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Monday, April 28, 2014

Alex JEROME ET AL Relators vs CitySt.Paul RespondantsA13-0313

A13-0313
Alex Jerome, et al., Relators, vs. City of St. Paul, Respondent.
Affirmed. Judge Matthew E. Johnson.
City of St. Paul.
http://www.mncourts.gov/opinions/coa/current/opa130313-042814.pdf

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A13-0313
Alex Jerome, et al.,
Relators,
vs.
City of St. Paul,
Respondent.
Filed April 28, 2014
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge
City of St. Paul
File No. RLH RR 12-68
Larry Leventhal, Elizabeth Royal, Larry Leventhal & Associates, St. Paul, Minnesota (for
relators)
Sara R. Grewing, St. Paul City Attorney, Virginia D. Palmer, Assistant City Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Cleary, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and
Rodenberg, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JOHNSON, Judge
Alex Jerome and Ameena Samatar purchased a vacant building that the City of St.
Paul previously had declared to be a nuisance. After their purchase, the city suspended
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its nuisance-abatement process to give them an opportunity to rehabilitate the building.
But after several months and multiple hearings, Jerome and Samatar failed to satisfy the
city’s requirements for a further suspension of the nuisance-abatement process. After
several extensions of time, the city council eventually adopted a resolution that ordered
the building to be either repaired or removed within 30 days. We conclude that the city
council’s decision is not arbitrary, capricious, oppressive, or unreasonable, and is
supported by substantial evidence; that the city’s procedures were not unlawful, irregular,
or contrary to city ordinance; and that the city did not violate Jerome’s and Samatar’s
rights to due process. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
The building at issue in this case is a two-story commercial building located at 601
Western Avenue North. The building previously was occupied at various times by the
Moonlight Magic Bar, a bar called Lucy’s, and Wilebski’s Blues Saloon. But the
building has been vacant since December 2011.
In May 2012, the city performed an inspection of the building, which revealed
multiple code violations, including a deteriorated roof, a foundation in need of repair,
defective interior ceilings, rodent infestation, mold, open plumbing, loose and open
electrical wiring, and the lack of a properly installed and operable smoke detector. On
June 1, 2012, the city declared the building to be a nuisance and ordered that the nuisance
be abated by July 1, 2012. At the same time, the city gave notice to the owners and
interested parties of record: Bayview Loan Servicing, the Murnane Brandt law firm, and
the Internal Revenue Service.
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On July 13, 2012, the city sent a notice of public hearing to the interested parties
of record, informing them that a hearing before a legislative-hearing officer (LHO) was
scheduled for August 14, 2012. The notice also stated that a public hearing before the
city council was scheduled for September 5, 2012, to consider a resolution ordering the
repair or removal of the building.
Between July 17 and 19, 2012, relators Jerome and Samatar purchased the
property. Relators acknowledge that they were aware before their purchase that an order
to abate nuisance had been issued. On July 31, 2012, the city performed a follow-up
inspection, which is summarized in a report listing eight pages of building-, fire-, and
safety-code violations.
Over the next four months, city staff held four legislative hearings concerning the
property, and the city council considered the matter at five meetings. The first legislative
hearing occurred on August 14, 2012. The LHO first asked the city’s code-enforcement
officer to give a report on the status of the property. The LHO then asked the codeenforcement
officer about the current owners of the property. At that time, Samatar came
forward and stated that she and Jerome recently had purchased the property, a fact of
which the LHO previously was unaware. After further discussion with the LHO, Samatar
stated that she and Jerome had not decided on their intended use of the building, but they
anticipated that the first floor would be used for a retail store of some kind and that the
second floor would be used for either offices or a wedding hall. City staff informed
Samatar that the paved parking lot next to the building is zoned residential and would
need to be rezoned if relators wanted to use it for parking. The LHO noted that taxes had
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been paid, that the vacant building fee had been paid, that a performance deposit had
been posted, and that the “only things left then are plans to do the rehab and
demonstration that there is the money available to execute the rehab.” The LHO stated
that the city needed three things from relators: (1) contractor bids, (2) a work plan, and
(3) a demonstration of available funds to complete the project. The LHO asked Samatar
to submit a work plan by August 28, 2012, or to let her know if relators needed more
time. Samatar acknowledged each of the LHO’s statements. Throughout the hearing, the
LHO expressed enthusiasm about the project and told Samatar, “I’m excited that you’re
doing this.”
On September 5, 2012, the city council considered the matter at a public hearing
for the first time. Relators were present. They previously had submitted to the LHO a
bank statement indicating a balance of approximately $46,000, a $50,000 home-equity
line-of-credit statement, and a spreadsheet with the estimated costs of the project. The
LHO reported to the city council that relators had submitted a work plan and financial
statements but that they were “very sketchy, a few lines long” and “woefully inadequate
to demonstrate the capacity to execute the rehab for this property.” Because of the
inadequate documentation, the LHO recommended that the city council adopt a
resolution to repair or remove the property but asked that the matter be laid over for two
weeks to allow time for notice of the recommendation to be sent to relators.
Relators spoke in opposition to the LHO’s recommendation. The council
president informed relators that the work plan they had provided was inadequate because
it needed to “have more detail in it.” Jerome responded: “I can do it in phases, so the first
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time I’m going to do the outside, and then the second time I’m going to do the electrical
and the water, and then I can do the rest. That’s the plan.” Council Member Carter then
sought to clarify exactly what the city needed from relators, apparently to ensure that
relators understood the city’s expectations:
COUNCIL MEMBER CARTER: [W]hat we need
from you is like a more specific written work plan, like with
real specific bids from contractors about each different part of
the work that needs to be performed . . . . [Y]ou’ve got a list
of orders from the City, right, that says here’s all the things
that the City wants done on the property?
JEROME: Yeah, I have a very long list of things that
get done, but --
COUNCIL MEMBER CARTER: Right. So what we
need from you in order to -- so what we need from you is a
real specific work plan that says, Here’s how I’m -- here’s
how I’m going to address all of these issues on this list and
here’s some specific bids from contractors who will actually
be doing the work. I will need a demonstration that you have
the resources to be able to do those things, so that -- so that
we can have some confidence that work will actually be done.
JEROME: I’ve put a lot of money into this
product -- to this project already, and, you know -- and I have
absolute confidence that I can do it. And I can’t -- you know,
all I can say is, you know, this is -- this is what I’ve got. I
mean, I already did the tuck pointing on the outside, so I
spent $7,000. That’s what I spent.
COUNCIL MEMBER CARTER: Okay.
JEROME: I’ve done the electrical. That, I spent
twenty-two hundred there. What else am I -- am I supposed
to -- I hired contractors and I let them do the work. And I
gave out some -- you know, whatever I thought was
appropriate.
COUNCIL MEMBER CARTER: Okay.
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JEROME: But I, you know -- I’m not -- I have done
this before.
COUNCIL MEMBER CARTER: I understand.
JEROME: I’m confident I can do it.
Samatar then addressed the city council, stating that she and Jerome had provided
the financial documents required by the city. She referred to a spreadsheet and stated,
“[T]his is the plan of how to spend the money on the property.” Jerome also referred to
the spreadsheet and stated: “This is the plan. This is it. I mean, it shows little
spreadsheets, estimates of what we think is going to be spent on the thing, but -- you
know, if we had, you know, millions of dollars, we could have used it, you know, for
fancy plans, but we don’t. We have, you know, limited means . . . but we have
experience and we can do it.” Council Member Carter suggested that a one-on-one
meeting might help and said that he would try to meet with relators the next day. Council
Member Carter moved to accept the LHO’s recommendation for a two-week layover and
said to relators, “Hopefully we can work together and get it figured out between now and
then.” The city council approved the motion by a vote of seven to zero.
After the September 5, 2012 city council meeting, the city sent relators a followup
letter via e-mail to confirm that the matter had been heard by the city council and
would be continued to its September 19, 2012 meeting. The letter further stated:
[Y]ou need to submit a detailed work plan in accordance with
the code compliance inspection report or a sworn construction
statement by your contractor for the project. [The LHO] will
also need an affidavit dedicating the funds from an account
for this project. These conditions need to be submitted to our
office by Monday, September 10. If you wish to attend the
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Legislative Hearing on Tuesday, September 11 . . . to go over
your plans and affidavit, please let me know and I will add
you to the Agenda.
The record does not indicate that relators contacted the city to request to be added to the
September 11, 2012 legislative-hearing agenda.
On September 19, 2012, the city council considered the matter at a public hearing
for the second time. Neither Samatar nor Jerome was present. With respect to relators’
property, Council Member Carter stated: “Yep, we’re still working on it. We’ve got
some momentum going and I’m told by the legislative hearing officer that we’ve got
some positive indicators, but it’s not done yet, so I’m going to ask for a four-week
layover.” The city council approved a motion to lay the matter over to October 17, 2012,
by a vote of seven to zero.
On September 25, 2012, the second legislative hearing occurred. Samatar was
present; Jerome was not. Relators still had not provided the city with a detailed work
plan, contractor bids, or affidavits indicating that funds were dedicated to the project.
The LHO again informed Samatar of the city’s requirements: “We’ve got to get the
building stabilized . . . . And then to pick a use for it, get the zone in place, and develop
plans that are specific to that use.” Samatar stated that she intended the second floor to
be a rental hall and the first floor to be a restaurant on one side and a retail store on the
other side. There was extensive discussion between Samatar and city staff with respect to
parking, zoning, and licensing issues that might arise, depending on the ultimate use of
the building. The LHO instructed Samatar to schedule a meeting for the following week
with a particular person in the department of safety and inspections to discuss the
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parking, zoning, and licensing issues. The LHO expressed concern that relators had not
