple personal items that were found in the 2002 Silverado.� Further, neither Macalus nor Fred Macalus, Sr. adequately accounted for the 24,400 miles that had been put on the truck in the year since its purchase.� The district court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous and therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in its ultimate finding that Fred's Tire knew or should have known of Macalus's unlawful use or intended use.� See Maxfield, 452 N.W.2d at 221.

Although a finding that Fred Macalus, Sr., as the sole owner of Fred's Tire, knew or should have known of Macalus's unlawful use or intended use is sufficient to defeat the "innocent owner" defense under Minn. Stat. � 169A.63, subd. 7(d), we also conclude that the district court correctly determined that Macaulus's knowledge, as an authorized agent of the corporation, could be imputed to Fred's Tire.� In making this determination, the district court found that Macalus�as a co-manager� was authorized to use the 2002 Silverado, and that Macalus knew of his intended and unlawful use of the vehicle.�

Fred's Tire argues that it was impermissible to impute any knowledge Macalus had of his own actions to the corporation because he is not an officer of the corporation. Macalus testified that under the company policy, store managers are authorized to use the company vehicle.� Use of the company vehicle was within the scope of Macalus's authority and therefore his knowledge regarding his use of that vehicle is imputable to the corporation.� Kay v. Peter Motor Co., Inc., 483 N.W.2d 481, 485 (Minn. App. 1992) (stating knowledge of corporate officer "as both employee and officer was properly imputed to the corporation by the trial court" (emphasis added)).

Further, because Fred's Tire acquiesced in the personal use of the company vehicle or would have learned of Macalus's use of the vehicle if it had exercised proper care, the corporation is chargeable for his acts.� See McGee v. Breezy Point Estates, 283 Minn. 10, 22, 166 N.W.2d 81, 89 (Minn. 1969) (stating "scope of apparent authority is determined not only by what the principal knows and acquiesces in, but also by what the principal should, in the exercise of ordinary care and prudence, know his agent is doing").

Affirmed.




* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, � 10.






Vote for your city's best dining and nightlife. City's Best 2008.

Wednesday, May 21, 2008

Unpublished PHA v. Deanna-Drug Addict Disability

Tuesday, May 13, 2008

Saint Paul/ RICO Update Plaintiffs Objections To Magistrate's Order Of April 23, 2008 And Amended Order Of May 8, 2008.

Please click onto the COMMENTS for the motion. (New here? Read the RICO lawsuits against the City of Saint Paul located to the right of the screen under the Scale of Justice)

This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2006).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A07-1199

Public Housing Agency of the City of Saint Paul, Appellant, vs. Deanna Ewig, Respondent.

Filed May 20, 2008

Reversed and remanded

Willis, Judge

Ramsey County District Court

File No. C1-07-2573

John J. Choi, St. Paul City Attorney, Michael F. Driscoll, Assistant City Attorney, 400 City Hall and Courthouse, 15 West Kellogg Boulevard, St. Paul, MN 55102 (for appellant)

JaPaul J. Harris, Southern Minnesota Regional Legal Services, Inc., 166 East Fourth Street, Suite 200, St. Paul, MN 55101; and Michael Hagedorn, Southern Minnesota Regional Legal Services, Inc., 450 North Syndicate Street, Suite 285, St. Paul, MN 55104 (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Shumaker, Presiding Judge; Willis, Judge; and Peterson, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

WILLIS, Judge

In this eviction action, appellant housing agency challenges a district-court order denying a writ of restitution. We reverse and remand

Appellant Public Housing Agency of the City of Saint Paul (PHA) brought this action after learning that one of its tenants, respondent Deanna Ewig, smoked crack cocaine and allowed guests to smoke crack cocaine in her apartment. PHA alleged that these actions constitute "a serious violation" of the terms of Ewig’s lease and sought to have Ewig evicted. The district court dismissed the action, concluding that, because Ewig is addicted to cocaine, she is disabled under the federal Fair Housing Act and thus is entitled to a reasonable accommodation, which PHA failed to provide, rendering PHA’s attempt to evict Ewig discriminatory. This appeal follows.

D E C I S I O N

On review of a district-court order in an eviction action, we defer to the district court’s findings of fact, and those findings will be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous. See Minneapolis Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Smallwood, 379 N.W.2d 554, 555 (Minn. App. 1985) (discussing the standard of review in an unlawful-detainer action, now replaced by an eviction action), review denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 1986). But we do not defer to the district court on a purely legal issue. Frost-Benco Elec. Ass’n v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 358 N.W.2d 639, 642 (Minn. 1984).

