Facebook Badge

Wednesday, May 21, 2008

Unpublished PHA v. Deanna-Drug Addict Disability

Tuesday, May 13, 2008

Saint Paul/ RICO Update Plaintiffs Objections To Magistrate's Order Of April 23, 2008 And Amended Order Of May 8, 2008.

Please click onto the COMMENTS for the motion. (New here? Read the RICO lawsuits against the City of Saint Paul located to the right of the screen under the Scale of Justice)

This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2006).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A07-1199

Public Housing Agency of the City of Saint Paul, Appellant, vs. Deanna Ewig, Respondent.

Filed May 20, 2008

Reversed and remanded

Willis, Judge

Ramsey County District Court

File No. C1-07-2573

John J. Choi, St. Paul City Attorney, Michael F. Driscoll, Assistant City Attorney, 400 City Hall and Courthouse, 15 West Kellogg Boulevard, St. Paul, MN 55102 (for appellant)

JaPaul J. Harris, Southern Minnesota Regional Legal Services, Inc., 166 East Fourth Street, Suite 200, St. Paul, MN 55101; and Michael Hagedorn, Southern Minnesota Regional Legal Services, Inc., 450 North Syndicate Street, Suite 285, St. Paul, MN 55104 (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Shumaker, Presiding Judge; Willis, Judge; and Peterson, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

WILLIS, Judge

In this eviction action, appellant housing agency challenges a district-court order denying a writ of restitution. We reverse and remand

Appellant Public Housing Agency of the City of Saint Paul (PHA) brought this action after learning that one of its tenants, respondent Deanna Ewig, smoked crack cocaine and allowed guests to smoke crack cocaine in her apartment. PHA alleged that these actions constitute "a serious violation" of the terms of Ewig’s lease and sought to have Ewig evicted. The district court dismissed the action, concluding that, because Ewig is addicted to cocaine, she is disabled under the federal Fair Housing Act and thus is entitled to a reasonable accommodation, which PHA failed to provide, rendering PHA’s attempt to evict Ewig discriminatory. This appeal follows.

D E C I S I O N

On review of a district-court order in an eviction action, we defer to the district court’s findings of fact, and those findings will be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous. See Minneapolis Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Smallwood, 379 N.W.2d 554, 555 (Minn. App. 1985) (discussing the standard of review in an unlawful-detainer action, now replaced by an eviction action), review denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 1986). But we do not defer to the district court on a purely legal issue. Frost-Benco Elec. Ass’n v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 358 N.W.2d 639, 642 (Minn. 1984).

An eviction action is a summary proceeding to determine the present possessory rights to property. See Minn. Stat. § 504B.001, subd. 4 (2006). A landlord is entitled to recover possession by eviction when a tenant holds over "contrary to the conditions or covenants of the lease." Minn. Stat

verdict requires that the district court find only whether "the facts alleged in the complaint are true." Minn. Stat. § 504B.355 (2006). Applying this standard, the supreme court has stated that "[u]nder the trial court’s limited scope of review in unlawful detainer actions, the court was bound to determine only whether [tenant’s] son engaged in . . . criminal activity and thus whether the lease was broken." Minneapolis Pub. Hous. Auth. v. Lor, 591 N.W.2d 700, 704 (Minn. 1999).

Ewig’s lease provides in part that she shall not allow her guests "to engage in any criminal activity, including drug-related criminal activity." PHA’s complaint alleges that Ewig violated this provision by allowing guests to smoke crack cocaine in her apartment. The district court "was bound to determine" whether this allegation is true and thus whether Ewig violated the lease. See Lor, 591 N.W.2d at 704. The district court failed to do so.

Ewig’s lease also provides in part that Ewig shall not "engage in . . . any criminal activity, including drug-related criminal activity." PHA’s complaint alleges that Ewig violated this provision by smoking crack cocaine in her apartment. At the hearing, Ewig admitted that she had done so on at least two occasions. Despite this admission, the district court did not enter a specific finding regarding the truth of PHA’s allegation that Ewig had smoked crack cocaine in her apartment. Instead, the district court concluded that, because Ewig is addicted to cocaine, she "has a disability" under the federal Fair Housing Act; that she is entitled to a reasonable accommodation of that disability; and that PHA’s decision to evict her was discriminatory. We disagree

The federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2006), prohibits discrimination against any person in the rental of a dwelling "because of a handicap1 of that [person]." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2)(A). Courts have held that recovering drug addicts are handicapped under the act. E.g., United States v. Southern Mgmt. Corp., 955 F.2d 914, 919 (4th Cir. 1992). But the act’s definition of "handicap" contains an exception specifically providing that "such term does not include current, illegal use of . . . a controlled substance." 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h). Ewig argues that she is not excluded under this provision because her relapse does not constitute "current" illegal use of a controlled substance. We interpret the words of the provision "in accord with [their] ordinary or natural meaning." Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228, 113 S. Ct. 2050, 2054 (1993). "Current" means "[b]elonging to the present time." The American Heritage Dictionary 446 (4th ed. 2000). Thus, drug use that is "reasonably contemporaneous with the alleged incidents of discrimination" is excluded from protection under the act. Fowler v. Borough of Westville, 97 F. Supp. 2d 602, 609 (D.N.J. 2000). Here, Ewig’s alleged use of crack cocaine occurred two weeks before PHA sought to evict her. Because Ewig’s drug use was reasonably contemporaneous with PHA’s decision to evict her, and was in fact a cause of that decision, she is not "handicapped" under the act.