yet obtained bids to determine the cost of the project. Samatar confirmed that an
architect would be putting together a report with detailed cost estimates, which would be
ready for the city’s review by the end of the week. The LHO instructed Samatar to speak
with her bank and with Historic Saint Paul, a non-profit organization, to discuss
financing. The LHO concluded by stating that the matter would be laid over for six
weeks, to November 13, 2012, to allow Samatar time to meet those requirements. The
LHO also stated that she would ask the city council to lay the matter over to its
December 5, 2012 meeting.
On October 17, 2012, the city council considered the matter at a public hearing for
the third time. Neither Samatar nor Jerome was present. The LHO suggested that the
matter be laid over to the December 5, 2012 council meeting. The LHO stated that she
had scheduled two legislative hearings in November, which would provide “a chance to
not only have the plans developed, but then revised, if necessary, and there could be
continued staffing on this issue.” Council Member Carter asked the LHO whether she
had the sense that relators were working with the city in good faith and actually could
complete the rehabilitation. In response, the LHO stated that some progress had been
made (specifically, that a structural-engineering analysis had occurred) but that the city
had not yet received certain documents. She also stated that work on rezoning had been
suspended because relators had not yet informed the city how they intended to use the
property. The LHO concluded by saying that she could not give the project a
“resounding endorsement at this time” but that the city was providing assistance to
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relators to help them succeed. Council Member Carter stated that he “wonder[s] if the
owner understands the kind of severity of what we’re discussing right now” but that “it
sounds like some progress is being made.” Council Member Carter moved to lay the
matter over to December 5, 2012. The city council approved the motion by a vote of
seven to zero.
Shortly thereafter, the city mailed a letter to relators to give them notice of the
legislative hearings scheduled for November 13 and 27, 2012. The letter also informed
relators of the work that needed to be accomplished before the hearings:
In the meantime, you will need to:
1) work with Larry Zangs on rezoning issues and
necessary license applications for assembly usage;
2) work with your architect on costs and plans, a
real estate agent on market value of the property (when the
structural analysis is complete and you have preliminary
plans from the architect, please share them with our office),
and
3) work with Craig O’Brien, PED, on additional
funding, if needed. We also recommend that you explore
project funding with Historic Saint Paul. This is the link to
the website:
http://www.historicsaintpaul.org/loans.
On November 13, 2012, the third legislative hearing occurred. Neither Samatar
nor Jerome was present. The prior evening, Jerome had sent an e-mail message to the
legislative-hearing coordinator, saying: “We can’t make it tomorrow. Our understanding
is there is a hearing scheduled on 601 Western Ave. N St Paul, however the owners have
too many pressing issues that have to be addressed.” At the hearing, the LHO told the
legislative-hearing coordinator to send relators a letter stating that “they’ve got to come
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in with all of their plans together on the 27th, and if they don’t, my recommendation will
be for the property’s removal with no option.” On November 15, 2012, the legislativehearing
coordinator sent an e-mail message to Jerome, stating, “This is to confirm that if
the conditions don’t meet by November 27, [the LHO] will recommend removal of the
building with no option for repair.”
On November 27, 2012, the fourth and final legislative hearing occurred. Samatar
was present; Jerome was not. The LHO reiterated that the city had requested the
structural-engineer’s report, contractor bids, an affidavit to prove adequate financing, and
a scope-of-work document, but stated that she had not yet received any of the required
documents. Samatar then gave some documents to the LHO. After reviewing the
documents, the LHO stated that Samatar had presented documents regarding financing
and contractor bids but that the documents were inadequate. Specifically, the LHO stated
that the bank statements provided by Samatar were inadequate because no affidavit
states, as required, that funds would be segregated for the rehabilitation project. The
LHO stated that the contractor bids were unacceptable because they were unsigned,
lacked detail, and did not provide timelines in which the work would take place. The
LHO informed Samatar that she would recommend to the city council that the building be
repaired or removed within 30 days.
On December 5, 2012, the city council considered the matter at a public hearing
for the fourth time. The LHO recommended that the city council order the building to be
repaired or removed within 30 days. In the alternative, if the city council wished to give
relators more time, she recommended the following conditions: (1) that relators develop a
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scope-of-work document; (2) that relators place the funds for the rehabilitation in escrow;
and (3) that relators hire a project manager to handle day-to-day decisions on the project.
Jason LeTourneau then addressed the city council. He stated that he had been
hired by relators three weeks earlier to be the project manager. He stated that he had
learned of the abatement proceedings only the prior week and had not previously realized
the amount of work required. Council Member Carter communicated to LeTourneau that
the city would give relators only one more chance:
And this is what I’m trying to tell you. Like, we -- we are
literally -- I want you guys to succeed. I really do. We’re
literally beyond the place where, you know, where I’ve been
comfortable with this for a while, honestly, you know, but
want you guys to succeed, so we’re trying to give you guys
every opportunity to. We’re sort of at the end of the
opportunity, all right?
Council Member Carter then stated that he would support another layover with the
conditions recommended by the LHO. He noted that the third condition had been met
because LeTourneau had been hired as project manager. He stated that the second
condition, placing the funds in escrow, should be easy to meet within two weeks. He
then asked LeTourneau how long it would take to develop a scope-of-work document.
LeTourneau requested 30 days. Council Member Carter stated his position as follows:
Okay. . . . [S]o here’s what my inclination is going to do -- is
going to be: I’m going to ask for a two-week layover. Within
two weeks’ time -- we’ve already got an outside project
manager, which is you Mr. LeTourneau. We should be able
to have the funds in escrow. That seems like that should take
a couple minutes to do, right? And then, you know, so get to
work on the scope for us.
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LeTourneau responded, “Absolutely.” Council Member Carter confirmed that relators
and LeTourneau were clear about the three conditions that needed to be met, and then he
moved to lay the resolution over until the city council’s December 19, 2012 meeting.
The city council approved the motion by a vote of six to zero.
Nothing in the record indicates that relators made any progress on the city
council’s three conditions after the December 5, 2012 meeting. On December 19, 2012,
the city council considered the matter at a public hearing for the fifth and final time.
Neither Samatar nor Jerome nor LeTourneau was present. The city council unanimously
approved a resolution ordering the repair or removal of the building within 30 days.
Relators appeal by way of a writ of certiorari.
D E C I S I O N
“Decisions of administrative agencies, including cities, are presumed to be correct,
and this court will reverse or modify an agency decision only if a party’s substantial
rights have been prejudiced because the decision exceeded the agency’s statutory
authority, was made upon unlawful procedure, was affected by other error of law, or was
arbitrary or capricious.” Rostamkhani v. City of St. Paul, 645 N.W.2d 479, 483 (Minn.
App. 2002) (citing In re Excess Surplus Status of Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Minn., 624
N.W.2d 264, 277 (Minn. 2001)). This court’s review is “limited to the evidence in the
record,” and the city’s decision must be upheld if it has “a legal basis demonstrated by
substantial evidence.” Id. (citing Cable Communications Bd. v. Nor-West Cable
Communications P’shp, 356 N.W.2d 658, 668 (Minn. 1984)). The city’s decision is
arbitrary and capricious only if it
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(1) relied on factors not intended by the ordinance;
(2) entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the issue;
(3) offered an explanation that conflicts with the evidence; or
(4) it is so implausible that it could not be explained as a
difference in view or the result of the city’s expertise.
Id. at 484.
The city’s ordinances define a “nuisance building” to mean a “vacant building or
portion of a vacant building as defined in section 43.02 which has multiple housing code
or building code violations.” St. Paul, Minn., Legislative Code § 45.02 (2007). Once the
city determines that a building is a nuisance building, the city is authorized to take steps
to abate the nuisance. St. Paul, Minn., Legislative Code § 45.08 (2004). Property owners
typically are given six months to rehabilitate the property, but one six-month extension of
that period may be approved if it can be shown that the code-compliance work is
proceeding expeditiously and is more than fifty percent complete, or “if unforeseen
conditions have had significant schedule impact on the completion of work.” St. Paul,
Minn., Legislative Code § 33.03(f)(4) (2009). The building at issue in this case has been
vacant since at least 2011 and has a documented history of code violations, as described
above. Relators’ own structural engineer and architect identified several areas of the
building that were in significant disrepair and in violation of city code.
Relators raise a number of arguments as to why the city council’s decision is
erroneous and should be reversed. We address each of them in turn.
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A.
Relators argue that the city council’s decision is not based on substantial evidence
because there is “undisputed evidence” in the record of relators’ substantial completion of
the city’s requirements.
The evidence in the record does not support relators’ argument that they had
substantially completed the abatement requirements, even if substantial compliance
would be sufficient. Between September and November 2012, relators repeatedly were
informed that they needed to provide the city with three things: (1) contractor bids, (2) a
work plan, (3) and a demonstration of available funds to complete the project. Relators
never satisfied those requirements. Although relators submitted some information, the
documentation was deemed inadequate. The city explained to relators on multiple
occasions why the documents they had provided were inadequate, and further explained
specifically what relators needed to provide in order to meet the city’s requirements. But
relators failed to cure the deficiencies, despite repeated extensions of time.
Thus, the city council’s decision is based on substantial evidence.
B.
Relators argue that the city council’s decision is arbitrary and capricious because it
“failed to consider undisputed evidence submitted by Relators that they were prepared to
take all appropriate remedial action immediately to complete their renovation of the
subject building.” Similarly, relators argue that the city council failed to consider an