An eviction action is a summary proceeding to determine the present possessory rights to property. See Minn. Stat. § 504B.001, subd. 4 (2006). A landlord is entitled to recover possession by eviction when a tenant holds over "contrary to the conditions or covenants of the lease." Minn. Stat

verdict requires that the district court find only whether "the facts alleged in the complaint are true." Minn. Stat. § 504B.355 (2006). Applying this standard, the supreme court has stated that "[u]nder the trial court’s limited scope of review in unlawful detainer actions, the court was bound to determine only whether [tenant’s] son engaged in . . . criminal activity and thus whether the lease was broken." Minneapolis Pub. Hous. Auth. v. Lor, 591 N.W.2d 700, 704 (Minn. 1999).

Ewig’s lease provides in part that she shall not allow her guests "to engage in any criminal activity, including drug-related criminal activity." PHA’s complaint alleges that Ewig violated this provision by allowing guests to smoke crack cocaine in her apartment. The district court "was bound to determine" whether this allegation is true and thus whether Ewig violated the lease. See Lor, 591 N.W.2d at 704. The district court failed to do so.

Ewig’s lease also provides in part that Ewig shall not "engage in . . . any criminal activity, including drug-related criminal activity." PHA’s complaint alleges that Ewig violated this provision by smoking crack cocaine in her apartment. At the hearing, Ewig admitted that she had done so on at least two occasions. Despite this admission, the district court did not enter a specific finding regarding the truth of PHA’s allegation that Ewig had smoked crack cocaine in her apartment. Instead, the district court concluded that, because Ewig is addicted to cocaine, she "has a disability" under the federal Fair Housing Act; that she is entitled to a reasonable accommodation of that disability; and that PHA’s decision to evict her was discriminatory. We disagree

The federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2006), prohibits discrimination against any person in the rental of a dwelling "because of a handicap1 of that [person]." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2)(A). Courts have held that recovering drug addicts are handicapped under the act. E.g., United States v. Southern Mgmt. Corp., 955 F.2d 914, 919 (4th Cir. 1992). But the act’s definition of "handicap" contains an exception specifically providing that "such term does not include current, illegal use of . . . a controlled substance." 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h). Ewig argues that she is not excluded under this provision because her relapse does not constitute "current" illegal use of a controlled substance. We interpret the words of the provision "in accord with [their] ordinary or natural meaning." Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228, 113 S. Ct. 2050, 2054 (1993). "Current" means "[b]elonging to the present time." The American Heritage Dictionary 446 (4th ed. 2000). Thus, drug use that is "reasonably contemporaneous with the alleged incidents of discrimination" is excluded from protection under the act. Fowler v. Borough of Westville, 97 F. Supp. 2d 602, 609 (D.N.J. 2000). Here, Ewig’s alleged use of crack cocaine occurred two weeks before PHA sought to evict her. Because Ewig’s drug use was reasonably contemporaneous with PHA’s decision to evict her, and was in fact a cause of that decision, she is not "handicapped" under the act.

1 The district court consistently refers to Ewig’s condition as a "disability" under the Fair Housing Act, but the Fair Housing Act uses the term "handicap," not disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h).

Our interpretation of the act is also consistent with the principle that statutes should not be interpreted to produce absurd results. See Rowley v. Yarnall, 22 F.3d 190, 192 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that interpretations of statutes that produce absurd results are

to be avoided). The district court concluded that Ewig was entitled to a reasonable accommodation that essentially excused her illegal drug use. Interpreting a federal anti-discrimination law to excuse illegal drug use produces an absurd result. The act’s definition of handicap "[wa]s not intended to be used to condone or protect illegal activity." Southern Mgmt., 955 F.2d at 921 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 100-711 (1988) (reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2183)).

Finally, Ewig argues that she is handicapped because, in addition to her cocaine addiction, she has been diagnosed with minor depression and anxiety disorder. But these diagnoses were not the cause of her eviction. She was evicted for using illegal drugs and allowing others to use illegal drugs in her apartment. The federal Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination "because of" a handicap. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2)(A). Even if Ewig’s minor depression and anxiety diagnoses are handicaps under the act, they were not the cause of her eviction.

Because the district court failed to enter specific findings regarding the truth of PHA’s allegations and misapplied the relevant federal housing law, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and

SharonsSearch

Law.com Newswire