1 The district court consistently refers to Ewig’s condition as a "disability" under the Fair Housing Act, but the Fair Housing Act uses the term "handicap," not disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h).

Our interpretation of the act is also consistent with the principle that statutes should not be interpreted to produce absurd results. See Rowley v. Yarnall, 22 F.3d 190, 192 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that interpretations of statutes that produce absurd results are

to be avoided). The district court concluded that Ewig was entitled to a reasonable accommodation that essentially excused her illegal drug use. Interpreting a federal anti-discrimination law to excuse illegal drug use produces an absurd result. The act’s definition of handicap "[wa]s not intended to be used to condone or protect illegal activity." Southern Mgmt., 955 F.2d at 921 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 100-711 (1988) (reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2183)).

Finally, Ewig argues that she is handicapped because, in addition to her cocaine addiction, she has been diagnosed with minor depression and anxiety disorder. But these diagnoses were not the cause of her eviction. She was evicted for using illegal drugs and allowing others to use illegal drugs in her apartment. The federal Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination "because of" a handicap. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2)(A). Even if Ewig’s minor depression and anxiety diagnoses are handicaps under the act, they were not the cause of her eviction.

Because the district court failed to enter specific findings regarding the truth of PHA’s allegations and misapplied the relevant federal housing law, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and

Saturday, May 17, 2008

City of Morris v. Sax Invest-A06-1188-MS16B.62,sub(1)2006

Supreme Court Opinions
http://www.mncourts.gov/opinions/sc/current/OPA061188-0515.pdf

A06-1188 City of Morris, Respondent, vs. Sax Investments, Inc., Appellant.
Court of Appeals.
1. When the express language of a state statute defines the scope of permissible municipal regulations, we determine the validity of municipal regulations on the same subject by applying the plain language of the statute.
2. Under Minn. Stat. § 16B.62, subd. 1 (2006), a municipal rental licensing ordinance regulating components or systems of a residential structure covered by the State Building Code is invalid where the municipal ordinance imposes different requirements than the State Building Code.
3. Inspection standards in a municipal rental licensing ordinance regulating ground fault interrupter receptacles, bathroom ventilation, and egress window covers are invalid under Minn. Stat. § 16B.62, subd. 1, because the inspection standards are building code provisions regulating components or systems of a residential structure and are different from provisions in the State Building Code.
4. The authority of municipalities to enact and enforce habitability standards for rental housing is constrained by the prohibition on municipal regulation of building code provisions in Minn. Stat. § 16B.62, subd. 1.
5. We will not consider issues arising out of allegedly dangerous conditions in a residential structure that were not previously raised or were not previously charged.
Reversed and remanded. Justice Lorie S. Gildea.
Dissenting, Justice Paul H. Anderson.
Took no part, Justice Christopher J. Dietzen.

STATE OF MINNESOTA 1 of 25

IN SUPREME COURT

A06-1188

Court of Appeals Gildea, J.

Dissenting, Anderson, Paul H., J.

Took no part, Dietzen, J.

City of Morris,

Respondent,

vs. Filed: May 15, 2008

Office of Appellate Courts

Sax Investments, Inc.,

Appellant.

S Y L L A B U S

1. When the express language of a state statute defines the scope of permissible municipal regulations, we determine the validity of municipal regulations on the same subject by applying the plain language of the statute.

2. Under Minn. Stat. § 16B.62, subd. 1 (2006), a municipal rental licensing ordinance regulating components or systems of a residential structure covered by the State Building Code is invalid where the municipal ordinance imposes different requirements than the State Building Code.

3. Inspection standards in a municipal rental licensing ordinance regulating ground fault interrupter receptacles, bathroom ventilation, and egress window covers are invalid under Minn. Stat. § 16B.62, subd. 1, because the inspection standards are building

Sunday, May 11, 2008

Alice Krengel Published


A07-645 Evelyn I. Rechtzigel Trust, by its Trustees Frank Rechtzigel
and Gene Rechtzigel, Appellant, vs. Fidelity National Title
Insurance Company of New York, Respondent; Pulte Title
Agency of Minnesota, LLC, Respondent.
Dakota County District Court, Hon. Richard G. Spicer.
1. Unless claims are asserted that threaten the marketability of title or other risks specified in the policy, title insurance does not cover monetary losses incurred by the insured arising out of the bankruptcy of a qualified intermediary in a 26 U.S.C. § 1031 like-kind exchange.
2. If a bankruptcy trustee's preference action against an insured does not implicate the marketability of title to real property or other risks specified in the title insurance policy, the title insurer has no duty to defend under a title insurance policy.
Affirmed. Judge David Minge.




A07-310 City of West St. Paul, Respondent, vs. Alice Jane Krengel,
Appellant.
Dakota Co
http://www.mncourts.gov/opinions/coa/current/opa070310-0506.pdfunty District Court, Hon. Leslie May Metzen.
1. A district court may not issue a permanent injunction to abate a public nuisance pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 617.83 (2006) unless the public nuisance exists at the time of the hearing on the request for the permanent injunction.
2. A public nuisance exists for purposes of Minn. Stat. § 617.83 (2006) if two or more incidents of statutorily defined nuisance activity have occurred within the 12-month period preceding the hearing on the request for the permanent injunction.
Vacated; motion denied. Judge Matthew E. Johnson.
Dissenting, Judge Gary L. Crippen.
*

SharonsSearch

Law.com Newswire