important aspect of the issue because it failed to consider the degree of project
completion and relators’ willingness to complete the project.
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This argument is inconsistent with the record. Relators’ project manager admitted
during the December 5, 2012 city council meeting that he previously was unaware of the
extent of work to be done and needed more time to prepare a scope-of-work document.
Council Member Carter made clear that relators had one last chance to prove that they
had the capacity to complete the project. He suggested three conditions that needed to be
satisfied by the city council’s next meeting on December 19, 2012, to keep the project
alive. The third of those conditions was the scope-of-work document. There is no
evidence in the record, and no argument by relators, that relators ever submitted that
document to the city.
Relators contend that the city failed to consider that they were “willing” to fulfill
the city’s conditions. Again, their contention is inconsistent with the record, which
clearly indicates that they did not fulfill the city’s conditions, even after being given
multiple opportunities. Contrary to relators’ contention, it appears that the city did
consider the extent of relators’ progress and their willingness to complete the project and
simply found both wanting.
Thus, the city council’s decision is not arbitrary and capricious, and the city did
not fail to consider an important aspect of the issue.
C.
Relators argue that the city council’s decision is so implausible that it cannot be
explained as a difference in view or the result of the city’s expertise. Relators contend
that this is so because relators had repaired the roof and the nuisance “was almost wholly
abated by the time the Council rendered its decision.”
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Contrary to relators’ argument, the record does not indicate that relators had done
the work required by the city or any substantial portion of the work required. The record
shows that relators did a relatively minor amount of work related to tuckpointing and
electrical wiring. Relators also failed to submit the documents required by the city to
suspend its nuisance-abatement process. The city’s decision can be explained by the
city’s expertise in managing the abatement of nuisance property and relators’ failure to
meet the conditions imposed by the city.
Thus, the city council’s decision is not so implausible that it must be overturned.
D.
Relators argue that the city relied on factors not intended by the ordinance because
the LHO was concerned with the aesthetics of the rehabilitation project, a factor not
addressed by city ordinance.
Relators’ argument is based on comments made by the LHO at the first legislative
hearing, on August 14, 2012:
I would love to see this building fixed. There’s a lot of
things that could be done to make it look horrible, and there’s
some things that can be done to make it look great. . . . So if
it can be a handsome part of that neighborhood . . . you know,
and a reputable business, great.
This comment is not connected to the city council’s decision four months later to order
the building repaired or removed. Relators never were “legally obligated to restore the
building to please the LHO’s sense of aesthetics,” as they argue in their brief. Indeed, at
the same legislative hearing, the LHO clarified that relators needed to provide the city
with only three things: (1) contractor bids, (2) a work plan, (3) and a demonstration of
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available funds to complete the project. The city never referred to aesthetics in any of the
requirements imposed on relators.
Thus, the city did not rely on factors not intended by the ordinance.
E.
Relators argue that “the City’s decision that demolition, without any right to repair
the structure, is clearly oppressive and unreasonable.” Relators are incorrect in arguing
that the city council’s resolution deprives them of the right to repair the building. Even
after the resolution was approved, relators still had an opportunity to repair the structure,
pursuant to the city’s conditions. Furthermore, relators had ample opportunity to make
repairs before the city council’s December 19, 2012 meeting. Thus, the city council’s
decision is not oppressive and unreasonable.
F.
Relators argue that the city council’s decision was made upon unlawful procedures
because the city’s enforcement officer did not “appear and present evidence” to the city
council.
Relators rely on a city ordinance that requires the city council, as part of the
nuisance-abatement process, to hold a public hearing at which the city council “shall hear
from the enforcement officer and any other parties who wish to be heard.” St. Paul,
Minn., Legislative Code § 45.11, subd. 5 (2005). The record indicates that the city’s
code-enforcement officer was present at all four legislative hearings. He testified at
length at the first legislative hearing. The city council was provided with the minutes of
each of the legislative hearings, including a half-page description of his testimony at the
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first legislative hearing. The city council also was provided with the order to abate
nuisance, which had been prepared by the vacant-buildings enforcement inspector; a code
compliance report, which was prepared by city inspectors; and over 40 photographs of
the property. The city council’s resolution states that the city council reviewed the
exhibits from the department of safety and inspections, the minutes of the legislative
hearings, and the testimony given at the legislative hearings. Relators cite no authority
for the proposition that the city council must receive the code-enforcement officer’s
testimony orally instead of in writing. Furthermore, it does not appear that relators were
prejudiced by the written format of the testimony because relators never challenged the
accuracy of that testimony.
Thus, the city council’s decision was not made upon unlawful procedures.
G.
Relators argue that the city council’s decision constitutes an unlawful taking of
their property because the city prevented them from rehabilitating the property by
denying them permits, giving them inadequate time to resolve zoning issues, and
requiring them to put money in escrow.
In their brief, relators cite the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
which provides that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use without just
compensation.” U.S. Const. amend. V. Relators do not develop their argument any
further by stating what is required for a regulatory taking or by citing any legal authority.
“An assignment of error based on mere assertion and not supported by any argument or
authorities in [an] appellant’s brief is waived and will not be considered on appeal unless
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prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.” Kaehler v. Kaehler, 219 Minn. 536,
537, 18 N.W.2d 312, 313 (1945).
City staff refrained from issuing permits for the property because, as was
explained to Jerome, the appropriate permits could not be issued until relators decided
how the property would be used. The city did not arbitrarily deny permits to relators to
prevent them from rehabilitating the property. The city simply required relators to follow
certain steps to ensure that time, money, and resources were not wasted. The zoning
issues remained unresolved because relators never decided how the property would be
used. Furthermore, it was not unreasonable for the city to require relators to put funds in
escrow.
Thus, relators have not established that the city council’s decision constitutes an
unlawful taking of their property.
H.
Relators argue that the city discriminated against them on the basis of race or
national origin in violation of their constitutional rights to due process. This court may
consider such a claim on a petition for a writ of certiorari, even though the claim was not
presented to the city. See Holt v. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 431 N.W.2d 905, 906-07
(Minn. App. 1988), review denied (Minn. Jan. 13, 1989).
Relators’ discrimination claim is based primarily on their assertion that the city’s
LHO described relators’ plans for the rehabilitated building in a derogatory manner as a
“joke.” Relators’ brief states, “When Samatar described several potential usages, each
designed to serve the Somali Community, the LHO understood that she was appearing as
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a new owner [and] described the situation as ‘a joke.’” At oral argument, relators’
counsel stated further that the LHO’s remark was a reaction to meeting Samatar, who
presented as a Muslim woman dressed in a hijab.
The comment at issue was made during the first legislative hearing. The LHO was
not previously aware that the property had been sold. After Samatar came forward and
said that she and her husband were the new owners of the building, the LHO engaged in
some informal conversation with Samatar, including the following exchange:
L.H.O.: Do you folks live in town here or --
SAMATAR: We’re living in Minneapolis actually.
L.H.O.: In Minneapolis. Oh, all right. [Laughter.]
It’s a joke.
The audio-recording of the hearing reveals that the LHO used a sarcastic tone when
saying, “Oh, all right.” The audio-recording also reveals that some persons who were
present (but not the LHO or Samatar) briefly engaged in some mild laughter in response
to the LHO’s remark. The LHO then said, “It’s a joke,” as if to explain to Samatar that
her sarcastic remark was an inside joke among city employees. Most importantly, for
purposes of relators’ discrimination claim, the audio-recording does not give a listener
the impression that the LHO was referring in any way to Samatar’s race or national origin
when she either made the joking remark or referred back to it. Rather, the audiorecording
gives the strong impression that the LHO’s joking remark referred to relators’
residence in the city of Minneapolis rather than the city of St. Paul. The LHO’s remarks
appear quite clearly to be an example of the rather common and innocuous practice of
21
residents of the Twin Cities to comment on, and sometimes joke about, the lighthearted
rivalry between two cities.
Furthermore, at the time of the LHO’s remark, there had not yet been any
discussion regarding the potential uses of the property. The first time Samatar mentioned
her ideas for potential uses of the property was later in that hearing, when she said that
she and Jerome anticipated that the first floor would be used for a retail store of some
kind and that the second floor would be used for either offices or a wedding hall. The
record indicates that, at a later date, relators told the city that they planned to use the
second floor of the property as a rental hall for weddings and events and the first floor as
a restaurant on one side and a retail store on the other. Contrary to relators’ appellate
arguments, relators never indicated to anyone associated with the city that they intended
to use the property for a purpose specifically associated with the Somali community, at
least as far as the record reveals. At oral argument, relators’ counsel repeatedly stated
that relators had planned to use the property as a “Somali meeting hall.” But there is
nothing in the record to support that assertion. If relators intended for the building to
serve the Somali community, it appears from the record that they never communicated
that intention to the city in any way.
Thus, relators’ claim that the city discriminated against them on the basis of race
or national origin in violation of their constitutional rights to due process is without merit.
22
In sum, each of relators’ arguments is without merit. The city did not commit
reversible error in any respect. Accordingly, we affirm the city council’s decision to
approve a resolution requiring the repair or removal of the building within 30 days.
Affirmed.

Monday, September 9, 2013

Sharon4Anderson_v_LenardFieldingMD_Brainard_Lufsky_1997


331 N.W.2d 731 (1983)

Lanny ENBERG, Appellant,
v.
John R. BONDE, etc., et al., Respondents.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.
March 18, 1983.
Linda Ojala, MCLU, Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty & Bennett and Susan L. Lentz, Minneapolis, for appellant.
Hubert H. Humphrey III, Atty. Gen., and Paul G. Zerby, Asst. Atty. Gen., Minneapolis, for respondents.
Robert M. Levy, New York City, Lisbeth Nudell, St. Paul, for Mental Health Ass'n of Minnesota and American Orthopsychiatric Ass'n.
Onek, Klein & Farr, Joel I. Klein and JoAnn E. MacBeth, Washington, D.C., for The Minnesota Psychiatric Society.
YETKA, Justice.
Plaintiff Lanny Enberg sought damages and injunctive and declaratory relief as a result of his involuntary detention at Brainerd State Hospital under Minn.Stat. § 253A.04, subd. 1 (1980).








1 The trial court denied that relief. Plaintiff appeals, claiming the statute is unconstitutional in that it does not require evidence of an overt act, attempt or threat of harm to self or others prior to emergency hospitalization and also does not require a preliminary hearing within 72 hours of initial detention. We find that plaintiff's first claim has been mooted by the adoption of Minn.Stat. ch. 253B (1982) and that his second claim is incorrect; consequently, we affirm.
Plaintiff commenced an action in 1977, with an amended complaint filed in September 1979. The complaint sought damages and injunctive and declaratory relief "pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article 1, Sections 7 and 8 of the Constitution of the State of Minnesota, and Minnesota common law."
2 The action arose out of plaintiff-appellant Enberg's detention at Brainerd State Hospital under Minn.Stat. § 253A.04 (1980), providing for the emergency hospitalization of mentally ill and mentally deficient persons. Appellant sued Dr. John R. Bonde, individually and as Director of Psychiatric Services; Dr. Leonard T. Fielding, individually and as Director of Medical Services; Vera J. Likins and Edward J. Dirkswager in their official capacities as Commissioners of the Department of Public Welfare and their successors in interest; and the State of Minnesota.
By order of August 4, 1980, as amended by order of September 4, 1980, the Crow Wing County District Court partially granted the summary judgment motion on behalf of defendants Likins and Dirkswager in their official capacity as Commissioners of the Department of Public Welfare and on behalf of the State of Minnesota, finding in their favor only on the issue of immunity from money damages. The summary judgment motion of Drs. Bonde and Fielding, individually, was denied.
The case was tried to a jury in May 1981. The jury was asked questions on special verdict. They found that:
(a) Dr. Bonde had sufficient medical evidence to determine that appellant should have been hospitalized under Minn.Stat. § 253A.04, subd. 1 (1980);(b) Dr. Bonde had reason to believe that appellant had committed, attempted or threatened a recent overt act of harm to himself or others; (c) appellant suffered no compensable damages; and(d) Dr. Fielding had acted in good faith, believed his actions were proper, and had reasonable grounds for belief that his actions were proper.After the special verdict, plaintiff moved for declaratory and injunctive relief, for special findings of fact and conclusions of law, for judgment NOV or, in the alternative, a new trial. The district court denied all motions in an order dated June 16, 1981. Plaintiff Enberg appealed. We affirm.
On January 2, 1976, Lanny Enberg went to Brainerd State Hospital. His purpose in going there was twofold: first to visit a friend in the chemical dependency unit (located in Building 22); second, to talk with someone about his own concerns. Appellant felt depressed and had been thinking about his father's suicide, which had occurred within the preceding year.
At the hospital, appellant spoke for several minutes with a member of the staff. He then spoke with Dr. Elizabeth Brody, a clinical psychologist at the hospital. Appellant spoke with Dr. Brody for about 20 minutes. He said that his friends thought that he was weird. He talked about his father's suicide. According to Dr. Brody's testimony at trial, Enberg was often incoherent, his speech was disjointed, and he used half sentences. Dr. Brody also testified that appellant appeared to be extremely agitated and kept looking suspiciously around the room.
After this conversation, Dr. Brody went to Dr. John R. Bonde, a staff psychiatrist and later chief of psychiatric services, Building 22, where Enberg was detained. Dr. Brody asked Dr. Bonde to talk with appellant.
Appellant told Dr. Bonde of certain premonitions he had had, including a premonition of his father's death and a vision of the Statue of Liberty with cracks all over it. He told Dr. Bonde that, at a party a few days before, he had drunk some wine, smoked marijuana, and perhaps had smoked some hashish as well. According to Dr. Bonde, appellant related an incident where he had been involved in a verbal altercation with a "redneck" and began to have thoughts of going out of control and kicking the man in the scrotum. Dr. Bonde also observed that appellant often glanced over his shoulder as if suspicious of something. At times, appellant would become angry. Appellant wore a jacket with a cobra on the back and took it off in order to show Dr. Bonde the snake, telling him it had to do with "protecting the heart when he was harassed by people."
After this discussion, which lasted roughly 10 minutes, Dr. Bonde decided to hospitalize appellant. Despite appellant's assertions to the contrary, there is evidence that, before hospitalizing Enberg, Dr. Bonde suggested the alternative of treatment at the Northern Pines Health Clinic; Enberg declined.
Much testimony at trial dealt with events subsequent to the decision to hold Enberg. Respondents brought out evidence of threats and other irrational behavior by appellant while appellant elicited testimony that he had never attempted or committed an overt harmful act. Appellant attempted to prove he had received no formal treatment, while respondents sought to show that Enberg refused attempts at treatment and benefited substantially merely from being hospitalized. Although such evidence might show that Dr. Bonde's decision that Enberg needed hospitalization and Dr. Fielding's consent to hospitalization had some merit, it is not relevant to the issues in this case; namely, whether Dr. Bonde had reason to hospitalize Enberg at the time he did so and whether Enberg should have had a preliminary hearing within 72 hours.
Within 72 hours after Enberg entered the hospital, his mother filed a petition for judicial commitment. The petition was accompanied by a written statement from Dr. Bonde. Before a hearing could be held pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 253A.07 (1980), it was determined that appellant Enberg had improved enough to be released. Enberg left Brainerd State Hospital on January 20, 1976.
This appeal raises the following issues:
1. Are respondents Bonde and Fielding immune from liability?2. Does due process require evidence of a recent overt act, attempt or threat to do harm to self or others before an individual may be involuntarily confined on an emergency basis?3. Does due process require a preliminary hearing of some kind within 72 hours of confinement under the emergency hospitalization statute?1. A threshold issue is whether the respondents here are immune from liability. All defendants except for Dr. Bonde and Dr. Fielding were granted immunity from damages by summary judgment and that disposition is not being challenged on appeal.
Minn.Stat. § 253A.04, subd. 1 (1980) provided that:
Subdivision 1. Any person may be admitted or held for emergency care and treatment in a hospital with the consent of the head of the hospital upon a written statement by any licensed physician that he has examined the person not more than 15 days prior to the person's admission, that he is of the opinion, for stated reasons, that the person is mentally ill, inebriate or mentally deficient and is in imminent danger of causing injury to himself or others if not immediately restrained, and that an order of the court cannot be obtained in time to prevent such anticipated injury. Such physician's statement shall be sufficient authority for a peace or health officer to transport a patient to a hospital.A later section of the same chapter granted a qualified immunity to those acting under the statute:
All persons acting in good faith, upon either actual knowledge or information thought by them to be reliable, who act pursuant to any provisions of this chapter or who procedurally or physically assist in the hospitalization of any individual, pursuant to sections 253A.01 to 253A.21, are not subject to any civil or criminal liability under sections 253A.01 to 253A.21.Minn.Stat. § 253A.21, subd. 2 (1980).
In answering the special verdict questions before it,

3 the jury here determined that defendant Fielding acted in good faith, believing that his actions were proper. The jury also found that there were reasonable grounds for Fielding's belief that his actions were proper. The jurors did not consider the application of the immunity defense to defendant Bonde since they had already found that Bonde had sufficient clinical medical information to satisfy the requirements set out in Minn.Stat. § 253A.04, subd. 1 (1980) and that he had reason to believe that plaintiff Enberg had committed, attempted or threatened a recent overt act of harm to himself or others. A thorough examination of the record reveals no reason for overturning these jury findings. Appellant argues that the court should have found as a matter of law that defendants did not act in good faith. We cannot agree. The study of case law indicates that the trial court's instructions and handling of this case were in complete conformity with present law on the subject and that the matters presented to the jury were proper jury questions. Consequently, the respondents are entitled to immunity under state statute.
We must still decide whether respondents are entitled to good faith immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In O'Connor v. Donaldson,
422 U.S. 563, 95 S.Ct. 2486, 45 L.Ed.2d 396 (1975), the United States Supreme Court was faced with an argument that the superintendent of a state mental hospital had unconstitutionally deprived the plaintiff of his constitutional right to liberty by keeping him confined at the hospital. The superintendent claimed good faith immunity. The Court remanded the case, leaving the finding of immunity vel non to a jury. The Court stated that:
[T]he relevant question for the jury is whether [the superintendent] "knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of [the patient], or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to [the patient]."Id. at 577, 95 S.Ct. at 2494, citing Wood v. Strickland,
420 U.S. 308, 330, 95 S.Ct. 992, 1005, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), reh'g denied, 421 U.S. 921, 95 S.Ct. 1589, 43 L.Ed.2d 790 (1975). The Court noted that "an official has, of course, no duty to anticipate unforeseeable constitutional developments." Id.
In Sebastian v. United States,
531 F.2d 900 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 856, 97 S.Ct. 153, 50 L.Ed.2d 133 (1976), the Court held that a psychiatrist who examined appellant pursuant to a petition filed in an Arkansas probate court and hospitalized him for further evaluation was entitled to good faith immunity. Id. at 903-04; accord Gross v. Pomerleau, 465 F.Supp. 1167 (D.Md.1979) (medical personnel who examined plaintiff under emergency commitment procedures entitled to good faith immunity where they had no reason to believe procedures deprived plaintiff of her constitutional rights and there was no evidence personnel behaved arbitrarily, recklessly, or maliciously so as to deprive plaintiff of her constitutional rights).
This court has addressed the physician's good faith immunity issue in a slightly different context. In Price v. Sheppard, 307 Minn. 250,
239 N.W.2d 905 (1976), the Director of the Minnesota Security Hospital had administered electroshock therapy to a patient against the express wishes of the patient's guardian. The court, relying on the language just quoted from O'Connor v. Donaldson, found the director immune from an action for damages for acts performed by him in good faith and which he could not reasonably have known would violate the constitutional rights of another. 307 Minn. at 260-62, 239 N.W.2d at 912.
In the present case, both Dr. Bonde and Dr. Fielding were state employees. Appellant does not argue that persons in respondents' position are not protected by good faith immunity, but claims that respondents did not act in good faith. As already noted, the jury found otherwise. It would appear that respondents are immune from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Respondents' immunity significantly affects our resolution of this appeal. Even if it is decided that appellant's due process rights were violated, there is presently no one from whom he may collect damages. All that remains are appellant's prayers for injunctive and declaratory relief. Under the recently enacted Minnesota Commitment Act of 1982, Minn.Stat. §§ 253B.01-.23 (1982), the requirement of a recent overt act, attempt or threat of harm to self or others has been incorporated into the emergency hospitalization (now described as emergency hold) procedure.
2. The next issue raised is whether due process requires evidence of a recent overt act, attempt or threat to do harm to self or others before an individual may be involuntarily confined on an emergency basis. Minn.Stat. § 253A.04, subd. 1 (1980) requires that, in order for a person to be admitted or held for emergency care, an examining physician conclude "that the person is mentally ill, inebriate or mentally deficient and is in imminent danger of causing injury to himself or others if not immediately restrained." Appellant argues that this requirement offers insufficient protection to persons being evaluated for admission or detention under the statute. Appellant relies in part on Addington v. Texas,

441 U.S. 418, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979). There, the United States Supreme Court stated:
This Court repeatedly has recognized that civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection. See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 [92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435] (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 [92 S.Ct. 1048, 31 L.Ed.2d 394] (1972); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 [87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527] (1967); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 [87 S.Ct. 1209, 18 L.Ed.2d 326] (1967). Moreover, it is indisputable that involuntary commitment to a mental hospital after a finding of probable dangerousness to self or others can engender adverse social consequences to the individual. Whether we label this phenomena "stigma" or choose to call it something else is less important than that we recognize that it can occur and that it can have a very significant impact on the individual.Id. 441 U.S. at 425-26, 99 S.Ct. at 1808-09. In order to protect this liberty interest, appellant maintains that it is necessary to provide a more rigorous standard for commitment: evidence of a recent overt act, attempt or threat of harm to self or others. Appellant contends that, without this added requirement, it is impossible to predict dangerousness with sufficient accuracy to justify the deprivation of liberty inherent in involuntary commitment.
This court recently recognized the problems involved in predicting dangerousness, noting that "[m]any psychiatrists themselves admit that their ability to predict future dangerousness is not reliable; to date, no valid clinical experience or statistical evidence reliably describes psychological or physical signs or symptoms that can be reliably used to discriminate between the harmless and the potentially dangerous individual." Johnson v. Noot,

323 N.W.2d 724, 728 (Minn.1982).
Both sides here presented considerable expert testimony at trial as to whether it is necessary to adopt the overt act, attempt or threat requirement in order to bring predictions of dangerousness up to an acceptable level of accuracy. Persuasive evidence for and against the requirement was presented at trial and compelling arguments for each position were laid out in amicus briefs from several mental health and psychiatric associations. Supporters of the requirement argue that, without it, many people will be wrongly confined as dangerous. Opponents respond that the test adds little reliability to psychiatrists' predictions and prevents the confinement of individuals who are clearly dangerous but have yet to undertake an overt act, attempt or threat of harm.
A good review of the cases in this area is presented in Note, Overt Dangerous Behavior as a Constitutional Requirement for Involuntary Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44 U.Chi.L.Rev. 562 (1977). In light of the conflicting views of the experts and the courts on this matter, we agree with the author of this Note that, while the recent overt act, attempt or threat requirement may be good policy, it is not necessarily a constitutional mandate. Id. at 592-93.
In any event, the Minnesota Legislature has, in fact, adopted this requirement. Minn.Stat. § 253B.05, subd. 1 (1982) provides:
EMERGENCY HOLD. Any person may be admitted or held for emergency care and treatment in a treatment facility with the consent of the head of the treatment facility upon a written statement by an examiner that: (1) he has examined the person not more than 15 days prior to admission, (2) he is of the opinion, for stated reasons, that the person is mentally ill, mentally retarded or chemically dependent, and is in imminent danger of causing injury to himself or others if not immediately restrained, and (3) an order of the court cannot be obtained in time to prevent the anticipated injury.The statement shall be: (1) sufficient authority for a peace or health officer to transport a patient to a treatment facility, (2) stated in behavioral terms and not in conclusory language, and (3) of sufficient specificity to provide an adequate record for review. A copy of the statement shall be personally served on the person immediately upon admission. A copy of the statement shall be maintained by the treatment facility.Although the standard here seems, at first glance, identical to that in Minn.Stat. § 253A.04, subd. 1 (1980), the new requirement has been incorporated into the definition of mental illness, which now reads as follows:
MENTALLY ILL PERSON. "Mentally ill person" means any person who has a substantial psychiatric disorder of thought, mood, perception, orientation, or memory which grossly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or to reason or understand, which (a) is manifested by instances of grossly disturbed behavior or faulty perceptions; and (b) poses a substantial likelihood of physical harm to himself or others as demonstrated by (i) a recent attempt or threat to physically harm himself or others, or (ii) a failure to provide necessary food, clothing, shelter or medical care for himself, as a result of the impairment. This impairment excludes (a) epilepsy, (b) mental retardation, (c) brief periods of intoxication caused by alcohol or drugs, or (d) dependence upon or addiction to any alcohol or drugs.Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 13 (1982); cf. id. § 253A.04, subd. 17 (1982) (person mentally ill and dangerous to the public).
Given the present statute, the issues as to whether a recent overt act, attempt or threat of harm to self or others is required by due process and whether all respondents are immune from liability for damages are moot.
3. Finally, appellant argues that due process "requires a preliminary judicial determination of probable cause within 72 hours of initial confinement, whether that be by physician or judicial hold order." Appellant relies in part on cases decided in other jurisdictions and in part on this court's decision in State ex rel. Doe v. Madonna,

295 N.W.2d 356 (Minn.1980).
Appellant was held at Brainerd State Hospital for 18 days without a hearing. Under the law then in effect:
Any person hospitalized pursuant to this section may be held up to 72 hours after admission, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, unless a petition for the commitment of such person has been filed in the probate court of the county of residence or of the county wherein such hospital is located. If the head of the hospital deems such discharge not to be for the best interest of the person, his family, or the public and no other petition has been filed, he shall prior to the expiration of 72 hours after admission, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, file a petition for the commitment of such person. Upon the filing of a petition, the court may order the detention of the person until determination of the matter. Upon motion of such hospitalized person the venue of the petition shall be changed to the probate court of the county of the person's residence, if he be a resident of the state of Minnesota.Minn.Stat. § 253A.04, subd. 3 (1980).
A petition was filed for appellant's commitment. The judicial commitment provision, Minn.Stat. § 253A.07, subd. 8 (1980) provided for a hearing within 14 days from the date of filing of the petition, with an extension of up to 30 days upon showing of good cause. Appellant's confinement without hearing for 18 days was authorized by Chapter 253A.
In State ex rel. Doe v. Madonna, this court held that when a petition for commitment had been filed and the proposed patient had been taken into custody and confined pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 253A.07, subd. 3 (1980):
[D]ue process compels a preliminary probable cause hearing at least within 72 hours of initial confinement under a hold order, unless the court extends the time for such a hearing on the basis of evidence demonstrating that a hearing within this period of time would have a serious adverse effect on the well-being of the confined patient, or that other emergency conditions justifying a continuance exist.295 N.W.2d at 365 (citation omitted).
The court stated that involuntary commitment to a mental institution was a deprivation of liberty that could not be accomplished without due process of law. Citing cases relied on by the appellant here, the court wrote that "[a]lthough the state may have a compelling interest in temporary ex parte detention of persons dangerous to themselves or others, such detention is justified only for the amount of time necessary to prepare for a probable cause hearing before a neutral judge." Id. The court concluded that the hearing need not be as formal as a full commitment hearing, but does require adequate notice and opportunity to be represented by counsel. Id. at 365-66.
Appellant also looks to cases in other jurisdictions for support of his position. In Lessard v. Schmidt,

349 F.Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis.1972), plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Wisconsin civil commitment statute. That statute permitted involuntary detention for up to 145 days without a hearing.4 The court recognized that the state sometimes has a legitimate interest in confining, without a hearing, "persons who threaten violence to themselves or others" in order to protect society and those persons. 349 F.Supp. at 1091. Nevertheless, the court found that such detention was limited to the period necessary to arrange a probable cause hearing and that such a preliminary hearing must be held within 48 hours of confinement. Id. Similarly, in Wessel v. Pryor, 461 F.Supp. 1144 (E.D.Ark.1978), the court modified Arkansas civil commitment procedures to require that a petition for commitment be filed within 24 hours, excluding weekends and legal holidays, in emergency confinement situations and that the respondent would have the opportunity to appear in court within 24 hours (again excluding weekends and holidays) of the filing of the petition. Id. at 1147.
On the other hand, there are also cases, relied upon by the respondent, where prehearing periods of more than 72 hours have received court approval. In Logan v. Arafeh,
346 F.Supp. 1265 (D.Conn.1972), aff'd sub nom. Briggs v. Arafeh, 411 U.S. 911, 93 S.Ct. 1556, 36 L.Ed.2d 304 (1973), a three-judge panel upheld the constitutionality of an emergency commitment statute under which a person certified as dangerous by a physician could be held up to 45 days without a hearing. Coll v. Hyland, 411 F.Supp. 905 (E.D.N.J.1976), another three-judge panel case, addressed the New Jersey civil commitment statute. The court found that no preliminary hearing was necessary where a final hearing was provided for within 20 days and the certifications of two physicians were required before temporary confinement. Other courts have also approved prehearing periods of more than 72 hours. E.g., French v. Blackburn, 428 F.Supp. 1351 (M.D.N.C.), aff'd, 443 U.S. 901, 99 S.Ct. 3091, 61 L.Ed.2d 869 (1977) (10 days); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F.Supp. 378 (M.D.Ala.1974), rev'd on other grounds, 651 F.2d 387 (5th Cir.1981) (7 days); Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F.Supp. 509 (D.Neb.1975); contra Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F.Supp. 1039 (E.D.Pa.1975), vacated and remanded, 431 U.S. 119, 97 S.Ct. 1709, 52 L.Ed.2d 184 (1977), on remand sub nom. Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Public Welfare, 459 F.Supp. 30 (E.D.Pa.1978).
Respondents argue due process does not require a hearing within 72 hours. They emphasize the statement in State ex rel. Doe v. Madonna specifically excluding Minn.Stat. § 253A.04 (1980) from consideration in that case. 295 N.W.2d at 361 n. 6. They point to valid reasons for the distinction between judicial and emergency hospitalizations. It is their view that more time may be required in emergency situations for proper diagnosis of persons detained. Where such persons are under the influence of drugs or alcohol, proper diagnosis must await the user's return to sobriety. Respondents contend that if the 72-hour period includes weekends and holidays, diagnosis and treatment will be hampered by a lack of trained personnel in state institutions. Finally, they note that under the new statute, a petition for commitment must be filed within 72 hours and a hearing held within 72 hours thereafter.
Appellant counters that both 72-hour periods exempt weekends and holidays. Consequently, with the right distribution of holidays, it is possible for 12 days to elapse between confinement and hearing. He also raises the possibility of serialized and consecutive emergency hold orders. Further, he argues that the reasoning of State ex rel. Doe v. Madonna is applicable here; that the deprivation of liberty is just as serious as in the case of judicial commitment and that there is no evidence of the impossibility of holding a hearing within 72 hours.
A majority of this court finds that a hearing within 72 hours of confinement is not constitutionally mandated; there are more imperative reasons for a hearing within 72 hours in the case of a judicial commitment than where a skilled and licensed physician has found that an emergency hold is required. Moreover, we cannot conceive of a case where serialized emergency holds are permissible. The statute requires that a petition for commitment be filed within 72 hours of being held under emergency hold. The courts of this state are thus aware of the confinement and the statute then requires the courts to conduct a probable cause hearing within 72 hours after filing of the petition for commitment. In the great majority of cases where one has been held under the emergency hospitalization act, a hearing will be held within eight days. Any physician failing to provide for a filing of the petition for commitment would be exposing himself to liability.

5
The trial court is affirmed in all respects.

FootNotes


1. The statutory scheme applicable to this case, Hospital and Commitment Act, Minn.Stat. §§ 253A.01-.23 (1980), was repealed in its entirety in 1982, Act of Mar. 22, 1982, ch. 581, § 25, 1982 Minn.Laws 1329, 1358-59, and replaced by the Minnesota Commitment Act of 1982, Minn.Stat. §§ 253B.01-.23 (1982).
2. In fact, the case was actually tried, and is here on appeal, as an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV 1980).
3. The jury was given the following interrogatories and answered them as indicated:"QUESTION NO. 1"On January 2, 1976, prior to the issuance of the hold order, did defendant Bonde have sufficient clinical medical information based upon medically accepted professional judgment, practice and standards upon which to base a reasonable medical diagnosis that plaintiff Enberg was mentally ill and in imminent danger of causing injury to himself or others and a court order could not be obtained to prevent such anticipated injury?"ANSWER: (Yes or No) /s/ Yes."QUESTION NO. 2"On January 2, 1976 prior to the issuance of the hold order, did defendant Fielding have sufficient clinical medical information based upon medically accepted professional judgment, practice and standards upon which to base a reasonable medical diagnosis that plaintiff Enberg was mentally ill and in imminent danger of causing injury to himself or others and a court order could not be obtained to prevent such anticipated injury?"ANSWER: (Yes or No) /s/ No."QUESTION NO. 3"Prior to the hold order on January 2, 1976, did defendant Bonde have reason to believe that plaintiff Enberg committed, attempted or threatened a recent overt act of harm to himself or others?"ANSWER: (Yes or No) /s/ Yes."QUESTION NO. 4"Prior to the hold order on January 2, 1976, did defendant Fielding have reason to believe that plaintiff Enberg had committed, attempted or threatened a recent overt act of harm to himself or others?"ANSWER: (Yes or No) /s/ No."QUESTION NO. 5"INSTRUCTION: Answer the following questions 5, 6, 7 and 8 only if you have answered "No" to any of questions No. 1, 2, 3 and 4. Do not answer questions 5, 6, 7 and 8 if your answers to questions No. 1, 2, 3 and 4 was [sic] yes."5. Were the actions of defendant Bonde a direct cause of plaintiff Enberg's confinement in the State Hospital from January 2nd to January 7th, 1976?"ANSWER: (Yes or No) /s/ Yes."QUESTION NO. 6"Were the actions of defendant Bonde a direct cause of plaintiff Enberg's confinement in the State Hospital from January 7th through January 20th, 1976?"ANSWER: (Yes or No) /s/ Yes."QUESTION NO. 7"Were the actions of defendant Fielding a direct cause of plaintiff Enberg's confinement in the State Hospital from January 2nd to January 7th, 1976?"ANSWER: (Yes or No) /s/ Yes."QUESTION NO. 8"Were the actions of defendant Fielding a direct cause of plaintiff Enberg's confinement in the State Hospital from January 7th through January 20th, 1976?"ANSWER: (Yes or No) /s/ Yes."QUESTION NO. 9"What amount of money as an award of damages would fairly and reasonably compensate plaintiff Enberg for the elements of damage plaintiff Enberg suffered as a result of his confinement in the Brainerd State Hospital from January 2nd through January 7th, 1976?"ANSWER: $/s/ -0-."QUESTION NO. 10"What amount of money as an award of damages would fairly and reasonably compensate plaintiff Enberg for the elements of damage plaintiff Enberg suffered as a result of his confinement in the Brainerd State Hospital from January 7th through January 20th, 1976?"ANSWER: $/s/ -0-."QUESTION NO. 11"With respect to the immunity defenses, answer question 11a, b and c only if you have answered "no" to either question 1 and 3. "11a Did defendant Bonde act in good faith?ANSWER: (Yes or No) /s/ _ _ _."11b Did defendant Bonde believe that his actions were proper? ANSWER: (Yes or No) /s/ _ _ _."11c If so, were there reasonable grounds for defendant Bonde's belief that his actions were proper? ANSWER: (Yes or No) /s/ _ _ _."QUESTION NO. 12"With respect to the immunity defenses, answer question 12a, b and c only if you have answered "no" to either question 2 or 4."12a Did defendant Fielding act in good faith? ANSWER: (Yes or No) /s/ Yes."12b Did defendant Fielding believe that his actions were proper? ANSWER: (Yes or No) /s/ Yes."12c If so, were there reasonable grounds for defendant Fielding's belief that his actions were proper? ANSWER: (Yes or No) /s/ Yes."
4. The statute permitted 5 days of emergency involuntary commitment, plus an additional 10 days if a court so decided. Additional extensions were permitted up to a total of 105 days. If the patient requested a jury trial, the period could be extended anothe
Cpl Jim Anderson Murdered 21Sept2000 Note to MN Governor Mark Dayton Are Boards ie Judicial,Medical Covert Coverup of Judicial and Medical Malpractice must be Abated/Abolished as Ineffective,unabated by MN Government Officials




Sunday, August 25, 2013

MNCourtSanctionsJudgeRichardPerkins_Stealing_Children_CarolineRice

Appeals Court Finds Judge Richard Perkins Guilty of Misconduct

Posted on August 24, 2013
5


Caroline Rice Wins Appeal
Appeals Court Criticizes Judge Richard Perkins
For Bias, Unfair Trial, Serious Mistakes
In an opinion released Monday, August 19, 2013, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals ruled that Caroline Rice
had been wrongly convicted of depriving and
interfering with the custody of her child. The appeals
court reversed the convictions of Caroline because
of “the cumulative effect of various evidentiary
rulings, an erroneous jury instruction, and
prejudicial judicial conduct deprived appellant of her
due process right to a fair trial.” [What happens
next? See the note at end of this blog.] The decision
was by a panel of three judges that ruled 2-1 in
Caroline’s favor.
In an earlier divorce case against her ex-husband, a
very wealthy stock broker, a Hennepin County
district court awarded Caroline custody of her two
oldest daughters, but awarded custody of her
youngest children, a girl and two boys, to her ex-husband. (At the time, the oldest girls had
experienced abuse by their father.) Caroline lost her
appeal in that case. Later, an order for protection
was issued that prohibited Caroline from having any
contact with any of her three youngest children. On
October 31, 2010, the girl who was in her father’s
custody, then 13 years old, ran from her father’s
home in Minnesota to Michigan near the border with
Canada. The girl, A.R., was with her mother for a
day. Caroline was arrested in Michigan after she
crossed the border back into the United States. She
was put in jail in Michigan. After weeks in jail there,
she was released and returned to Minnesota where
she was arrested and put in jail in Carver County for
about two months. In the trial before Judge Perkins,
Caroline asserted the defense that she had a
reasonable basis for trying to protect her child from
abuse by her father. She submitted 273 pages of
evidence of past abuse by A.R’s father but judge
Perkins ruled this evidence was not relevant
because it was evidence of abuse by the father two
or more years before the dates of the crimes she
was being tried for. Judge Perkins also excluded
medical evidence of abuse because Carver County
police concluded that the claims of abuse were
unfounded.
Caroline tried to submit evidence that A.R. almost
died because her father failed to send her to a
dentist for a root canal operation to treat an infected
tooth but Judge Perkins would not allow that
evidence. Caroline’s two oldest daughters, L.R. and
K.R. testified that they had been abused by their
father, that K.R. had been dragged down a flight of
stairs by her ankles by her father, but Judge Perkins
later told the jury no evidence of child abuse had
been submitted. During the trial, the Carver County
prosecutor, Peter Ivy, raised numerous objections
during Caroline’s opening statement which Judge
Perkins allowed. Mr. Ivy complained that he was
disadvantaged because “it appears I am beating up
on Ms. Rice, denying her the right to counsel.”
(Caroline had to be her own lawyer because the
lawyers she retained were afraid of Judge Perkins.
They knew that he was biased against Caroline and
were afraid Judge Perkins would damage their
careers.) Judge Perkins warned Caroline:
“And I’m telling you now very clearly on
the record that I intend to be much
more proactive in stepping in and
stopping you on your lines of
questioning. I’m going to do that
because I believe if I don’t do that that
is a great prejudice to the state
because, in fact, it does look like they’re
beating up on you, that they are
stacking the deck against you. That’s
not the case. So I’m going to be more
active in that so that if anybody is
going to be looking like a bully in this
proceeding. If you will, in the eyes of
the jury, it’s going to be me. So we can
continue to try to maintain a level
playing field to you that is fair to you as
well as the state.”
During Caroline’s questioning of her witnesses,
Judge Perkins began interrupting even though there
was no objection by the prosecutor, Mr. Ivy. Judge
Perkins interrupted Caroline’s direct examination of
L.R. more than 90 times and interrupted Caroline’s
direct examination of A.R. at least 45 times. Mr. Ivy
occasionally raised objections which Judge Perkins
upheld, but the majority of evidentiary rulings during
Caroline’s questioning were by Judge Perkins sui
sponte. Judge Perkins continued to do this when
Caroline questioned her ex-husband and asked him
if he ever sedated her daughter A.R. Judge Perkins
told Caroline: “Ms. Rice, you cannot continue to lob
hand grenades.” He continued saying that may not
“just lob hand grenades out there . . . . I don’t know
what they are, they’re not questions . . . .You
continue to ask questions that are not germane to
these proceedings . . . . You ask those questions of
witnesses where it doesn’t fit.” Caroline later asked
L.R. “Did you ever see your dad hit or hurt A.R.?”
After allowing an objection that the question
“assumes facts not in evidence”, Judge Perkins said
“You’re not going to answer that . . . ” Judge Perkins
then said to Caroline: “do you have any basis for
lobbing that one out there. Do you have any factual
basis for . . . asking that question?” Judge Perkins
then continued: “Don’t start asking another
question. You throw something out there and you
just leave it hanging. . . . Throwing out an allegation
about dad having harmed [L.R.] and/or [A.R.] . . .
There is no foundation laid here.”
Caroline asked a later witness: “Have the children
ever reported to you that anyone else has ever hit or
hurt them?” Despite L.R.’s earlier testimony, Judge
Perkins said: “Excuse me, there is no testimony that
anyone has hit or hurt them except for the specific
instances you’ve talked about and there is no
person identified in those instances. So you’re
suggesting that B.R. [Caroline’s ex-husband] has hit
or hurt them. That’s not in evidence. You may want
to rethink that question.” Caroline replied that her
daughter’s testimony provided that evidence, to
which Judge Perkins replied: “I’ve not heard any
such testimony because they haven’t been on the
stand. . . .[K.R. - Caroline’s oldest daughter] has not
been on the stand.” Judge Perkins added that there
was “no testimony that B.R. hurt or hit them.”
The daughter [A.R] who had run to her mother in
Michigan testified that two restraining orders had
been taken out in the past against her father
“because he hurt me.” Her testimony about these
incidents was brief and was punctuated by frequent
interruptions by Judge .R. Perkins. A.R. was having
trouble remembering details about each incident,
leading Judge Perkins to cut off questioning about
these incidents because A.R. had “provided the
answers she has available by her own recall.”
The Appeals Court ruled that it was wrong for Judge
Perkins to rule that evidence of earlier abuse was
irrelevant because there was no requirement that
evidence of abuse had to be recent. The Appeals
Court said Caroline had a reasonable basis to
believe her child needed protection. As to the
evidence of abuse the police said was unfounded,
the Appeals Court said it was not a good reason for
excluding it because “the jury could have believed
it.” Similarly, Judge Perkins was wrong to assume
that because the social workers had rejected
Caroline’s accusations of abuse there was no
foundation for her affirmative defense. While the
social worker’s opinions may have been permissible
evidence, the ultimate question of whether
Caroline’s belief that she needed to protect her child
“was a jury question.” The Appeals Court concluded
that Judge Perkins did not act impartially and had
denied Caroline the right to present a complete
defense. The Appeals Court said: “several of [Judge
Perkins] comments made while raising or
sustaining objections appeared to attack
[Caroline’s] credibility, her evidence, or her theory of
the case.” The Appeals Court went on to say Judge
Perkins may not “reflect upon the character of the
witness for truthfulness, or suggest that his
testimony was untrue or unworthy of belief.”
What did Caroline “win”?
The Appeals Curt reversed the convictions of
Caroline by Judge Perkins and said she could have
a new trial – before the same biased judge, with the
same unprincipled prosecutor, Peter Ivy, in the same
court. And Carolyn will have to try the case herself
again unless she can come up with tens of
thousands of dollars to pay a lawyer and persuade
the lawyer to risk his/her career by going before a
biased judge who is determined to destroy Caroline.
The truth is that Caroline is a broken woman. Her
family was destroyed, her oldest daughter is
dependant on her ex-husband, one of her sons is
believed to be on drugs and the other son is
pursuing a professional hockey career instead of
going to college. The sons are being trained to be
abusers like their father. Her daughter A.R. is a sad,
thin, depressed girl now about 16 years old who is
not allowed to have any contact with Caroline. Only
L.R. is succeeding and she is totally alienated from
her father. She is the one who turned down a
scholarship to attend West Point because she would
not serve a country that had treated her family so
shabbily. The probability is that prosecutor Ivy will
not try the case again, Caroline will not or cannot
defend it, and the matter will be left unresolved.
Caroline will not get justice. Four of her children will
become damaged members of society.
Written by Dale Nathan
651-454-0506
DaleNathan@usfamily.net
Rice Appeal decision is public record obtainable online. A link will be posted shortly.

Wednesday, May 22, 2013

Paluchii Trust_May6th2013 Minnesota Court

http://www.leagle.com/xmlResult.aspx?page=2&xmldoc=In MNCO 20130506184.xml&docbase=CSLWAR3-2007-CURR&SizeDisp=7


IN THE MATTER OF JENO F. PAULUCCI REVOCABLE TRUSTCourt of Appeals of Minnesota.
Filed May 6, 2013.


Jeno and Lois were residents of Florida, but in October 2011, Jeno was hospitalized in Duluth. On October 8, while hospitalized, Jeno executed the Thirteenth Complete Amendment to the Jeno Revocable Trust. This amendment replaced two Minnesota trustees, attorneys William Berens and George Eck, with two Florida trustees, respondents Larry Nelson, who worked with Jeno for a number of years, and David Simmons, a trial attorney and state senator. On October 10, Lois executed the Tenth Complete Amendment to the Lois Revocable Trust, which likewise replaced trustees Berens and Eck with Nelson and Simmons.
Lois died on November 20, 2011, and Jeno died on November 24, 2011. Trustee Nelson is the personal representative of Jeno's and Lois's probate estates and both wills have been admitted to probate in a Florida circuit court. Lois's will, which is governed by Florida law, provides that the residue of her estate is to be given to the trustee of the Lois Revocable Trust.
In March 2012, Gina petitioned the St. Louis County district court for, among other relief, the non-cause removal of trustees Nelson and Simmons of the Jeno Revocable Trust, to be replaced by former trustees Berens and Eck. Gina venued this petition in St. Louis County under Minn. Stat. § 501B.17, subd. 1(3) (2012),1 because the trust holds real property in St. Louis County. Later in March, Michael and Cynthia filed a notice of appearance in the St. Louis County action. On March 30, trustees Nelson and Simmons filed a memorandum objecting to the removal petition based on lack of jurisdiction (then under the mistaken belief that the trust held no real property in Minnesota) and on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The district court scheduled a hearing on the matter for April 3, 2012.
Meanwhile, in early February 2012, Berens and Eck, as trustees of the Trust FBO Lois, petitioned the Hennepin County district court for instructions regarding the disposition of that trust's assets and proposed an alternate disposition of the assets, alleging that Lois had intentionally exceeded her limited testamentary powers of appointment and subjected the trust assets to debts, expenses, and taxes. In late February 2012, Gina also petitioned the Hennepin County district court for, among other things, the non-cause removal of Nelson and Simmons as trustees of the Lois Revocable Trust, to be replaced by Berens and Eck. Gina venued the petition in Hennepin County district court under Minn. Stat. § 501B.17, subd. 2 (2012), which provides that when there have been prior trust proceedings—here, the Trust FBO Lois petition—a petition must be filed in the same court.
The St. Louis County district court, which was aware of the Hennepin County proceedings, conducted the April 3 hearing to address Gina's petition for the removal of Nelson and Simmons as trustees of the Jeno Revocable Trust and the trustees' objections to their removal, which they based on jurisdictional and forum-non-conveniens grounds. Michael and Cynthia appeared at the hearing as interested parties because they are beneficiaries, and, at the hearing, Gina filed joinders of the beneficiaries, including Michael and Cynthia, in her petition. The court advised the parties that it had contacted the Hennepin County district court to address its concern that the two courts might issue conflicting orders. At the close of the hearing, the court permitted Gina, as well as Michael and Cynthia, to file written replies to the objections by trustees Nelson and Simmons, and they did so, addressing both the merits of Gina's removal petition and the jurisdictional and forum-non-conveniens objections raised by trustees Nelson and Simmons.
After the April hearing, the St. Louis County district court informally stayed the proceedings while some or all of the parties unsuccessfully attempted to mediate their disputes. The court then gave counsel until July 18 to file responsive pleadings. On July 13, 2012, Michael and Cynthia petitioned the St. Louis County district court, in relevant part, for a determination that the thirteenth amendment to the Jeno Revocable Trust was void based on incapacity and undue influence by trustees Nelson and Simmons and to remove them as trustees, to be replaced by Berens and Eck. On July 16, the court scheduled Michael and Cynthia's petition for a September 2012 hearing. In a July 16 letter, the court advised the parties that whether this hearing took place depended on their review of the instant letter, informed them that the court believed counsel wanted a determination of whether Minnesota or Florida had jurisdiction over the matter, and told them to inform the court immediately if this was in error. Gina submitted a supplemental brief on July 18, but Michael and Cynthia filed nothing further with the court. The court then allowed trustees Nelson and Simmons until July 26 to file a reply to Gina's supplemental brief, and they did so.
In an August 1, 2012, order, the St. Louis County district court concluded, "Florida is the proper jurisdiction and venue to hear all matters pertaining to the Thirteenth Complete Amendment to the Trust Agreement of Jeno F. Paulucci," and dismissed the action without prejudice. And the court ruled that any pending petitions would not be considered, which we construe as dismissals without prejudice of those petitions. The court also denied appellant and co-appellants permission to move for reconsideration.

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